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As systems have become increasingly complex, engineers are relying on reuse of
components and subsystems as a method to curb complexity. However, integrating these
reuse components and subsystems have historically often resulted in catastrophic failures.
Technical principles key to integration success and the role of reuse in these principles
are not currently defined. The objective of this research is to, first, derive and validate a
set of technical integration principles and subsequently to explore how incorporating
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conclusions from the historical data. Qualitative analysis techniques including case-study
analysis, root-cause analysis, and thematic analysis are used to find common themes in
the data to build data sets. These data sets are then quantitatively analyzed to determine
what variables are associated with integration success. The results of this research
identified six candidate principles of integration. The Principles of Hierarchy, Hierarchic
Verification, Insight, and Optimization were all found to be statistically associated to
integration success. The Principles of Reuse and Evolvability and Dependence were
found to be not associated with integration success, however, the interactions between the
Principle of Reuse and Evolvability and the Principles of Insight, Optimization, and
Hierarchic Verification. These interactions were characterized and based on the
historical integration data. Two of the manifestations of the Reuse/Hierarchic
Verification and two of the manifestations of the Reuse/Insight interactions were found to
be associated with integration success. The Optimization/Reuse manifestation was not
found to be associated with integration success. The associated manifestations were used
to formulate a set of secondary considerations that, when implemented in conjunction
with reuse, will increase the probability of integration success in future integration
efforts.
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction

Throughout the history of flight, from the Wright brothers to the first man on the
moon, humanity has sought to push the limits of aerospace technology. Over the past fifty
years, technology has progressed at an unprecedented rate encompassing computational
technology, technology miniaturization, software development and material science.
This progression has spurred increased mission objectives and complexity, resulting in
more complex aerospace systems required to meet these objectives. Herbert Simon
defines a complex system in the “Architecture of Complexity” as a system made up of a
large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way [1]. Larger systems with more
internal interactions, data flow, and embedded software has complicated the efforts of
systems engineering professionals, especially system integrators.
1.1 Complex Systems Integration
As system complexity rises, problems encountered in systems integration continue to
plague complex engineered systems (CES) development. In 2018, the US Government
Accountability Office attributed National Astronautics and Space Administration’s
(NASA) James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) schedule delays and cost escalation to
systems integration difficulties:
“The delay—from October 2018 to a launch window between March and June
2019—was primarily caused by components of JWST’s spacecraft taking longer
to integrate than planned.” [2]
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Silva et.al. characterized the magnitude of these effects by pointing out that the
cost to find problems during integration and testing can be up to 100 times more
expensive than finding and correcting problems during the design and definition phases
[3]. It is no mystery why identifying a few problems during the integration phase can put
a program in jeopardy. Even successful integration phases consume a significant portion
of program resources and time. For space systems, the cost of integration and testing
account for approximately fifteen percent of the total project while, on average, taking up
approximately twenty-five percent of total project execution time [4, 5]. In some
components and subsystems, integration and testing can take an even larger percentage of
program resources. For example a Rocketdyne paper identified seventy percent of the
cost of the F-1 and J-2 engine development is due to the iterative test, analyze, and fix
cycle of the component and engine development program [6]. These effects are not
limited to aerospace systems. International Business Machines (IBM) observed that
“debugging, testing, and verification can easily range from fifty to seventy-five percent of
the total development cost” of a commercially developed program [7].
1.2 The Rise of Reuse
As cost and schedules associated with these complex systems have ballooned,
development programs have begun to leverage component and subsystem design reuse as
a method reduce integration complexity. For example, NASA Deputy Administrator
George M. Lows championed the reduction of cost for space flight missions by
developing standardized parts “each with a goal of low cost and high reliability” [8].
With the rise of commercial companies such as Space Exploration Technologies
Corporation (SpaceX), Blue Origin, and United Launch Alliance (ULA), the reuse of
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larger and larger subsystems is increasing.

For example, SpaceX reuses the entire first

stage of their rockets and ULA is planning to reuse the engines from their first stage of
the new Vulcan launch system [9]. With the demonstrated success of both government
and commercial ventures embracing reuse, there is no indication this trend towards reuse
will slow down in the future.
Although integrating reuse components into a complex system has shown clear
benefits in reducing cost and schedule in the past, there have been numerous failures
associated with reuse components. One example from Europe, the ARIANE-V, failed
because of reused software carried over from its predecessor, the ARIANE-IV [10]. In
an eerily similar failure from the U.S., the Delta 3 rocket experienced a failure due to
software taken from the Delta 2 rocket [11]. These failures are not reserved for software,
however. In the case of the Roma Airship, the engineers replaced the relatively new and
unknown Italian Ansaldo engines with the well-known American-made Liberty engines
[12]. This decision resulted in a catastrophic failure resulting in the loss of human life.
It is unclear what predicates failures or success of reuse components or
subsystems in complex engineered systems. Very little research currently exists
exploring the effects of reuse components or subsystems into complex systems. Most of
the available research focuses on software reuse, leaving hardware and system reuse as a
gap in the body of knowledge. However, to focus on the effects of reuse with regards to
complex systems integration, one must first understand complex systems integration.
While integration plays an important role in the success or failure or a system, it is
currently governed by the principles of systems engineering and the sister discipline of
system architecture. It is intuitive that governing principles of system integration would
16

be closely related to the principles of its parent discipline of Systems Engineering and
sister discipline of Engineering Architecture. However, these various guidelines have not
been analyzed to distill a relevant set of integration principles that can be used as a formal
guide to system integration practice by system integrators. This set of integration
principles would be particularly beneficial to system integrators in industry. In particular,
for CES development, teams typically work independently within Systems Engineering
product teams from sister disciplines, such as system architecture teams, and thus it
would be beneficial to identify the governing principles for systems integration. The
purpose of this research is to identify and validate a set of system integration principles
and evaluate how incorporating reuse into a complex aerospace system can affect, both
positively and negatively, the integration effort and operation.
1.3 Structure of Research
As discussed, this research will be comprised of two major efforts: to identify and
validate a set of technical integration principles and, secondly, to identify how reuse of
component and subsystem designs impact integration success. The effort to define and
validate a set of complex integration principles will seek to answer two research
questions:
RQ1: What are the key technical factors that contribute to integration success or
integration failures?
RQ2: In what circumstances is reuse one of these factors?
By defining and validating these principles of integration, the foundation is set for
a deeper study into the effects of reuse on system integration success. This allows for a
targeted study on systems that failed due to reuse. The historical system case studies will
17

be subjected to a root-cause analysis study. This root-cause analysis will effectively
answer a third research question and identify if the reuse is, in fact, a significant
contributor to system integration in the historical system data.
RQ3: What are the common technical root causes stemming from reuse that
result in integration issues of complex systems?
A follow up study is then conducted to define how the negative effects of reuse
manifest in the historical systems. These manifestations will then be evaluated to
determine which manifestations are associated with integration success. The results of
this study will answer a fourth research question:
RQ4: What are the contributing factors stemming from reuse that led to system
success or failure?
This ultimately leads to a fifth and final research question that must be answered
to avoid making the same mistakes in the future:
RQ5: How can these factors be avoided in future complex systems development?
To answer RQ5, the associated manifestations of reuse-implicated failures will be used to
formulate a set of secondary considerations for integrating reuse components and
subsystems in complex systems. Utilizing these considerations, future integrators will be
able to avoid mistakes of the past and increase the probability of success of integration.
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CHAPTER 2. Literature Review

To evaluate the factors that predicate success or failure in the integration of reuse
components and subsystems, one must understand the factors that affect the success of
complex systems integration. A complex system is a dynamic system that contains both
software and hardware subsystems and components integrated to perform a unique task.
Therefore, complexity represents a measure of the quantity and complications related to
the interactions between the components and subsystems of a given complex system.
Langford identified a set of integration principles supporting a General Theory of
Systems Integration: The Principles of Alignment, Partitioning, Induction, Limitation,
Forethought, Planning, and Loss [13]. However, these principles are more programmatic
in nature than technical. For instance, the Principle of Alignment recommends alignment
of strategies for the business enterprise, the key stakeholders, and the project. This leaves
a gap in the body of knowledge with regard to a set of technical integration principles and
identifies two key research question that must be addressed:
RQ1: What are the key technical factors that contribute to integration success or
integration failures?
RQ2: In what circumstances is reuse one of these factors?
To enable the identification potential candidate principles of complex systems
integration, several seminal works were reviewed: “The Architecture of Complexity” by
Herbert Simon, “Complexity as Thermodynamic Depth” by Seth Lloyd, and “General
Systems Theory: Foundations, Developments, Applications” by Ludwig Von Bertalanffy
and John W. Sutherland [1, 14, 15]. Although these seminal works are not closely tied
19

and are logically independent from one another, they all represent key aspects of complex
systems integration. The seminal works were studied to identify, not only each work’s
strongest individual contributions to the body of knowledge, but also points of
commonality between the works. These contributions and points of commonality were
identified as integration principle candidates that needed to be vetted out by further
literature reviews. The candidates identified through the full literature review are as
follows:
1. The Principle of Hierarchy
2. The Principle of Hierarchic Verification
3. The Principle of Reuse and Evolvability
4. The Principle of Insight
5. The Principle of Optimization
6. The Principle of Dependence
The need to further vet out these candidate principles necessitated a multi-faceted
literature review branching from the three seminal papers to further define, evaluate, and
ground the candidate principles in academic and industry literature. This literature
review encompassed many fields, including systems engineering, military engineering,
industrial engineering, decision theory, and biology. If the core contributions and mesh
points of the seminal paper review were considered the backbone of the candidate
principles, the findings of this review could be considered the meat on the bones. The
findings in these two literature reviews were synthesized, where the results of former
review identifies the core concept of the candidate principles, while the latter review
augments this data to form clear definitions and key relational concepts of the candidate
20

principles of integration. The results of this exercise will be laid out in the following
sections on a principle-by-principle basis.
2.1 The Principle of Hierarchy
The Principle of Hierarchy recommends architecting a complex system with
fixed, stable intermediate subsystems. This principle embodies the crux of Simon’s work
“The Architecture of Complexity” [1]. Simon introduces the concepts of Hierarchical
Architecture and Near Decomposability. Academic literature expounds on these
concepts. One trademark of a hierarchical architecture is the ability to be decomposed
into subsystems to manage the complexity of integration and verification [16, 17, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22]. Another aspect of Hierarchical systems are that they are isolable, or have
well defined interfaces between modules in order to isolate the effects of changes in the
system and facilitating the testing at the level of unit/system [3, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27].
These characteristics help reduce the resources needed to develop and integrate a system
by allowing parallel work and ensure stable intermediate points that effectively allow the
designers and integrators to “save their work” [3, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 28]. Utilizing the
characteristics above, Hierarchy can be defined as decomposing a very complex system
into smaller stable subsystems and components to make the development process easier
to digest and the interactions between components easier to understand [1, 3, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32].
For a large system such as airplane or a rocket, this provides a roadmap for development
and integration efforts by distilling the system down into manageable segments. These
intermediate subsystems should be able to be stand-alone verifiable systems with fixed
interfaces and environments.
21

Lloyd defines complexity in “Complexity as Thermodynamic Depth” as the
number of trajectories that can be taken from the starting ingredients of a system to the
final form [14]. Architecting a system with fixed intermediate subsystems as Simon
suggests would constrain the trajectories at the states of the given subsystems and
therefore reduce the complexity of the system as a whole. Humanity tends to gravitate
toward this way of problem solving as a way of managing complexity. For example,
when building a house a person would probably begin by laying out pouring the
foundation. Then they would frame the house, install plumbing, then electrical, then
drywall and trim. No one would begin from the front of the house and pour concrete and
frame, run wire, and pipe, and install drywall all at the same time as they progress from
the front to the back. Progressing sequentially as opposed to simultaneously ensures that
if you did not frame the house properly, you would not have to tear out electrical,
plumbing, and drywall to fix it. This principle is key into managing the complexity of a
project.
Another critical contribution to the Principle of Hierarchy was Bertalanffy’s
“General Systems Theory” [15]. Bertallanfy asserts that all systems are functionally
hierarchical in addition to physical or structural hierarchy. This functional hierarchy is
defined as the flow and order of processes in a complex system. He states that in some
cases the physical hierarchy (order of parts) and the functional hierarchy (order of
processes) may be the same. Bertalanffy outlines the importance of looking for
functional hierarchy in systems as well as physical hierarchy. This allows for two
different dimensions of hierarchy that can be leveraged based on the individual
characteristics of the system being designed. For example, if requirements constrain the
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packaging of a system so that it is not easily separated into physically separable, isolable,
subsystems, the designers and indicators can separate this system into functionally
separable isolable subsystems. Let us consider, for example, a simple television remote
control. Due to the compact size, the object is largely comprised of one circuit board,
one IR transmitter, a series of buttons, a set of batteries, and a housing. Therefore, the
physical hierarchy breakdown of the remote control is very limited and can only progress
down to the component level of the circuit board. It would be very difficult to separate
these components into isolable, semi-autonomous physical hierarchies due to the compact
nature and shared components. However, this same remote control has many functions:
it can control the channel, the volume of the television, open settings, navigate through
the screen, and magnify portions of the screen, among many others. Each one of these
commands, though they may share some aspects, have a unique function path through the
components on the circuit board. Therefore, while the remote is very limited based on
the physical hierarchy, it can be further broken down based on the functional hierarchy.
For example, the top-level functionality of volume control consists of sub-functions of
volume up, volume down, and mute, all of which can be further broken down by the
functions of the components that share the function path. Kossiakoff similarly asserts that
all systems are hierarchical by nature [32].
Hierarchy is closely related to the concept of system modularity. [21, 23, 26, 30,
32] Three main features characterize system modularity: (a) modules are separable from
the rest of the product; (b) modules are isolable as self-contained semiautonomous
elements; and (c) modules can be recombined with other modules [17, 19, 22, 23, 30].
The requirement for the element to be self-contained and semiautonomous means that
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these systems must be contained within defined interfaces and be operable to a degree
without influence or input from another module. The concept of modularity is a key
enabler of many of the following principles, such as the Principle of Hierarchic
Verification and, therefore, warrants an introduction here. System modularity is also
related to other integration principles and will subsequently be discussed in those
respective contexts.
Kossiakoff identifies a common taxonomy for the various decomposition levels in
a hierarchical system [32]. The first level of decomposition is made up of subsystems, or
subassemblies. He calls the next level of decomposition components and the following
level subcomponents. He also notes that multiple systems can be combined to make
super systems, or a system of systems. This taxonomy will be adopted for this study. It
should be noted that there is no limit to how many levels a system can be decomposed.
For this work, a system will be considered the top-level of integration and a component
or part will be considered the lowest level of integration. Multiple levels of subsystems
or subassemblies can reside between these two boundaries depending on how a system is
composed. These levels will be differentiated numerically, i.e. subsystem level 2 and
subsystem level 3.
The Principle of Hierarchy serves as a foundation for the other principles. A
visual example of the Principle of Hierarchy is shown in Figure 2-1.
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Figure 2-1: The Principle of Hierarchy - Architecture Visualization

2.2 The Principle of Hierarchic Verification
The literature review highlighted the importance of verifying the intermediate
subsystems generated by using a hierarchical architecture. Verification is the process of
proving that a system meets a set of requirements and/or functions through test, analysis,
demonstration, or inspection. Therefore, each of these methods were treated as a method
for verification. Therefore, this principle dictates the need to have a verification event,
whether it incorporates testing, analysis, inspection, demonstration, or some combination
of the three at every hierarchical level.
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For example, Moti highlighted the necessity of having a well-planned testing
campaign for successful integration [34]. Similarly, Silva highlighted an inadequate
testing philosophy and/or poor testing philosophy to be a source of system integration
failure [3]. Bahill stresses the need to develop iteratively and test immediately, testing
the small components as they are integrated [26]. This characteristic defines the
Principle of Hierarchic Verification as: each intermediate assembly should have been
verified before progressing to the next level of integration [3, 22, 26, 35]. Verification of
these intermediate assemblies was often completed by testing to ensure that the assembly
functions as expected/designed. Simon illustrates this concept in a watch parable as
follows:
There once were two watchmakers, named Hora and Tempus, who
manufactured very fine watches. ... The watches the men made consisted of about
1,000 parts each. Tempus had so constructed his that if he had one partly
assembled and had to put it down-to answer the phone say-it immediately fell to
pieces and had to be reassembled from the elements. ... The watches that Hora
made were no less complex than those of Tempus. But he had designed them so
that he could put together subassemblies of about ten elements each. Ten of these
subassemblies, again, could be put together into a larger subassembly; and a
system of ten of the latter subassemblies constituted the whole watch. Hence,
when Hora had to put down a partly assembled watch in order to answer the
phone, he lost only a small part of his work, and he assembled his watches in only
a fraction of the man-hours it took Tempus. [1]
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In Simon’s watch parable Hora was more successful than Tempus as he designed
his watches to be put together as subassemblies and as he was interrupted, he could start
back at the last subassembly integration level instead of starting over [1]. This rings true
not just for interruptions, but if integrators run into system issues as well if they verify all
subassemblies prior to integration. This parable relies on the assumption that both
craftsmen are masters and make no mistakes and there only detriment is the interruption
of the customers’ calls due to the fact they have made thousands of watches. Many
systems, however, are only made once and we cannot rely on historical experience or a
recipe for integration. If this parable is extended to include product defects, the
difference between Hora and Tempus increase exponentially. Tempus would not be able
to detect defects until the watches were fully integrated and upon seeing the defects he
could not isolate the problem and the watch would have to be taken apart and analyzed
piece by piece. Conversely, Hora would be able to test each subassembly for
functionality and if defects were found the subassembly could be broken down and
organized. For each defect, Hora would have to analyze ten parts compared to Tempus
analyzing 1000 and additionally Hora be able to maintain the state of the other
subassemblies. This extension of the parable outlines the importance of The Principle of
Hierarchic Verification.
The definition of system modularity introduced in the Principle of Hierarchy
section is consistent with the Principle of Hierarchic Verification. By decomposing the
system into self-contained, semi-autonomous elements as prescribed by the Principle of
Hierarchy, a clear roadmap for integration results which follows the Principle of
Hierarchic Verification. Verifying in this structure will allow the leveraging of
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modularity to effectively verify a range of granularities, or levels of decomposition, for a
given system. By verifying at every level as prescribed in the Principle of Hierarchic
Verification, the interactions between modules can be identified and understood before
integration progresses to the next level. A visualization of The Principle of Hierarchic
Verification is shown in Figure 2-2.

Figure 2-2: The Principle of Hierarchic Verification - Architecture Visualization

This principle is very easy to visualize. The yellow stars represent the verification
events in the integration timeline. Notice that a verification event occurs for all
components, all subsystems after their integration, and the system after final integration.
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This allows for integration failures to be detected and fixed at the lowest possible fidelity
of the system.
2.3 The Principle of Reuse and Evolvability
The Principle of Reuse and Evolvability advocates for the reuse of previously
developed components and subsystems or using components or subsystem that can be
acquired through other means than development. A component or system is considered
“reuse” if the program in discussion did not have to go through a full development
process to define and build the component [36]. Lloyd repeatedly states throughout his
work that copies of systems and components do not constitute a doubling of the
complexity [14]. Simon defines human problem solving as a form of means-end analysis
that aims at discovering a process description of the path that leads to a desired goal;
otherwise, given a blueprint, find the corresponding recipe [1]. Integration is merely a
problem as described by Simon and the integration process is the sought after recipe.
Leaning on Simon’s example, we can understand the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability
in terms of cooking. Given the ingredients to bake a cake, people will instinctively seek
out a recipe to reduce the complexity of the task at hand. The Principle of Reuse and
Evolvability is merely stating that if an appropriate subsystem or component exists, use it
because the recipe for said system has already been defined. Academic literature outlines
several benefits to the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability. For example, reuse
components can greatly reduce the resource cost and increase reliability [24, 26].
Further, using these components can reduce the system complexity [3, 24, 26]. These
characteristics support Simon’s assertion that when the recipe can be reused, the
complexity of the system only increases a small amount as opposed to the process of
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developing a new component [3, 21, 24, 26, 36, 37]. A visualization of The Principle of
Reuse and Evolvability is shown in Figure 2-3 where the numbers are representative of
relative complexities.

Figure 2-3: The Principle of Reuse and Evolvability - Architecture Visualization

Let the aggregation of complexity be assumed to occur in a simple additive
manner with all component complexities be arbitrarily set to a uniform value of one and
no interaction complexities. The various colors at the four levels represent the various
components that make up the system. Note that the blue component is represented three
times. Let the first instance require a full complexity measure for development but the
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next two instances represent “reuse” with reduced complexities of 0.2. This reduces the
overall system complexity from 14 to 12.4.

2.4 The Principle of Insight
Academic literature identifies the need to maintain knowledge and information
transparency during system integration. Cabigiosu identifies the need for a firms’ need to
“know more than they do” to leverage modularity [23]. Another important concept is
information transparency between integrators and suppliers [21, 23, 24, 38, 39, 40].
Macduffie identifies a “competency trap” if firms outsource components and do not
retain the knowledge of how to make them [18, 22].

A competency trap represents

when a firm outsources the production of a component to the point that the firm no longer
retains the knowledge of how to make the component, which negatively impacts the
ability to perform systems engineering tasks, including integration. Therefore, firms and
teams need to “know more than they make”. Leveraging these aspects, The Principle of
Insight is defined as: top level integrator understanding the integration process down into
the lowest level [23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 32, 38, 39, 40]. Literature often calls this information
transparency [24]. Lloyd identifies the need for this understanding by stating that
information is always needed to specify a trajectory, which the system has followed to its
present state [14]. The trajectory discussed by Seth Lloyd represents the integration path,
or integration process, from the initial components to the final state of the product. This
trajectory can be sliced into several granularities, where the final state represents
everything from a lower-tier subsystem to the final complex system. Without this
information, the primary integrator has no information on the overall complexity of the
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system or how the interactions of complimentary subsystems that integrate together
might affect one another or even the system as a whole. This is potentially detrimental to
being able to efficiently locate and fix faults with the system. Without a full recipe of
how the system was integrated from the elementary elements any simple test finding
could result in many months or years of isolation testing and rework even in a
hierarchical system. A visualization of The Principle of Insight is represented by Figure
2-4.

Figure 2-4: The Principle of Insight - Architecture Visualization

Figure 2-4 depicts the integration of the Red Circle (Subsystem Level 2) and
examines two scenarios of differing integrator vision into the design process. The paleyellow triangle represents the integrators knowledge depth into the project. In scenario 1
on the left, the integrator has thorough Insight into the component level integration and
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can see the components making up the purple triangle must communicate with the
components making up the brown triangle and that these communications add complexity
to the system. These communications are represented by the green arrow. In scenario 2
the integrator does not have adequate Insight to the subassembly or component level
interactions. The missed interactions, represented by a red arrow cause the integrator to
have a false appraisal of the complexity of the system. The missed interactions are also
potential design escapes, inter-component dependencies, or emergent behaviors that
could create a negative impact that propagates through the entire system.
2.5 The Principle of Optimization
The Principle of Optimization advocates a reduction of the amount of information
transferred within and out of a system to what is necessary. Seth Lloyd states each
information transfer and each manipulation (multiplication, addition, etc.) on this
information is associated with a cost, or an increase in complexity [14]. The total cost of
the system then provides one indicator of the total complexity of the system. By reducing
the information flow within the system to the bare minimum, the overall cost and
therefore the complexity can be reduced. The concept of system modularity follows this
principle by allowing the integrators and architects of the system to have greater control
in the Optimization of information flow, among other interactions, throughout the system
[26].
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Figure 2-5: The Principle of Optimization - Architecture Visualization

Figure 2-5 depicts two alternative paths to integrate the Blue Circle Subsystem
Level 2. In Integration Path 1, the architecture of the system consisting of the red square
(component 4.8) and grey square (component 4.9) share data and the subassembly level 3
subsystems share data. Suppose this information between the red and grey components is
desirable but not necessary for system functionality. The added complexity for the
interactions is represented by the dashed arrows between the components. In Integration
Path 2 data sharing between the two components is bypassed, resulting in reduced
complexity in Integration Path 2. Revisiting the image of Integration Path 1, let it be
assumed that the information exchange between component 4.8 and component 4.9 is
necessary, but instead of taking place as a communication directly between two
components, the interchange can take place through subassembly 3.2 as shown in
Integration Path 2. The additional complexity of this interaction is negligible as
information interfaces are already established within subassembly 3.2 with each
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component and no additional processing is required. This visualization shows that by
reducing the unnecessary information path or by utilizing established interfaces to pass
information when available, the final integration complexity effort will be reduced by 1,
or approximately 10% of the total complexity, in Integration Path 2. Note that the
beginning complexity of 1 was chosen to easily portray the concept of complexity and the
exponential growth of complexity as a system is integrated at higher levels. This
placeholder can be representative of interfaces, integral components, requirements levied
against the component, or any other measure of complexity. The concepts of these
principles are intended to be applicable to complex systems of all levels of complexity,
from smaller systems like satellites and explorers to much larger systems such as the
international space station.
2.6 The Principle of Dependence
The Principle of Dependence dictates that the chosen size of the intermediate
subsystems is very important to the success of the integration effort as a whole. Simon
used empire building (Alexander the Great in particular) to conceptualize this principle
[1]:
We have not exhausted the categories of complex systems to which
the watchmaker argument can reasonably be applied. Philip assembled his
Macedonian empire and gave it to his son, to be later combined with the
Persian subassembly and others into Alexander's greater system. On
Alexander's death, his empire did not crumble to dust, but fragmented into
some of the major subsystems that had composed it. The watchmaker
argument implies that if one would be Alexander, one should be born into
a world where large stable political systems already exist. Where this
condition was not fulfilled, as on the Scythian and Indian frontiers,
Alexander found empire building a slippery business. So too, T. E.
Lawrence's organizing of the Arabian revolt against the Turks was limited
by the character of his largest stable building blocks, the separate,
suspicious desert tribes. [1]
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He reasoned that the largest available subassembly dictates the size system that
we can build. In his example, Alexander had an easy time folding in the Persian Empire
as a subassembly into his ever expanding Macedonian Empire. The two were similar in
size and structure with large, stable political systems and therefore integrated reasonably
well. However, when Alexander tried to integrate the Scythian and Indian Frontiers
where there was no large, stable political system he found this to be increasingly difficult.
This societal lesson shows that although each next assembly should be larger and more
complex than the parts it is comprised of, the size of this next assembly is constrained by
the size of the constituent parts. For example, it is much harder to build a computer
station from the individual capacitors, resistors, semiconductors, etc. than it is to build it
from a monitor, keyboard, mouse, computer, and the associated cables. Dependence and
Hierarchy are very similar, however they are distinct principles. The latter address the
need to decompose a complex system into smaller subsystems to decrease the
complexity, while the former addresses the need to consider the impact of the chosen size
of the steps on complexity during integration of subsystems to the system level. As an
example, recall Herbert Simon’s discussion on Alexander the Great:
In the case of the Macedonian empire, it is evident that the empire was built
hierarchically from the building blocks of Persia and Macedonia among others, which
embodies the Principle of Hierarchy. However, the need for stable intermediate building
blocks of a certain complexity is embodied by the easy integration of the Persian
subassembly into the Macedonian empire, but the Scythian and Indian frontiers was
much more difficult to integrate. This is an example of the Principle of Dependence.
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Lloyd’s work reinforces this principle with his definition of complexity [14].
Lloyd and Simon are articulating the same point, that the integration path should be
constrained to reduce the overall number of integration paths to get to the resulting
product. However, Simon is stating that the gap between these constraints is also
important to consider. The size of the intermediate steps should be carefully chosen
based on the size of the sum of their constitutive parts and the sum of the parts that
integrate to complete the system. Of course following this principle verbatim would
likely have integrators breaking systems into an infinite number of subsystems. This is
not what the principle intends. An important concept called granularity will help define
the optimum breakdown of the system.
Establishing the architecture of a modular system involves balancing two
granularities, fine grain and coarse grain [40]. A fine grain system is a made of a large
number of relatively simple modules, whereas coarse grain system is made of a small
number of large and often complex modules. Typically, finer grain are preferred because
they tend to be easier to implement. This comes with a tradeoff though as the number of
fine grain modules increases, the interactions between the modules become more
voluminous and difficult to understand, thereby increasing the complexity. A visual
example of The Principle of Dependence is shown in Figure 2-6 where the numbers
represent the relative scale of the components.
Note that there are fourteen individual components with a complexity of one
being integrated into a system with a complexity of fourteen. The principle of
Dependence states that the integration at the system-level will have a much better chance
of success if the building blocks are used as shown in the figure, and in compliance with
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the Principles of Hierarchy and Hierarchic Verification. This constrains the number of
components and corresponding interfaces being integrated at one time. Consider,
however, that instead of using this step-wise approach one were to try to integrate all of
the components into the system at one-time. The interfaces and interactions the
integrator must be concerned with at one time would grow exponentially increasing the
chances that the system integration effort would not be successful. Take, for example,
the building of a computer. Individuals with very little training can build a computer
from defined subcomponents, such as a motherboard, processor, graphics card, RAM,
hard drives, predefined operating system, a fan, and others. However, if the same
individual were given a series of base components, such as resistors, capacitors, and
various chips, needed to build a computer, they would have a much tougher time
successfully building it. The various base components introduce an exponential number
of failure modes not present when building a computer from a set of defined
subcomponents.
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Figure 2-6: Principle of Dependence - Architecture Visualization

The literature review identified 6 potential principles of complex systems
integration. These six principles are summarized in Table 2-1.
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Table 2-1: Integration Principles Summary
The Principle of Hierarchy

Architect a system with fixed stable intermediate
subsystems.

The Principle of Hierarchic
Verification

Subsystems should be tested and/or verified before
integration into the next level.

The Principle of Reuse and
Evolvability

Copying components or states does not increase the
complexity of the assembly. Copies should be made when
available (i.e. code, chips, etc.)

The Principle of Insight

Top level integrator should have insight into the entire
integration process, including Subsystem Integration

The Principle of Optimization

Reduce the amount of information flow between
components where possible. (i.e. have processors inside
displays instead of stand-alone)

The Principle of Dependence

The chosen size of the intermediate subsystems is very
important to the success of the integration effort as a whole

Having defined a set of six candidate principles of complex systems integration,
an analysis must be conducted to validate the principles. However, complex integration
efforts are very expensive and time consuming. Therefore, traditional research methods
with multiple trials cannot be conducted to build the data set in a cost-effective and timefriendly manner.
However, many complex systems have been developed over the past century that can be
used as data points to build a data set. To use these historical integration efforts, a
40

methodology must be identified to gather historical data and graft these independent
points into a data set for analysis.
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CHAPTER 3. Methodology

Two sources were identified that utilized historical system data to conduct
research: “The Role of Software in Spacecraft Accidents” by Nancy Leveson and
“Requirements Development, Verification, and Validation Exhibited in Famous Failures”
by Terry Bahill [42, 44]. These two works will be discussed independently and evaluated
for applicability to building a systems integration data set.
3.1 Leveson’s Methodology
In “The Role of Software in Spacecraft Accidents”, Nancy Leveson studied
several software-related spacecraft accidents to determine common systemic factors that
drove the failures [42]. She found that although the details for each accident were
different, very similar factors were identified that drove the failures evaluated. To
accomplish this Leveson chose a set of five known system failures and evaluated them
based on a set previously determined set of criteria. The methodology centered on this
handful of criteria and each system was analyzed for data that supported the criteria. For
example, one of the criteria was “Flaws in the Safety Culture”. Leveson found that all
five systems exhibited a flawed safety culture and, therefore, the safety culture was a
relevant factor in software’s role in spacecraft disasters.
The practicality of applying Leveson’s methodology to the Principles of
Integration is immediately apparent on a fundamental level. It is recognized that by
identifying a multitude of complex systems and categorizing them into integration
successes and failures would allow for them to be characterized based on the adherence
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to each of the principles. This provides evidence to ground or otherwise refute the
validity of the principles determined from the literature review.
However, Leveson’s methodology presents several issues as well with this
application. While Leveson’s fundamental methodology is promising, the structure of
her methodology is ill-suited for this particular task. Leveson used a very limited system
set of five systems. This allowed her to evaluate the data on the basis of the criteria,
rather than a system-by-system review. This research is expected to analyze a larger set
of systems (> fifty), however, which would make Leveson’s methodological structure
very cumbersome and tough to track patterns in the data in its entirety. Further, Leveson
does not provide a clear, succinct method of displaying the data. It is noted that while
this is acceptable for a small system set, this is not ideal for larger system sets. With
Leveson’s fundamental methodology in mind, a new skeletal structure is needed to
leverage a larger system set.
3.2 Terry Bahill’s Methodology
In “Requirements Development, Verification, and Validation Exhibited in
Famous Failures”, Terry Bahill takes a similar approach to Leveson by utilizing historical
system data to discuss where various defined systems engineering tasks were performed
correctly and incorrectly [44]. He examines several system failures to try to pinpoint bad
practices that need to be avoided to increase the probability of future system success.
This is very similar to the methodology utilized by Leveson in “The Role of Software in
Spacecraft Accidents” and is, therefore interesting as an alternative or a supporting
methodology.
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Leveson’s methodology lacks utility for this particular line of research is in its
methodological structure, and so that is of utmost interest in Bahill’s work. Bahill begins
this research by offering a summary of the practices of interest while analyzing past
system failures, in this case requirements development, verification, and validation.
Twenty-three systems were then identified in the work as systems that will be evaluated
for their methods regarding the practices of requirements development, verification, and
validation. In contrast with Leveson, Bahill analyzed these twenty-three systems on a
system-by-system basis. This was likely due to the relatively small number of practices
and large number of systems as opposed to Leveson’s research in which the two things
were nearly equal. At the end of the analysis, Bahill presented his findings in a table so
that patterns could be identified and conclusions could be reached through qualitative
means much more easily for this relatively large system set. An excerpt showing Bahill’s
summary table is shown in Table 3-1.
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Table 3-1: Excerpt from Bahill's Work [43]
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The structure of Bahill’s methodology is much more appropriate for the analysis
of the integration principles due to its ability to handle larger data sets as well as the
output of a table of results. This output allows for easy identification of patterns in the
data. However, the fundamental methodology of Bahill is not appropriate for their
research. Bahill’s work analyzes historical data using a set of well-defined and
understood failure criteria, where this work is using undefined criteria that have not been
previously validated.

3.3 Hybrid Methodology
Although neither methodology alone is ideal for this research, aspects of these
methodologies can be married together to establish a methodology that can be used to
validate the integration principles. The fundamental methodology of Leveson can be
taken and applied to the structure of Bahill’s to create a suitable methodology for
analyzing a large number of systems to draw conclusions about a known quantity of
principles or practices based on historical data. The fundamental methodology is rooted
in Leveson’s work and historical systems are analyzed to find supporting or refuting
evidence regarding the Principles of Integration.
The structure of this methodology closely resemble Bahill’s. The systems will be
analyzed on a system-by-system basis, for supporting or refuting evidence regarding the
Principles of Integration. This data will be gathered and aggregated in a method similar
to the example table taken from Bahill’s work. This table became the basis for the
qualitative analysis technique, inspection, used to draw conclusions regarding the validity
of each principle.
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This hybrid methodology will be foundational for establishing data sets and
drawing conclusions to meet the objectives of this research. As shown the parameters of
this hybrid methodology will be manipulated to establish multiple data sets throughout
this research as applicable. This methodology will be carried forth as the “hybrid
methodology” in this research.

3.4 Methodology for this Work
The hybrid methodology described above will be the primary tool for gathering
historical systems integration data and compiling the data into a data set for analysis. To
answer the research question identified in the literature review and determine the key
technical factors that contribute to integration success or integration failures the hybrid
methodology will be used to analyze complex system integration efforts, both integration
successes and integration failures, to compile a data set centered on adherence to the
candidate integration principles.
3.4.1 Failure Criteria
To evaluate the principles of integration identified through either quantitative or
qualitative means, data from both integration successes and failures must be identified.
Therefore, a set of criteria must be determined to differentiate integration successes and
integration failures in historical system data. Therefore, establishing a set of failure
criteria to differentiate integration successes and failures is needed. Several books
focusing on failed technology and metrics for evaluating designs were reviewed in an
effort to identify common failure criteria. These books were:
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When Technology Fails by Neil Schlager [12]



Failed Technology Volumes 1 and 2 by Fran Locher Freiman and Neil Schlager
[44]



Space System Failures by Harland and Lorenz [11]



Metrics and Case Studies for Evaluating Engineering Designs by Moody et al [45]

The books provided a wealth of in-depth case studies on system failures and served as a
basis, along with the author’s experience, for developing the failure criteria.
Through professional experience and the literature reviewed for this work, the
following set of failure criteria was identified:
1) System Failure – The system fails to complete the task or mission that it was
designed. System integration failures often result in system failures or mission
failures. This failure criterion is foundational and can result in other criteria that will
be discussed. The threshold for this criterion is that the system did not adequately
complete the mission for which it was designed. This failure criterion was found in
multiple examples throughout the literature, specifically in the books that focused on
system failures [11, 12, 44]. One example of the criterion is the Clementine
spacecraft, which was forced to abandon its mission after a software error caused the
depletion of the craft’s propellant reserves [11]. It is worth noting that while system
failure and system integration failure are not the same, they will be treated very
similarly in this research. System failure is considered a symptom of a system
integration failure. Further data review and document analysis will determine if a
system failure is not tied to a system integration failure, and this system will be

48

removed from the study. This process allows for a broad failure criteria such as
system failure to be applied to the selected area of research of systems integration.
System failures can manifest themselves in many different ways throughout the
system lifecycle. Several of these manifestations are outlined in the following subpoints:
a) Major Redesign – The system requires extensive resources to redesign major
portions of the system prior to fielding. Major redesign is a manifestation of
system failure that is early in the systems lifecycle, prior to fielding. The
threshold to meet this criterion will be set to identify redesigns across multiple
subsystem interfaces. Therefore, simple component designs do not qualify and
even the redesign of a subsystem that only has one interface into the rest of the
system will not qualify. However, redesigns that touch more than one other
subsystem would qualify.
A common feature of major redesigns are cascading effects across the system
through the system interfaces [11].
b) System Rescue – The system requires extensive effort and rework to complete the
mission or task successfully after fielding. System Rescue is a manifestation of
system failure that is experienced after fielding of the system. This criterion is
preceded by system failure, but in the cases of these systems, the engineers are
able to expend resources to rescue the system and return it to the appropriate
mission. Therefore, the threshold to meet this criterion will be a programmatic
effort costing both schedule and monetary cost to rescue the system and allow it
to continue the mission. This criterion was determined from several NASA
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systems such as the SOHO in Harland and Lorenz’s “Space System Failures”
where the program had to work to correct a software upgrade that made the
spacecraft essentially useless [11].
c) Personnel Injury/Death– The operation of the system results in injury or death to
persons associated with the system. Personnel injury or death can occur
throughout the system lifecycle and is can be experienced during the testing phase
or after fielding the system. This criterion is often, but not always, preceded by
system failure. This criterion will be straightforward to evaluate as any evidence
of personnel injury or death qualifies the system to meet this criterion. This
criterion is prolific throughout Schlager’s “When Technology Fails” and Freiman
and Schlager’s “Failed Technology Volumes 1 and 2” [12, 44]. These books
examine some of the worst failures in history, which resulted in loss of human
life.
Examples of this criterion can be seen in the accident at Chernobyl nuclear
accident [44], and the crashing of the Roma and R-101 airships [12] among many
other examples.
2) Severe Schedule Overrun– The development of the system takes significantly more
time than projected due to technical issues. This criterion was developed from
“Metrics and Case Studies for Evaluating Engineering Designs” by Moody et al [45].
The criteria that will be used to determine if a system meets the adequate threshold to
meet this criterion will be somewhat arbitrary as many of these systems have wildly
different development schedules. Therefore, the author will rely on the literature to
identify if a system experienced a schedule overrun.
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An example of a cost overrun

and schedule overrun can be seen in the MD-11 case study. The author of this book
points out that the complex integration effort resulted in a nine-month delay of an
original 3-year schedule, which is significant [45].
3) Severe Cost Overrun– The development of the system costs significantly more
resources than projected due to technical issues [45]. This criterion was developed
from “Metrics and Case Studies for Evaluating Engineering Designs” by Moody et al.
[45]. The criteria that will be used to determine if a system meets the adequate
threshold to meet this criterion will be somewhat arbitrary as many of these systems
have wildly different cost bases. Therefore, the author will rely on the literature to
identify if a system experienced a cost overrun.

An example of a schedule overrun

can be seen in the MD-11 case study. The author of this book points out that the
complex integration effort resulted in a thirty percent cost overrun, which is
significant [45].
These criteria will be the basis for determining whether a historical system should be
categorized as a system integration failure or a system integration success. If a system
integration effort meets any one of these criterion it will be considered a system
integration failure. Otherwise, it will be determined to be a system integration success. It
should be noted that many of the failure criterion are highly correlated. For instance,
severe schedule overruns typically result in severe cost overruns. Likewise, major
redesign efforts typically result in both severe schedule and cost overruns. Therefore, it
is, expected that systems will meet more than one of the system failure criteria. For this
research, a system that meets one of these criterion will be treated the same as a system
that meets multiple criteria.
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The three general system failure criteria of system failure, severe cost overrun, and
severe schedule overrun will be used to evaluate systems first. If a system is found to
have met the failure criteria of system failure, an additional review will be conducted to
determine if the system met one of the three system failure manifestations identified:
major redesign, system rescue or personnel injury or death. Consequently, these two
reviews will be captured in a tabular nature as illustrated in Table 3-2.

Table 3-2: Failure Criteria Example Analysis

Systems
General
System

Failure Criteria
System Failure Manifestations
Severe
Severe
Personnel
System
Major
System
Schedule
Cost
Injury or
Failure Redesign Rescue
Overrun Overrun
Death
X

X

In the case of the general system in Table 3-2, the initial review identified the system
experienced a system failure. The results of the first analysis are shown under the blue
headings. Therefore, the second review was conducted and identified that the system
ultimately had to be rescued to be able to complete the mission. The results of this follow
up manifestation analysis is shown under the yellow headings. All of the systems will be
evaluated using the same methodology and the data will be captured the same way.

52

3.4.2 Qualitative Path Finder
To accomplish the analysis, a two-step approach will be utilized. First, a small
data set (<fifteen systems) will be established and analyzed using the qualitative analysis
of inspection as a pathfinder study. To facilitate the qualitative analysis and allow for
future validation of a set of failure criteria for future studies, two methods will be used to
identify candidate historical systems. The first will be an informal survey of working
engineers and the second will be a literature review. A group of working engineers will
be informally surveyed to identify systems they had worked on or been associated with in
the past that could be considered integration successes or systems that experienced
integration issues. The results of this survey will be down-selected based on the
complexity of the system, personal opinions or experience of the primary author on the
system that may skew the results, and the number of corroborating sources that could be
found for each system in academic and industry literature.
Following the survey, a literature review will be conducted through academic,
government, and industry literature to find additional systems that could be analyzed.
Systems that are identified in the literature must have two or more corroborating
resources to be carried forward for analysis. General sentiment from the literature and
the opinions of the engineers that worked the programs will be utilized to validate a set of
failure criteria derived from academic, industry, and government literature. The systems
identified in the literature review will be joined with the systems that were carried over
from the survey and a final down-select will be performed. The number of sources
available for a particular system and the quality of data in those sources will be utilized to
remove systems from consideration in the down-select process. This down-select process
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will result in a two system sets: integration successes and integration failures. This
dichotomy will be determined by the general sentiment of the literature and opinions of
the working engineers.
3.4.2.1 Validating the Failure Criteria
Now that a method for differentiating integration failures and successes is
formalized and initial data set is created, the hybrid methodology will be utilized to form
a data set in an effort to validate the criteria. To validate the criteria, each one of the
systems in the data set will be analyzed to determine if the system meets one or more of
the failure criteria. Based on the results, the systems will be divided into two groups,
integration successes and failures, and compared to the designation given by the literature
and working engineers. It is expected that the categorization of these systems will match
the categorization of the failure criteria. However, if they do not, the failure criteria must
be amended to accurately categorize the systems. For example, if there is no evidence
supporting a failure criterion, it will be dropped from consideration for the larger data set.
The resulting data set will have been divided into integration successes and failures using
the validated failure criteria.
3.4.2.2 Building the Data Set
Next, the hybrid methodology will be used to survey relevant literature for each
system for evidence to determine whether the system integrators adhered to each
integration principle. Each instance of a departure or adherence must be identified and
supported by evidence from one or more data source. For instance, “The program
decided to use the commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) OpenGL graphics language standard
which allowed the developers to use ‘standardized’ computational and graphics
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technology inside the displays. Code was also reused as available during the development
of the F-22 Cockpit Avionics.” is a representative data point showing the F-22 Avionics
System’s adherence to the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability [46]. A contrasting
example with regard to the Boeing 787’s failure to adhere to the Principle of Insight is
“The supply chain strategy of the Boeing 787 took the integrator, Boeing, out of major
portions of the integration process [47][48]. Many of Boeing’s supplier sent subsystems
that were unfinished or missing appropriate documentation for final assembly [47].” It is
important to note that it is expected that not all systems will have data for every candidate
principle of integration. Therefore, missing data is expected to be common in the
evaluation. If no data is found that a given system adhered to or departed one particular
principle, this principle will be treated as missing data for that particular system.
The results will be compiled into a binary data set in a table similar to Table 3-1
for ease of inspection. The results are expected to show that systems integration
successes primarily adhered to all systems and that integration failures will violate one or
more integration principles. If a principle is shown to be primarily adhered to in the
integration successes and is generally violated in the integration system failures, the
principle will be considered validated. The results are expected to validate all of the
integration principles identified in the literature review.
3.4.3 Quantitative Study
The results are expected to show a more in-depth analysis is warranted. If the
results show promise and adherence to the integration principles seems to be correlated
with integration success, a more in-depth quantitative analysis will be conducted on a
much larger data set (>fifty systems).
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3.4.3.1 Forming the Data Set
The first step to improving the validation outlined in the pathfinder study will be
to find additional systems that can augment the data set. These additional systems will
strengthen the qualitative validation while, also allowing quantitative analyses. These
additional systems for analysis will be identified using the hybrid methodology as in
pathfinder study, and the threshold of a minimum of two corroborating resources will be
adopted for the system to be analyzed. The additional systems will then be subjected to
the validated failure criteria to categorize them as integration successes or integration
failures. Once categorized the hybrid methodology will be utilized to build an expanded
data set, similar to the one developed in the pathfinder study.
As in the pathfinder study, each system will be reviewed to find evidence that will
support or refute each of the principles. To identify data corresponding with the
principles, it will be necessary to identify a standard for evaluation that can be used to
determine if a system is following or not following the principle.
Each of these principles is unique and thus it is necessary to identify six unique
standards on a principle-by-principle basis.


Principle of Hierarchy – To evaluate a system for adherence to this system, both
the physical and functional architectures were examined. To evaluate Hierarchy,
Simon’s own standard will be used. That is the decomposability of the system
[1]. If one or both of the physical and functional architectures were decomposed
to stable sub-architectures that continually become less complex, the system is
considered functionally hierarchical, physically hierarchical, or both. The data to
support this can come in many forms including written descriptions or pictorial
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decompositions. Simon hypothesized that all systems will follow this structure,
and therefore it is expected that most, or all, systems evaluated will follow the
Principle of Hierarchy. [1]


Principle of Hierarchic Verification – Evaluating the Principle of Hierarchic
Verification will be less straightforward. For evaluating adherence to this
principle, levels of testing will be drawn from “Integrated Systems Testing of
Spacecraft”. This work identifies the following as necessary levels of testing:
system-level testing, subsystem-level testing, and component level testing [49].
However, testing is only one method of verification. Therefore, this research will
look for one verification method (test, analysis, demonstration, inspection) at each
of these levels. Although it is unlikely that the researchers will have access to the
test and/or analysis plans for each development and integration program, most
sources will provide other evidence that will allow the researchers to draw
conclusions. This study will utilize “Document Analysis” as described in
“Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method”. The documents will be
analyzed to identify data that will support the overall binary theme as to whether
the system adhered to the Principle of Hierarchic Verification using the following
methodology [50]. In the case of positively following the principle, the sources
will be searched for descriptive examples of a rigorous testing campaign that
would lead an impartial researcher to the conclusion that the development and
integration could have reasonably or even likely followed the Principle of
Hierarchic Verification. For example, in O’Reilly’s “The Patriot PAC-3 Missile
Program” identifies a rigorous testing program of components, subsystem testing
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including hardware-in-the-loop testing of the seeker, simulations, and ultimately
culminating in system level and flight test [52]. This data drives the reasonable
conclusion that the PAC-3 program followed the Principle of Hierarchic
Verification.
However, the evidence to prove that a system did not follow the principle of
Hierarchic Verification is expected to be much more accessible in failure reports
and mishap reports. Therefore, instead of a culmination of data that presents a
reasonable conclusion, this research will look for hard evidence that a testing
event, simulation event, or verification event was incorrectly performed or
skipped altogether. An example of the type of data sought to prove that a system
did not adhere to the Principle of Hierarchic Verification can be found the System
Failure Case Study for the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous
Technology (DART). The “Fender Bender” case study pinpoints one of the root
causes of the failure to a “Lack of software validation and verification” [52]. This
is the kind of explicit data that will be sought to determine if a system did not
follow the Principle of Hierarchic Verification.


Principle of Reuse and Evolvability - Reuse is very common to find in almost all
complex systems development. Therefore, the threshold of reuse required to
successfully follow this principle had to be determined. Key types of reuse will
be drawn from “Maximizing Reuse: Applying Common Sense and Discipline” by
Waligora and Langston. The study identifies Reuse of Personnel, Reuse of Code,
Reuse of Processes, and Reuse of Requirements and Designs [53]. This research
will focus more on the technical aspects of reuse and therefore will focus on reuse
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of code, reuse of process, and reuse of requirements and designs. This research
identified systems that had a programmatic focus on reuse on a system or subsystem-level as the appropriate threshold for following the Principle of Reuse.
This focus on fits perfectly with the reuse types identified by in the study above.
For example, in the case of the F-22 Avionics System one of the sources referred
to the program incorporating reused code and system designs in the following
way: “The entire effort has been a success story in bringing Commercial-Off-TheShelf software tools and hardware components to the program as NonDevelopmental Items.” [55]. This threshold will be used in to avoid identifying
the use of standardized components such as nuts and bolts or the reuse of simple
components as strict adherence to the principle, and therefore avoid
overprescribing this principle.
Determining when a system did not adequately leverage reuse when it could have
is much more difficult to determine. As discussed above reuse is very common
and many systems have the opportunity to reuse many components or subsystems.
For this research, a negative mark for reuse will only be given to systems for
which one of the sources specifically identifies how a lack of reuse increased the
complexity of the project. A good example of this is in Leveson’s “Medical
Devices: Therac-25”. An excerpt from that paper reads “However, AECL
designed the Therac-25 to take advantage of computer control from the outset;
they did not build on a stand-alone machine” [55]. In this case, the author is
pointing out that the development of the Therac-25 did not take advantage of the
existing standalone radiation machines to reduce the developmental complexity
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by focusing solely on the control software. Instead, they developed a whole new
radiation machine from the ground up that integrated the control software into it.


Principle of Insight – To determine if a system development and integration effort
followed the Principle of Insight, each source will be analyzed to find direct
evidence indicating a departure or adherence to Insight. In the case of adherence
to the Principle of Insight, evidence will point to a specific focus on
understanding and tracking information at the lowest level of the program.
Indicators of Insight will be taken from “Success Factors in Strategic Supplier
Alliances: The Buying Company Perspective” by Monczka et al. In this work
trust and coordination, interdependence, information quality and participation,
information sharing, joint problem solving, avoidance of severe conflict
resolution tactics, and the existence of a formal supplier/commodity alliance
selection process were all found to be significantly related to partnership success
and will be used as indicators of Insight in this work [56]. A good example of
data that would indicate adherence to the Principle of Insight can be found in
Stockman’s Case Study on the International Space Station:
“NASA invoked three levels of oversight as follows:
o Level 1: was housed at NASA HQ in Washington D.C. and
handled the political interfaces and highest-level program and
funding decisions.
o Level 2: was located in Houston at Johnson Space Center to be the
systems engineering center for the Freedom Program.
o Level 3: handled the detailed engineering of the subsystem and
modules.
Level 3 of oversight assigned a system development manager and an
integration manager to each subsystem and module to ensure that the
development met the requirements and that each module would
successfully integrate into the system as a whole.” [57]

60

This data shows that the program adhered to the indicators of interdependence and
information sharing. The quality of data needed to determine that a system did
not follow the Principle of Insight also needs to be direct and explicitly state the
shortcomings of Insight into lower levels of the program development and
integration. An example of data that identifies a program that does not follow the
Principle of Insight is found in the DART Case Study. The “Fender Bender” case
study identifies one of the root causes for failure as a “Lack of training,
experience, and oversight of the project team and prime contractor” [52]. This
points to two distinct areas of failures when it comes to Insight. The first is that
NASA did not maintain adequate oversight of their personnel to ensure they were
properly trained and had relevant experience for the work. The second is that
NASA did not provide adequate oversight when it comes to the project team and
prime contractor, ultimately resulting in a posture closer to black-box acquisition.
This data points to a lack of information sharing and coordination within the
program.


Principle of Optimization – The Principle of Optimization is unique as it directly
goes against a common practice in aerospace engineering, specifically manned
systems, of redundancy in critical components. However, evaluating each
departure from the Principle of Optimization to determine if the component or
subsystem in question meets the criteria of a critical component is beyond the
scope of this research. Therefore, each departure from the Principle of
Optimization will be treated the same, regardless of the concept of redundancy for
critical components. Much as how Simon’s work shaped the evaluation of the
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Principle of Hierarchy, Lloyd’s work “Complexity as Thermodynamic Depth”
will serve to define how the Principle of Optimization will be evaluated. Seth
Lloyd states each information transfer and each manipulation (multiplication,
addition, etc.) on this information is associated with a cost, or an increase in
complexity [14]. Therefore, evidence will be sought for each system that
explicitly shows an effort to reduce the information flow throughout the system to
show that the system in question adhered to the Principle of Optimization. The F22 Avionics development provides a good example of this data. Bailey describes
the computing process for the on board displays in “F-22 Avionics on Track”
[46]. The display software takes the data and then renders the output to the pilot
onboard the actual display as opposed to rendering all display data on a central
computer and feeding them to the appropriate displays. By having dedicated
computer chips, video chips and software in each of the displays, this system
adhered to The Principe of Optimization by reducing the number of information
paths to get from one state to another. This is a good example of the types of data
that will be sought to prove that a system followed the Principle of Optimization.
To show that a program did not adhere to the Principle of Optimization, data
should show that the development and integration program kept unnecessary data
flows, whether for commonality, redundancy, or another reason. This data will
likely show up in failure reviews, mishap reviews, and case studies. The
ARIANE-5 provides one of the best examples of clear data showing a departure
from the Principle of Optimization. Leveson describes the root cause of the
ARIANE-5 catastrophic first launch as software functionality that was
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unnecessary but kept for the sake of commonality: “The software was reused
from the ARIANE 4 and included functions that were not needed for ARIANE 5
but were left in for ‘commonality’. In fact, these functions were useful but not
required for the ARIANE 4 either” [42].


Principle of Dependence – To determine if a system development and integration
effort followed the Principle of Dependence, each source will be analyzed to find
direct evidence indicating the size of the intermediate systems were directly
impactful to integration success.

For instance, if a system experiences severe

cost or schedule overruns due to the time it takes to identify a system failure
because the size of the subsystem test is much larger and more complex than the
next, lower-level subsystem that was tested would be evidence of not following
the Principle of Dependence. On the other hand, if there was evidence that a
system success was able to overcome a testing failure and identify an issue in a
timely manner because of the reasonable size differential between the current test
configuration and previous configuration, this would be evidence of adhering to
the Principle of Dependence.
It should be noted that if that data cannot be definitively gathered for a given
system to meet or violate the above criteria for any of the principles, adherence to that
principle shall be considered inconclusive and for further analysis the data will be treated
as missing. Given the stringent, unique requirements to show adherence to each
principle, it is expected that many, if not most, systems will show inconclusive data for
one or more principles. Due to the quality of information available and the differences
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in the principles that no one method for evaluation was found to encompass all of the
principles. A summary of the evaluation criteria is shown in Table 3-3.

Table 3-3: Summary of Principle Evaluation Criteria
Principle

Optimization

Evaluation Criteria
Written Descriptions or pictorial decompositions showing that
the system is functionally or physically decomposable.
Document Analysis identifies holistic testing through
component, subsystem, and system levels was or was not
conducted.
Direct evidence citing a programmatic focus on code, process,
and/or requirements and design reuse or an opportunity to
exploit reuse that was not taken.
Direct evidence showing adherence or violation Insight by way
of one or more of the following indicators: trust and
coordination, interdependence, information quality and
participation, information sharing, joint problem solving,
avoidance of severe conflict resolution tactics, and the
existence of a formal supplier/commodity alliance selection
process
Direct evidence that a programmatic effort was made to
minimize information transfer and manipulation or that
unnecessary information transfers and manipulations were
maintained.

Dependence

Direct evidence indicating the scale of the intermediate systems
were directly impactful to integration success.

Hierarchy
Hierarchic
Verification
Reuse and
Evolvability

Insight
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3.4.3.2 Evaluating the Principles of Integration
Once the augmented data set is created, the data will be subjected to the same
qualitative analysis technique of inspection as in the pathfinder analysis to identify
patterns in the data tying adherence and violation to the principles to integration success.
This analysis by inspection will allow for a cursory look at the data to determine whether
a more in-depth, quantitative analysis is warranted. If the qualitative analysis of
inspection shows similar results to the pathfinder analysis, the data set will be
manipulated to a quantitative data set for a more complete analysis. If the results are not
similar to the pathfinder analysis, an in-depth look into the differences must be
conducted. A deeper study and more sources and systems will be required to continue to
gather data to explain these contradictions before any additional analysis can be
conducted.
The qualitative data set will be manipulated to a categorical quantitative
representation to facilitate quantitative analysis techniques to identify statistically
significant relationships between the principles of integration and integration success.
The principle adherences for each system will be changed to a numerical (categorical)
value of “1”, the principle departures will be changed to a categorical value of “0”, and
the missing data will be left as empty cells. To capture the integration success/failure
portion of the data, an additional row will be inserted to represent whether the systems
were considered integration successes or integration failures. In this categorization, “1”
represents success and “0” represents failure. To illustrate this transformation, the
Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) system data will be
used. The DART system will be fully introduced in the Results chapter. An example of
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the qualitative-to-quantitative data transformation using the example of the DART system
is shown in Table 3-4.

Table 3-4: Quantitative to Qualitative Transformation
Principle
Hierarchy
Hierarchic
Verification
Reuse and
Evolvability
Insight
Optimization
Dependence
Integration
Success

DART
DART
(Qual)
(Quant)
Adherence

1

Violation

0

Adherence
Violation
Missing
Data
Missing
Data
Integration
Failure

1
0

0

This transformation will result in a quantitative representation of the data that will
be used for statistical analysis. All of the data in the quantitative representation will be
categorical, that is either a “1” or a “0” for each system and respective principle of
integration. Each system integration effort will either be assigned a “1” if it adhered to
the principle or a “0” if it did not. Otherwise, if no data is found to support the principle
being followed, a “*” will be used to represent missing data. Additionally, each system
will be assigned a categorical value to represent whether the system was an integration
success or failure, also a “0” or a “1”. A system will be assigned a “0” if it was found to
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be an integration failure by meeting one or more of the failure criteria or a “1” if it was
determined to be an integration success. If every system is found to adhere to a particular
principle, then this principle will be removed from the statistical analysis, because the
analysis would yield no additional Insight.
The goal of this research is to be able to associate the adherence of the principles,
on a principle-by-principle basis, to integration success thereby validating each principle.
A Chi-Square test is used to determine if there exists a relationship between two
categorical variables. Therefore, the Chi-Square test is the ideal statistical analysis to
determine if there is a relationship between adherence to the Principles of Integration and
Integration Success. A Chi-Square Test for Association will be utilized to test for a
statistically significant association between the integration success and each individual
principle of integration where:
H0 = There is no association between the Principle and Integration Success
H1 = There is an association between the Principle and Integration Success
The tests will be conducted in Minitab at the 5% confidence level meaning that the pvalue result of the test must reach a threshold of less than or equal to 0.05 for the results
to be statistically significant. This p-value will be used as a matter of convenience for
judging the significance of deviations as Fisher stated in “Statistical Methods for
Research Workers” [58]. Fisher states “The value for which P=0.05, or one in twenty, is
1.96 or nearly two; it is convenient to take this point as a limit in judging whether a
deviation ought to be considered significant or not.” Therefore, only deviations exceeding
twice the standard deviation are regarded as significant.
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The Chi-Square test will quantitatively identify which principles are associated
with integration success. These results will provide a quantitative validation of the
inspection results of the preliminary qualitative analysis. The results of the Chi-Square
analyses are expected to closely align with the cursory qualitative inspection results,
showing a statistically significant association between all of the principles and integration
success.
The qualitative and quantitative validation of the principles of integration will
serve to answer the research questions RQ1 and RQ2 identified from the literature
review:
What are the key technical factors that contribute to integration success or integration
failures? In what circumstances is reuse one of these factors?
The results of the Chi-Square Analyses and Qualitative analysis will identify the key
technical factors that contribute to integration success, namely the validated set of
integration principles, including the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability.
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CHAPTER 4. Results

Prior to conducting a full quantitative analysis on the system set, a smaller subset
of systems was analyzed using the hybrid methodology. This will be referred to as the
“Pathfinder Analysis”.
4.1 Pathfinder Analysis
Two methods were used to identify candidate historical systems. The first was an
informal survey of working engineers. A group of working engineers was informally
surveyed to identify systems they had worked on or been associated with in the past that
could be considered integration successes or systems that experienced integration issues.
The results of the survey are captured in Table 4-1.

69

Table 4-1: Informal Survey Results

The results of this survey were down-selected based on the complexity of the
system, personal opinions or experience of the primary author on the system that may
skew the results, and the number of corroborating sources that could be found for each
system in academic and industry literature. Following the survey, a literature review was
conducted through academic, government, and industry literature to find additional
systems that could be analyzed. The systems identified in the literature review were
joined with the systems that were carried over from the survey and a final down-select
was performed. This down-select resulted in fourteen systems being chosen for review,
five that were considered integration successes and nine that were considered integration
failures. These systems are shown in Table 4-2:
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Table 4-2: Systems for Review

4.1.1 Validation of Failure Criteria
The general sentiment in the literature and opinions of the working engineers
identified nine systems that experienced systems integration issues in Table 4-2. The
systems that experienced integration issues will be utilized to validate the failure criteria
identified in the literature. The ARIANE-5 system will be used as an example. In the
literature, the ARIANE-5’s maiden flight ended in disaster. The flight failed only about
forty-seconds after initiation of the flight sequence, when the launcher veered off its
flight path, broke up and exploded [10]. Therefore, the system met the “System Failure”
failure criteria. Because this system met the “System Failure” criteria, the data was
reviewed to see if the system met one of the specified system failure manifestations.
Fortunately, no personnel were injured or killed so the ARIANE-5 did not experience that
manifestation. A redesign did not drive the failure, nor could the system be rescued.
Hence, the system could be considered a general system failure.

71

The system-by-system evaluation is shown in Appendix A: Failure Criteria Analysis.
The full results are shown in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3: Failure Criteria Validation

Systems
DART
Boeing 787

Failure Criteria
System Failure Manifestations
Severe
Severe
Personnel
System
Major
System
Schedule
Cost
Injury or
Failure Redesign Rescue
Overrun Overrun
Death
X
X
X

X

MCO

X

ARIANE-5

X

Therac-25

X

Genesis
Contour
SOHO
WIRE

X
X
X
X

X

X

At least one system met each of the three major failure criteria: Severe Schedule
Overrun, Severe Cost Overrun, and System Failure. Additionally, the system failure
manifestations of personnel injury or death and system rescue were realized. These
failure criteria were all validated and be carried forward to differentiate the system
successes and failures for the larger system set. Major redesign, on the other hand, was
not realized in any of the nine systems that experienced integration issues. Therefore,
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this manifestation of system failure will not be carried forward as a validated failure
criterion.
4.1.2 Establishing Data Set for Qualitative Analysis
The relevant literature was reviewed for each system for evidence to determine
whether the system integrators followed each integration principle. Each instance of a
departure or adherence was identified and supported by evidence from one or more data
source. The ARIANE-5 will be used as an illustration of this methodology. The
ARIANE 5 data was evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the
principles of integration were followed.


The Principle of Hierarchy: Figure 4-1 below taken from the ARIANE-5’s
User’s Manual clearly shows that the launcher can be broken down into
subsystems and is of a hierarchical architecture [59]. Hence, the ARIANE-5
adhered to the Principle of Hierarchy.

Figure 4-1: ARIANE-5 Exploded View [59]
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The Principle of Hierarchic Verification: There was no requirement levied
against the unneeded data generated by the inertial reference system (SRI) and so
no test was associated with this data. The SRIs were largely tested in isolation
and not tested in the closed loop simulations of flight for verification [10]. This
data shows a clear departure from the Principle of Hierarchic Verification.



The Principle of Reuse and Evolvability: The design of the ARIANE-5 inertial
reference unit was practically the same as the one used on its predecessor, the
ARIANE-4 [10]. This evidence shows that the program adhered to the Principle
of Reuse and Evolvability.



The Principle of Insight: No data was found to support or refute adherence to
this principle. Therefore, this will be treated as missing data.



The Principle of Optimization: The software was reused from the ARIANE 4
and included functions that were not needed for ARIANE 5 but were left in for
“commonality.” In fact, these functions were useful but not required for the
ARIANE 4 either [42]. This shows clear departure from the Principle of
Optimization.



The Principle of Dependence: No data was found to support or refute adherence
to this principle. Accordingly, this will be treated as missing data.

This process was repeated for each of the systems. The full results on a system-bysystem basis are located in Appendix B: Integration Principle Analysis Data. After all of
the systems were evaluated for all candidate principles, the results were compiled into
Table 4-4.
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Table 4-4: Qualitative Results

Principle

Hierarchy

Hierarchic
Verification

Dependence

Reuse and
Evolvability

Insight

Optimization

F-22
Integration
Successes

Hubble
COSTAR
PAC-3
ISS
DART
Boeing 787
MCO

Integration
Failures

ARIANE 5
Therac-25
Genesis
Contour
SOHO
WIRE
Adheres to Principle
Violates Principle
No Evidence

Inspection of Table 4-4 reveals that the Principle of Hierarchy, The Principle of
Optimization, The Principle of Hierarchic Verification, and the Principle of Insight are all
validated by this study. The Principle of Hierarchy is consistently followed across all
cases, successes and failures and, hence, is validated. The other three principles, Insight,
Optimization, and Hierarchic Verification, are predominantly followed in integration
successes and violated in integration failures. For example, the Principle of Optimization
is followed in two system successes and violated in one of the system failures.
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However, the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability did not follow the expected trend, as
there were more instances of adherence to this principle in the integration failures than
there were departures from the principle. Additionally, no evidence was found that
validated or refuted the Principle of Dependence. The data supporting Table 4-4 can be
found in Appendix B: Integration Principle Analysis Data.
All systems follow a hierarchical architecture, which has become ubiquitous in
engineered systems development. The Principle of Hierarchic Verification appears to be
very important to the success of integration. All of the successfully integrated systems
evidenced following this principle while all but one of the systems with integration issues
were found to have violated this principle. The Principle of Insight also proved to be very
important. Although very few systems were identified as explicitly following this
principle, clear departure from the principle was determined to be a contributing factor to
several integration issues. The Principle of Optimization is sitting on the weakest
foundation of all of the principles that are supported by evidence. Only one system was
identified as explicitly following this principle and only one system was found that
plainly violated it. However, the departure from the Principle of Optimization was
conclusively a contributing factor to the integration failure of the ARIANE- 5, and
therefore may be considered weakly validated by the qualitative analysis. No data was
found to support or refute the Principle of Dependence. Upon, further review this
principle is very closely related to the Principles of Hierarchy and Hierarchic
Verification. As discussed, The Principle of Dependence dictates that the chosen size of
the intermediate-stable subsystems is very important to the success of the integration
effort as a whole. The need for carefully determined intermediate subsystems is
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synonymous with the Principle of Hierarchy. Likewise, the need for these subsystems to
be stable is captured in the Principle of Hierarchic Verification. Therefore, the Principle
of Dependence is judged a combination of these two other principles and will not be
carried forward as a separate principle in this research.
Lastly, The Principle of Reuse and Evolvability was supported by significant
evidence. However, in several cases adherence to this principle was identified as a
contributing factor to several system integration issues. As such, these results reveal a
divergence from the expected results. Consequently, the Principle of Reuse and
Evolvability warrants deeper study to determine the reason for this departure from the
expected results. As four of the six principles were validated, a more in-depth analysis is
warranted.
4.1.3 The Reuse Conundrum
As the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability departed from expectation, further
analysis was conducted based on reuse in an attempt to try to identify any
interrelationships between reuse and the other principles. In the cases of the ARIANE-5,
Genesis, Contour, and SOHO the reuse of heritage components seemed to have a
detrimental effect on the programs as the heritage components directly tied into the
failures experienced by the program. It appears that all of the failures that occurred from
“reuse” can be directly attributed to departures from other Integration Principles outlined
in this paper as depicted in Table 4-5. For instance, in the case of the ARIANE 5, the
Principle of Optimization was deliberately violated to maintain commonality between
ARIANE 5 and ARIANE 4 inertial reference system [10]. In this case, the decision to
reuse the inertial reference system from the ARIANE 4 directly led to the violation of the
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Principle of Optimization and ultimately led to the catastrophe. In the cases examined,
these departures primarily stem from an overconfidence in the heritage designs driving
project offices to focus less on overseeing and verifying these components – violations of
the Principles of Insight and Hierarchic Verification respectively. These over confidences
manifested themselves in several ways: the Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) was lost
because NASA did not find it necessary to verify that the reuse navigation software [61],
the Genesis was lost because a heritage-derived design was treated as heritage and not
verified appropriately [62], and the code modifications to the Solar Heliospheric
Observatory (SOHO) were not properly documented, communicated, or verified prior to
implementation on the in-use spacecraft [63]. In all of these examples, the reuse of a
component or subsystem directly resulted in the violation of one of the other principles of
integration due to an overconfidence in the component or subsystem. This resulted in
system or mission failures. An additional concern was brought to light by the ARIANE-5
varying from The Principle of Optimization to keep the system “common” with the
ARIANE 4 system it was derived from.
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Table 4-5: How Reuse Effects Adherence to Other Principles

This review indicates that there are secondary considerations that should be noted
when exercising The Principle of Reuse and Evolvability. Specifically, while using a
“reuse” system the project should not allow confidence in the part or a desire for
commonality to drive the development of the system. Based on the existence of these
interrelationships and the perceived impact on integration success, a deeper study will be
conducted to formally evaluate the existence and relevance of the interrelationships
between the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability and the Principles of Hierarchic
Verification and the Principle of Insight.
If the quantitative validation of the principles fails to validate the Principle of
Reuse and Evolvability, as the qualitative analysis did, the existence of these interactions
will drive the need for further quantitative analysis. Once the quantitative data set is
established, the interactions between the principles can be calculated for further statistical
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study. The same statistical methodology can be used to determine a statistically
significant association between the calculated interactions and integration success.
4.2 Validation of the Principles of Integration
The results of the pathfinder study validated four of the six integration principles;
therefore, additional analyses are warranted. The first step in these analyses was to form
an extended system data set with sufficient data to facilitate a statistical analysis. NASA
and Air Force databases, academic literature, industry literature, and more than thirty
books were reviewed for data to identify additional systems. To be considered for the
study, two or more resources must be available for each system that provide evidence
adherence or departure to the Principles of Integration. This review provided an
additional thirty-eight systems for analysis, which, with the original fourteen systems
from the pathfinder study, resulted in a total of fifty-two systems for future analysis.
These systems are listed in Table 4-6.

Table 4-6: System for Further Analysis
F-22
Hubble
COSTAR
PAC-3
ISS
Northrop B-2

DART

Boeing 787

MCO

ARIANE V

Therac-25

Genesis

Contour

SOHO

WIRE

Soviet Airship

Lewis

Mars Observer

SL-1

Centaur/Milstar

MD-11

Deep Space 2

X-15

X-43a

Boeing 777

Comet

Constellation

ZR-2

MTSI

Roma

Soyuz 1

Skylab Meteor Shield

Lockheed F117

Electra

Athena

Delta 3

TOMS-EP

TIMED

Voyager-2

Pat Scud Interceptor

Cobalt 60

Mariner 1

Mariner 10

USS Thresher

Mark 14 Torpedo

Black Arrow

Boeing Starliner

Long March 3

Learjet 60
IBM
Canadarm
R101
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The data for each of these systems were then analyzed to determine whether each
system met one or more of the failure criteria identified in the methodology section. This
analysis enabled these systems to be divided into integration success and integration
issues buckets. The failure criteria analysis can be seen in Appendix A: Failure Criteria
Analysis. All of the systems found to meet one or more of the failure criteria are shown
in Table 4-7:
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Table 4-7: Failure Criteria Analysis
Failure Criteria
Systems

Severe
Schedule
Overrun

DART
Boeing 787

X

Severe
Cost
Overrun
X

System
Failure

System Failure
Manifestations
Personnel
System
Injury or
Rescue
Death

X

X

MCO

X

ARIANE-5

X

Therac-25

X

Genesis
Contour
SOHO
WIRE

X
X
X
X

Soviet R-16

X

X

R101
Lewis

X

X

X
X

X

X

Mars Observer

X

SL-1

X

Centaur/Milstar

X

Md-11

X

X

X

X

X

Deep Space 2

X

X-15
X-43a
Comet

X
X
X

X

Constellation

X

X

ZR-2
Roma
Soyuz 1

X
X
X

X
X
X
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X

Table 4-7 Continued
System Failure
Manifestations

Failure Criteria

Systems

Severe
Schedule
Overrun

Severe Cost
Overrun

Skylab
Meteor
Shield
Electra
Athena
Delta 3
TOMS-EP
TIMED

System
Failure

System
Rescue

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

Personnel
Injury or
Death

X

Voyager 2

X

Pat-Scud
Interceptor

X

X

Cobalt 60

X

X

Mariner 1

X

Mariner 10

X

USS
Thresher
Mark 14
Torpedo
Black
Arrow
Boeing
Starliner
Long
March 3

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
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X

The failure criteria analysis identified forty systems that experienced system
integration issues leaving twelve systems that could be identified as system successes.
Each “X” in the tables represents that data was found to support that the system met the
corresponding failure criteria. For example, in the case of the Roma Airship, the airship
failed to complete the test flight, crashing twenty-five minutes into the flight representing
a system failure [12]. During the subsequent landing attempt, the Roma exploded killing
all but eleven men on-board. Therefore, this system also met the failure criteria for
personnel injury/death. The data supporting all of the systems above is shown in
Appendix A: Failure Criteria Analysis. It is worth noting that system failure was
determine to be the failure mode in thirty-eight out of forty, or ninety-five percent, of the
failures. The resulting system disposition breakout is shown in Table 4-8. Of these
thirty-eight failures, fifteen failures, approximately forty-percent, resulted in personnel
injury or death. Only three systems needed to be rescued. Only five out of forty systems,
or 12.5%, were found to fail due to severe cost and schedule overruns.
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Table 4-8: Disposition of Systems
Integration Successes
F-22
Hubble
COSTAR
PAC-3
ISS
Northrop B-2

Integration Failures
DART

Boeing 787

MCO

ARIANE V

Therac-25

Genesis

Contour

SOHO

WIRE

Soviet Airship

Lewis

Mars Observer

SL-1

Centaur/Milstar

MD-11

Deep Space 2

X-15

X-43a

Boeing 777

Comet

Constellation

ZR-2

MTSI

Roma

Soyuz 1

Skylab Meteor Shield

Lockheed F117

Electra

Athena

Delta 3

TOMS-EP

TIMED

Voyager-2

Pat Scud Interceptor

Cobalt 60

Mariner 1

Mariner 10

USS Thresher

Mark 14 Torpedo

Black Arrow

Boeing Starliner

Long March 3

Learjet 60
IBM
Canadarm

The systems in the blue section on the left were systems that met none of the
failure criteria and, therefore, can be considered systems integration successes. The
larger group of sections in the orange section on the right were found to meet one or more
failure criteria in the analyses and are considered systems integration failures.
4.2.1 Establishing a Quantitative and Qualitative Data Set
Once the set of systems had been identified and dispositioned, the resources
pertaining to each system were analyzed for adherence to the principles of integration on
a system-by-system basis to build the initial data set that will be used for the analysis.
Each data point is color coded with blue representing that the system adhered to the
principle and red representing that the system development did not adhere to the system
for ease of qualitative analysis. The gray cells represent missing data. The data points
were also assigned a numerical value as described in the methodology to facilitate
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qualitative analysis. The Boeing 787 will be analyzed as an example. Tang and
Zimmerman’s work provided pictorial evidence of the hierarchical nature of the Boeing
787 development shown in Figure 4-2 [64].

Figure 4-2: Boeing 787 Hierarchy [48]

Therefore, the Principle of Hierarchy was marked as “1” for the quantitative
analysis. The cell will also be shaded blue for ease of the qualitative analyses of
inspection for a preliminary assessment of the data. The literature review also
illuminated a departure from the principle of Insight. The works of Shenhar et al and
Tang state that Boeing delegated large parts of the integration effort to the suppliers [64].
At least one of these of these integrators, Vought, hired Advanced Integration
Technology (AIT) as a tier 2 supplier to serve as a system integrator without informing
Boeing. Therefore, Boeing did not have Insight into the full integration efforts of the
787, violating the Principle of Insight. The Principle of Insight cell will be assigned a “0”
because the system did not follow this principle. The cell was colored red to allow for
easier inspection. The literature reviewed did not give any evidence that the Boeing 787
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did or did not follow the Principles of Hierarchic Verification, Reuse and Evolvability,
and Optimization. These cells were treated as missing data. The cell was be colored grey
for easier inspection and will not contain a numerical value. Each system was be
evaluated in the same way. The data for this review is shown in Appendix B: Integration
Principle Analysis Data. The data is will populate the initial data set. This initial data set
is shown in Table 4-9.
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Table 4-9: Integration Principle Analysis Results

System Failures

System Successes

Principles of Integration

Systems
Hierarchy
F-22
1
Hubble
1
COSTAR
1
PAC-3
1
ISS
1
Northrop B2
1
Boeing 777
1
MTSI
1
Lockheed F117
1
Learjet 60
1
IBM
1
Canadarm
1
DART
1
Boeing 787
1
MCO
1
ARIANE-5
1
Therac-25
1
Genesis
1
Contour
1
SOHO
1
WIRE
1
Soviet R-16
1
R101
1
Lewis
1
Mars Observer
1
SL-1
1
Centaur/Milstar
1
Md-11
1
Deep Space 2
1
X-15
1
X-43a
1
Comet
1
Constellation
1
ZR-2
1
Roma
1

Hierarchic
Reuse and
Verification Evolvability Insight Optimization Dependence
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
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System Failures

Table 4-9 Continued

Systems
Soyuz 1
Skylab Meteor
Shield
Electra
Athena
Delta 3
TOMS-EP
TIMED
Voyager 2
Pat-Scud Interceptor
Cobalt 60
Mariner 1
Mariner 10
USS Thresher
Mark 14 Torpedo
Black Arrow
Boeing Starliner
Long March 3

Principles of Integration
Hierarchic Reuse and
Hierarchy Verification Evolvability Insight Optimization Dependence
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
1

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
1
1

0

0
1
1
1

4.2.2 Principle of Integration Qualitative Analysis Results

A cursory qualitative analysis was performed prior to a full-statistical analysis to
ensure that the results are in-line with the previous qualitative analysis. The results of the
inspection perfectly complement the results of the pathfinder study. As in the previous
inspection, all systems were found to adhere to the Principle of Hierarchy. Therefore, the
Principle of Hierarchy will be removed from the statistical analysis, because the analysis
would yield no additional Insight. The Principle of Hierarchic Verification was followed
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on eleven of the twelve Integration Successes and only three of the thirty-nine systems
that experienced integration issues did not violate this principle. Out of the twelve system
integration successes, five of the systems adhered to the Principle of Insight and no
systems did not adhere to this principle. Similarly, fourteen out of the thirty-nine systems
that experienced integration issues violated the Principle of Insight. There was no
evidence that any of the systems that experienced integration issues adhered to the
Principle of Insight. Only three of the twelve systems that were successfully integrated
provided data concerning this principle, however, all of three adhered to the principle.
Likewise, only two of the thirty-nine systems that experienced integration issues provided
data concerning this principle. Both of these systems did not follow the Principle of
Optimization and both of these failed in large part due to that violation. Evidence was
found that all of the system integration successes adhered to the Principle of Reuse and
Evolvability. However, twenty-four of the thirty-nine systems that experienced
integration issues also adhered to this principle and only three systems were found to
have violated this principle. Therefore, as in the pathfinder analysis, the Principle of
Reuse and Evolvability could not be validated. Given the results agree with the
pathfinder study, a statistical analysis will be performed.
4.2.3 Principle of Integration Quantitative Analysis Results
A Chi-Square test for each Principle and Interaction was conducted as described in the
methodology section in Minitab. An example output of the Chi-Square is shown in
Figure 4-3.
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H0 = Hierarchic Verification and Integration Success
are not associated.
P-Value ~ 0.000: Therefore, the null hypothesis can
be rejected.

Figure 0-1: Example of Chi Square Analysis Output for Principle

In the example, the P-value for the test is 0.000, which is less than 0.05. Therefore, an
association was found to exist between Hierarchic Verification and Integration Success.
Similar tests were run for each principle.
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The outputs of each individual Minitab analyses can be seen in Appendix C: Chi-Square
Test Results. A summary of the simplified results is shown in Table 4-10:

Table 4-10: Summary of Quantitative Analysis
Principle/Interaction
Hierarchy
Hierarchic Verification (HV)
Insight
Reuse
Optimization
Dependence

Associated
Yes (P~0.00)
Yes (P~0.00)
No (P > 0.05)
Yes (P<0.05)

The principles shaded in blue represent an association was found with integration
success and the ones shaded in red represent no association was found with integration
success. The principles with gray shading represent that the quantitative analysis could
not be performed. All systems were found to adhere to the Principle of Hierarchy. No
data was found with respect to the Principle of Dependence.
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CHAPTER 5. Discussion

5.1 Failure Criteria and System Integration
The results of the System Failure Criteria review in Table 4-7 are summarized in
Table 4-10. Note that because a system can meet multiple failure criteria that the total
percentages in the second column will not add up to 100%. This column is intended to
show a frequency of occurrence. It is evident that system failure makes up the vast
majority of failure criteria with the percentage of total cases reaching ninety-five percent.
Cost and Schedule overruns only occurred in 12.5% of the respective systems. Of these,
sixty-percent fell victim to both cost and schedule overruns, while forty-percent only
cited cost overruns. Therefore, system failure were seen to overwhelmingly be recorded
as system failures, not cost and schedule overruns. One potential reason for this disparity
could be the way the data is recorded historically. Typically engineering case studies are
written from a technical perspective and do not focus on the overarching programmatic
considerations such as cost and schedule unless they are written by a project manager or
program management perspective. This technical focus would shift the evidence to focus
more on the technical system failures and result in a data tilt towards technical failures
instead of programmatic issues. Additionally, there is evidence that overarching
programmatic influences strongly discourage cost and schedule overruns, particularly in
government sponsored programs. For example, the “Faster, Better, Cheaper” initiative at
NASA cost-capped the missions with the threat of cancellation if they overrun [62]. An
additional issue could be the tendency of programs to claim success when a system is
fielded successfully and not to report or record significant cost and schedule overruns that
led up to the system fielding. This could result in a system that actually experienced
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system integration issues to be considered a system success due to selective data being
available.
In any case, system failure warrants a deeper look as it occurred in ninety-five
percent of the cases. Three manifestations of system failure were analyzed, major
redesign, system rescue, and personnel injury or death. Major redesign was not found in
any case. As discussed earlier, one potential reason for this is that the redesign is
captured at a higher level as a cost and/or schedule overrun. Even though cost and
schedule overruns were found not to occur often in this research, this possibility cannot
be discounted. Major redesigns are often captured early in the system lifecycle, so
another possibility for the lack of data is that major redesigns were not recorded or
reported for systems that were fielded successfully. This would skew the results and
misrepresent a system that experienced system integration issues as a system integration
success.
System rescues were only experienced in approximately eight percent of system
failure cases. The small case count is somewhat intuitive, because to be rescued, a
system must have failed in a non-catastrophic way that allows the system to be changed
after fielding. This automatically excludes any systems that catastrophically failed, or
systems that could not be modified after fielding, which is common in aerospace systems
given proximity and communications challenges.
Lastly, personnel injury or death was experienced in almost forty percent of
system failure cases. This highlights the importance of fielding systems correctly and the
serious implication that could arise if a system is not integrated correctly. These three
system failure manifestations do not make up 100% of the system failure cases, leaving
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twenty systems, or approximately fifty-three percent, that simply failed to complete the
mission they were designed.
In the case of the thirty-eight system failures cases that were reviewed it is worth
noting that all thirty-eight of these failures manifested late in the system lifecycle. No
cases were found regarding major redesign early in the system lifecycle. The data points
to a nebulous pattern where most integration issues propagate through the system
lifecycle until system failure occurs after fielding. This is somewhat surprising given the
amount of testing and integration planning that programs perform and points to the
possibility that many integration issues that are found and resolved are never captured as
data points for future evaluation and learning or only captured from the verification and
test perspective rather than as an operational viewpoint. Therefore, system integration
failures are only recorded when systems fail during the mission phase of their lifecycle.
This points to a need to reinvigorate data collection throughout the design and integration
phase of the systems lifecycle to better understand the early and mid-lifecycle
manifestations of integration issues.
Similarly, the data points toward the need to understand and implement a fixed
integration methodology to reduce the number of integration issues experienced in
complex systems. Based on the data many major integration issues will continue to
propagate through the lifecycle unnoticed until after the system is fielded. Once these
manifest it is very unlikely (approximately an eight percent chance) that the system will
be able to rescued. Therefore, there is a need for a paradigm to help integrators identify
these issues early in the system lifecycle prior to fielding.
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It is worth noting that system failures and integration failures are not the same.
However, very little data exists regarding integration-focused failures. For this study,
system failures are treated as a symptom of integration failures and they are treated
similarly. In the case that a system was chosen for review as a system failure, and the
system was not tied to an integration failure, the in depth data review in regards to the
principles of integration and Reuse and Evolvability helped identify the discrepancy so
that the system could be removed from consideration. For example, the Shenandoah
airship was considered, as this airship was not able to complete its mission resulting in a
system failure [12]. However, upon further review, it was found that this airship was
destroyed by a severe thunderstorm. The literature describes the storm as “extraordinary”
and likely one that the airship was never designed to endure [12]. Therefore, this was
determined not to be a failure due to integration, but due to circumstance and was
removed from further consideration. This allowed for the broader topic of system failure
to be narrowed to a system integration focus.

Table 5-1: Summary of Failure Criteria Results
Number of
Cases
Severe Cost Overrun
Integration
Severe Schedule
Failure
Overrun
Manifestation
System Failure

Percentage of Total Cases
2
5.00%
2
38

Number of
Cases
Major Redesign
System
Failure Sub- System Rescue
Manifestation Personnel Injury or
Death

5.00%
95.00%
Percentage of Total System
Failures
0
0.00%
3
7.89%

15
96

39.47%

5.2 Pathfinder Analysis
The pathfinder analysis validated 4 of the 6 principles of integration: Hierarchy,
Hierarchic Verification, Insight, and Optimization. The pathfinder study failed to
validate Reuse and Evolvability and Dependence. All systems follow a hierarchical
architecture, which has become ubiquitous in engineered systems development. The
Principle of Hierarchic Verification appears to be very important to the success of
integration. All of the successfully integrated systems evidenced following this principle
while all but one of the systems with integration issues were found to have violated this
principle. The Principle of Insight also proved to be very important. Although very few
systems were identified as explicitly following this principle, clear departure from the
principle was determined to be a contributing factor to several integration issues. The
Principle of Optimization is sitting on the weakest foundation of all of the principles that
are supported by evidence. Only one system was identified as explicitly following this
principle and only one system was found that plainly violated it. However, the departure
from the Principle of Optimization was conclusively a contributing factor to the
integration failure of the ARIANE- 5, and therefore may be considered weakly validated.
No evidence was found supporting or refuting the Principle of Dependence. This was
unexpected, but upon further analysis, it appears that the Principle of Dependence is
highly related to the Principles of Hierarchic Verification and Hierarchy. The Principle
of Dependence dictates that the chosen size of the intermediate-stable subsystems is very
important to the success of the integration effort as a whole. The need for carefully
determined intermediate subsystems is synonymous with the Principle of Hierarchy.
Likewise, the need for these subsystems to be stable is captured in the Principle of
Hierarchic Verification. Therefore, the Principle of Dependence is a combination of these
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two other principles. Because Dependence was determined to be a combination of these
two principles, it was removed from consideration in the in-depth analysis. Lastly, The
Principle of Reuse and Evolvability was supported by significant evidence. However, in
several cases adherence to this principle was identified as a contributing factor to several
system integration issues. As such, these results reveal a divergence from the expected
results. A further analysis was conducted on the relationships between The Principle of
Reuse and Evolvability and the other Principles. Historical data suggests that
interrelationships between Reuse and Evolvability and the Principles of Hierarchic
Verification, Insight, and Optimization exist and significantly impact the successful
implementation of reuse in integration success.
5.3 Validation of the Principles of Integration
The qualitative results of the larger study shown by color in Table 4-9 closely
resembles the limited results of the pathfinder analysis. As in the pathfinder analysis, all
of the additional system integration successes followed the some or most of the Principles
of Integration and did not depart from any of them. However, in every case of a system
that experienced system integration issues, the system violated one or more of the
Principles of Integration. Therefore, many of the principles of integration can be
validated to varying extents. To determine which of the Principles can be validated, and
to what extent, an in-depth look on a principle-by-principle basis is required.
In an effort to supplement the Qualitative analysis above and further quantify the
differences in the validations, Chi-Square Tests for Association were employed to
determine which principles could be validated to a statistically significant degree. It was
expected that the statistically significant validations would mirror the validations from
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the qualitative analysis. An overview of the results of the analysis are shown in Table
4-10.
5.3.1 The Principle of Hierarchy
All systems followed the Principle of Hierarchy. This was expected due to
Simon’s hypothesis in “The Architecture of Complexity” that man and nature make all
systems hierarchically [1]. The architecture of all complex systems reviewed in this
research, both successes and systems that had issues all shared a hierarchical architecture.
Evidence of these hierarchies is shown in Appendix B: Integration Principle Analysis
Data.
5.3.2 The Principle of Hierarchic Verification
There was evidence of the Principle of Hierarchic Verification on more systems
than any other principle, save Hierarchy. The Principle of Hierarchic Verification was
followed on eleven of the twelve Integration Successes. The lone system that did not
follow this principle was the Hubble Space Telescope. Although the Hubble did not
exactly fall into any of the failure criteria outlined in this research, the violation of the
Principle of Hierarchic Verification did result in operational issues.
On the other hand, only three of the thirty-nine systems that experienced
integration issues did not violate the Principle of Hierarchic Verification. In fact, twentyone of the thirty-nine systems that experienced systems integration issues only violated
the Principle of Hierarchic Verification, signifying the importance and weight of this
Principle.
In total, evidence regarding the Principle of Hierarchic Verification was found in
forty-nine of the fifty-one systems evaluated. In forty-seven of these systems, the overall
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integration effort mirrored the adherence to the Principle of Hierarchic Verification.
Therefore, the Principle of Hierarchic Verification is strongly validated.
The quantitative results showed strong agreement to the qualitative analysis
results. The relationship between the Principle of Hierarchic Verification and integration
success was found to be statistically significant with a P-value of approximately 0.00,
therefore the null-hypothesis, that the Principle of Hierarchic Verification and Integration
success are not related, can be rejected. Further, given the frequency seen in the in
qualitative analysis, the Principle of Hierarchic Verification seems to strongly influence
integration success as it was followed in nearly every successful event and violated in
nearly every integration event that failed. It would be advisable that future integration
efforts spend a considerable amount of resources to ensure this Principle is followed.
5.3.3 The Principle of Reuse and Evolvability
Given the results of the pathfinder analysis, this analysis was expected to follow a
similar pattern. Previously, the validation of the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability was
inconclusive, due to a large number of systems in which the adherence to the Principle
ultimately led to system failure. Therefore, all of the integration successes and many of
the systems with integration issues both adhered to the Principle of Reuse and
Evolvability.
The results of this expanded effort were as expected and largely mirrored the
results of the pathfinder analysis. Evidence was found that all of the system integration
successes adhered to the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability. However, twenty-four of
the thirty-nine systems that experienced integration issues also adhered to this principle
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and only three systems were found to have violated this principle. Therefore, the
Principle of Reuse and Evolvability could not be validated.
The p-value for the relationship between the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability
and Integration Success was 0.172, therefore the null-hypothesis could not be rejected
meaning this relationship is not statistically significant in the quantitative analysis. In
regards to the quantitative results, this was expected. However, the academic literature
clearly states that reuse should be a key factor in integration success. The first clue, to
the discrepancy between expectations can be found in the “Reuse Conundrum”. It is
hypothesized that while the Reuse-Integration Success relationship is not statistically
significant, perhaps the interactions between Reuse and the other principles are, in fact,
significant. This will be further explored in the qualitative analysis of the Principle
interactions at the end of this section.
5.3.4 The Principle of Insight
The Principle of Insight was expected to be validated, though not as strongly
validated as the Principle of Hierarchy, as in the pathfinder analysis. The results from the
extended analysis in the research were as expected and largely extended the trends seen
in the pathfinder analysis. Out of the twelve system integration successes, five of the
systems adhered to the Principle of Insight and no systems did not adhere to this
principle. Similarly, fourteen out of the thirty-nine systems that experienced integration
issues violated the Principle of Insight. There was no evidence that any of the systems
that experienced integration issues adhered to the Principle of Insight.
The quantitative analysis results aligned closely with the qualitative results. The
P-value for the Principle of Insight was found to approximately 0.00. Therefore, the null101

hypothesis can be rejected, and it can be concluded that the principle is statistically
significantly related to systems integration success. The Qualitative Analysis above
shows that while this Principle is related to integration success; it is far less prevalent in
the historical data than the Principle of Hierarchic Verification.
5.3.5 The Principle of Optimization
The Principle of Optimization was expected to be validated, though much more
weakly than the other validated principles, as in the pathfinder analysis. The data in the
extended analysis in this research closely resembles that of the pathfinder analysis, in that
there were very seldom systems that offered evidence of adherence or violation of this
principle. However, all of the data that was gleaned from the literature reviews mirrors
the success of the system’s integration efforts. For instance, only three of the twelve
systems that were successfully integrated provided data concerning this principle,
however, all of three adhered to the principle. Likewise, only two of the thirty-nine
systems that experienced integration issues provided data concerning this principle. Both
of these systems did not follow the Principle of Optimization and both of these failed in
large part due to that violation.
The Principle of Optimization was found to have a statistically significant
relationship with integration success. The P-value for this relationship was found to
approximately 0.01, and therefore, the null-hypothesis is rejected. The qualitative
analysis shows that while Optimization is related with Integration Success, departures of
this Principle least frequently impacted integration success relative to the other four
principles.
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The overall results of these analyses are not surprising as they line up with the
results of the pathfinder analysis exactly. The combined qualitative and quantitative
results identify four principles (Hierarchy, Hierarchic Verification, Insight, and
Optimization) that are correlated with integration success. Therefore, these are the key
factors that help to ensure integration success. While this answers RQ1: What are the
key technical factors that contribute to integration success or integration failures, it does
not answer RQ2, In what circumstances is reuse one of these factors, as Reuse and
Evolvability was found to not be correlated with integration success. Therefore, further
analysis must be conducted into the interrelationships between Reuse and Evolvability
and the other principles to determine the answer RQ2.
5.4 Interactions between Reuse and the Other Principles
The qualitative and quantitative analyses both failed to validate the Principle of
Reuse and Evolvability. The analysis to this point helps answer RQ1 identified in the
literature review: What are the key technical factors that contribute to integration success
or integration failures? However, it does not answer RQ2: how reuse is one of the
factors that contribute to integration success.
The pathfinder analysis suggests that there are interrelationships between the
Principle of Reuse and Evolvability and the Principles of Hierarchic Verification, Insight,
and Optimization exist and influence integration success. To determine the viability of
these relationships prior to an in-depth analysis, a literature review will be conducted on a
principle-by-principle basis, centering on the effect of each principle on reuse in complex
systems. Because of the small amount of academic, government, and industry literature
available concerning reuse in complex systems, the literature review will be augmented
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to include hardware and software-centric reuse as well. Lessons-learned literature will be
particularly valuable to this review. For a particular principle, if the literature suggests a
relationship or correlation between the principle and reuse integration success, this will
strengthen the case for further analysis of the principle’s relationship to reuse integration
success. However, if no relationship is found in literature, it will be assumed that no
relationship exists between reuse integration success and that particular principle.
5.4.1 Hierarchic Verification and Reuse Integration Success
Multitudes of sources were found that addressed the relationship between reuse
integration success and the Principle of Hierarchic Verification. One example is a book
by Beydada et al, is dedicated to the appropriate testing of COTS components [65]. He
outlines the difference and importance of three main testing paradigms that need
evaluation when integrating COTS components: testing components independently,
testing components in the context of a system, and testing component-based systems.
This strongly reflects the intermediate testing prescribed by the Principle of Hierarchic
Verification. Testing components independently represents the independent isolable
testing of the component to verify it meets requirements and functionality expectations.
Testing components in the context of a system largely represents testing the interactions
and interfaces of a component to ensure that when integrated into the next highest
assembly, the interactions and interfaces are as expected. Finally, testing componentbased systems represents the testing needed to verify that, once integrated, all of the
components interact in a way that meets the system based requirements, functionality
expectations, and performance expectations.
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Horrowitz and Lambert state that “since there is no control of, or visibility into
existing vendor-provided software packages, the analysis-oriented systems engineering
efforts on a development project are replaced with comparing vendor-stated
specifications and carrying out test evaluations of the potential system components” [66].
They assert that testing is even more important in reuse that the integrator does not have
adequate Insight to, or if the integrator does not have the ability to conduct design
analysis, predict integration problems, failures, etc. Prosnik, in the Defense Acquisition
Management Course, outlines the need to conduct repeated testing with each new COTS
product release, outlining the need to test reuse components as they are updated [67][68].
Mariani and Pezze realized that testing of COTS is important and offered a behavior,
capture, test method to test COTS components without access to the source code [69].
This method allows the COTS software behaviors to be quantified and verified, even
though the integrators may not have visibility into the software development.
In addition to the academic literature above, several lessons-learned focused
papers identified the importance of testing and verification as well as the need to evaluate
if the previous testing is adequate for the new environment and mission. Wincentsen
points out the need to review heritage test data and test plans to verify if they meet
current project requirements [70]. He asserts that if the previous testing does not meet
the current requirements that the integrator needs to study the impact and feasibility of a
revised testing program. A similar work by Wincentsen echoes the need to review
previous testing for applicability to the new design and mission [71].
Nieberding asserts that any item adopted for use based on successful flight
performance should be deemed unqualified in the adopting application until a thorough
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analysis has been performed to confirm that the adopting application is identical (or less
demanding) in all relevant features to the prior successful applications and that any
deviations must be qualified by test [72]. Iskenderian emphasizes the risk of buying
custom-designed components for other applications based on qualification by similarity
[73]. Besnard and Lawrie explain that testing in and validation procedures in conjunction
with reuse reduces the possibilities of neglecting discrepancies between the two
application structures and flawed analogical reasoning [74]. Barley, Backsay, and
Newhouse identified an instance where verification of a suite of science instruments were
bypassed as a method for cost-reduction, but an analysis carried out in the future showed
that the suite of instruments must be modified to meet the mission [75]. All of these
sources support the existence of the interrelationship between Hierarchic Verification and
Reuse. This relationship highlights the need to test and/or verify the reuse components
when integrating into a complex system and not assume that the components will work as
desired or as they did in their previous applications
5.4.2 Insight and Reuse Integration Success
A similar amount of data was found relating Insight and Reuse. Boudreau cited
the paramount importance of extensive communication between users, material
developers, and contractors in the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion program [76].
Horowitz and Lambert explain that if adequate Insight is not available into the reuse
components, test evaluations of the potential components must be carried out to compare
to vendor-stated specifications [66]. Davenport identifies the necessity of knowledge
capture and knowledge management to the success of Reuse [77] [78]. Morisio et al
identifies a lack of commitment by top management, or non-awareness of the importance
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of reuse processes and considering human factors, often coupled with the belief that using
the object-oriented approach or setting up a repository would automatically lead to
success in reuse [79].
Analogous to the relationship with Hierarchic Verification, several examples of
the importance of Insight to Reuse was identified through lessons learned. Nieberding
identified inadequate project and systems engineering management as one of the root
causes of the failure Genesis, which failed due to reuse components [72]. Similarly,
Jezequel and Meyer cited the ARIANE-5 failure to explain the importance of flowing
down precise, rigorous specification down throughout the organization and that a failure
to do so could result in disaster [80]. Barley, Backsay, and Newhouse point out the risk
of lack of insight/oversight of reuse components [75]. In one of the examples they
analyzed, the lack of Insight into the configuration management of a propulsion system
precluded by expert personnel availability and driven by overconfidence in a reuse
component resulted in the team missing a design flaw resulting in failure. Tracking the
configuration management would have pointed to the numerous changes to the “heritage”
system and only a small degree of heritage could be claimed [75].
These sources support the existence of an interrelationship between the Principles
of Insight and Reuse. This underlines the importance of visibility into the development,
integration, and verification of reuse components by the system integrator. This largely
argues against the “black box” approach of just blindly taking a COTS or reuse
component from suppliers and integrating it into a complex system.
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5.4.3 Optimization and Reuse Integration Success
A more limited dataset was identified regarding the relationship with
Optimization and reuse integration success. The sources identified came entirely from
lessons learned publications. Wincentsen identifies how using heritage designs can add
complexity and potential new failure modes to a design [71]. Leveson also points to the
ARIANE-5 as an example of how adhering to the principle of “commonality” with reuse
components can cause catastrophic failures due to additional complexity, errant signals,
and additional failure modes [42].
While the sources are limited, these do support the interrelationship between the
principles of Optimization and Reuse. This indicates that unneeded functionality,
interfaces, or signals introduced to reuse components can increase the complexity of a
system and even introduce failure modes.
5.4.4 Summary of Principles and Reuse Integration Success Interactions
The relevant literature indicated that interrelationships between the Principles of
Hierarchic Verification and Insight and reuse integration success exist. Although the data
showing an interrelationship between Optimization and reuse integration success is more
limited, data was found and cannot be discounted. Therefore, this relationship between
Optimization and reuse integration success should be explored further. These results are
expected given the results of the qualitative and quantitative analysis
This is existential data and merely suggest that these relationships exists.
However, there exists ample evidence to suggest a further study be conducted to prove
the existence of these relationships. Further, there are many ways that these relationships
can manifest themselves, including both programmatic and technical domains. Some of
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these manifestations were suggested by the literature, such as a programmatic decision
not to test heritage hardware, but without performing an in depth analysis it is impossible
to determine which of these manifestations are linked to reuse integration success. The
common manifestations found through this literature review is shown in Table 5-2.

Table 5-2: Theme to Source Mapping
Programmatic Posture

Corresponding Source

Heritage designs not
appropriately verified after
modification of system or
mission

Beydada et al [65]
Prosnik [65]
Wincentsen [70, 71]
Nieberding [72]
Iskenderian [73]
Besnard and Lawrie [74]

Significant reliance on
Contractors/Subcontractors
providing reuse components
with minimal oversight

Beydada et al [65]
Horrowitz [66]
Besnard and Lawrie [74]
Barley, Backsay, and
Newhouse [75]
Horrowitz [66]
Boudreau [76]
Morisio [79]
Nieberding [72]
Barley, Backsay, and
Newhouse [75]

Disregarding or not
communicating case
data/observations/test data
from reuse

Boudreau [76]
Horowitz and Lambert [66]
Davenport [77]
Jezequel and Meyer [80]

Did not adhere to the
Principle of Optimization for
commonality reasons

Wincentsen [70, 71]
Leveson [42]

Use of heritage designs
reduce verification process
(time, cost)
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5.5 Validating the Interactions
The literature review supports the existence of the interrelationships between the
Principle of Reuse and Evolvability and the Principles of Hierarchic Verification, Insight,
and Optimization. Thus it is necessary to conduct a statistical analysis to determine if
these interrelationships between the principles. The interrelationships can be identified
by determining the interactions of the data set in Table 4-9.
The interactions will be determined by simply multiplying the categorical values
of the principles in question. For example, in the DART example in Table 3-4, the
interaction between Hierarchic Verification, which is 0, and Reuse and Evolvability,
which is 1, is found to be 0 (1*0). In contrast, the interaction between Hierarchy, which
is 1, and Reuse and Evolvability, which is 1, is found to be 1 (1*1). It is, therefore, an
important choice to make the violation of the principles 0 as opposed to -1. For example,
if -1 is chosen to represent violations the interaction between DART Hierarchic
Verification and Insight would be -1 * -1 = 1, which would be an identical value to two
principles that follow the principles. Using 0 insures that no matter if one, two, or three
principles are violated, the interaction output will be 0. The blank cells for the principles
represent missing data, or the fact that no evidence was found to show a system adhered
to or departed from a particular principle. Therefore, the interactions involving a
principle identified as missing data would also be represented by a blank cell. Therefore,
for an interaction to have data and not be “missing”, data must have existed for all of the
comprising principles.
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For example, in the case of DART the interaction between Reuse and
Optimization would be blank, because the Principle of Optimization was identified as
missing data. An example of the resulting first-order interactions for DART is shown in
Table 5-3.
Table 5-3: First Order Interactions
Principle
Hierarchy
Hierarchic
Verification
Reuse and
Evolvability
Insight
Optimization
Hierarchic
Verification *
Reuse and
Evolvability
Hierarchic
Verification *
Insight
Hierarchic
Verification *
Optimization
Insight *
Optimization
Insight * Reuse
and Evolvability
Optimization*
Reuse and
Evolvability
Integration
Success
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DART
1
0
1
0

0

0

0

0

Within Scope of Study
Outside of Scope of Study

Legend

The principles and the interactions in the blue boxes are within the scope of this
study. The interactions in the orange boxes are outside of the scope of this study, but
were calculated for completeness of the example.
As the data remains categorical, a Chi-Square Test for Association will be used
again as a method to determine the association between the interactions and integration
success where:
H0 = There is no association between the Interaction and Integration Success
H1 = There is an association between the Interaction and Integration Success
To avoid the compounding of errors by chaining multiple Chi-Square Analyses
together, a Bonferonni Correction will be applied at every interaction level (first-order,
second-order, and third-order). The Bonferonni Correction is characterized by the
following equation:
∝𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 =

∝
𝑚

(5.1)

Where ∝ represents the overall p-value for the group of tests and m represents the total
number of tests in the group. The Bonferonni Correction effectively divides the desired
p-value by the number of tests run to get a corrected p-value to use for each individual
test, resulting in an overall confidence level of 1-∝. Using the three reuse-related first
order interactions, the corrected p-value will become 0.05/3 or .0167. A Chi-Square test
for association will be performed with the corrected p-values to determine whether the
interactions were statistically significantly associated with integration success. The
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results are expected to highlight the first-order interactions between Reuse and
Evolvability and the Principles of Hierarchic Verification, Insight, and Optimization to
validate the assertions set forth through the pathfinder study and the literature review
conducted with regard to the interrelationships.
The contributing principles of each interaction found to be statistically related
with integration success will be tested for collinearity. A Chi-Square Test for
Association will be conducted for the contributing principles of each first-order
interaction that is related to integration success to determine if the contributing principles
are collinear where:
H0 = There is no association between the constituent principles of the interaction,
therefore they are not collinear.
H1 = There is an association between the constituent principles of the interaction,
therefore they are collinear.
The interactions for which collinearity is present between principles will need to be
reevaluated before being carried forward in future analysis. The interactions for which
collinearity is not present between principles can be carried forward in future analysis.
The values for the first order interactions related to Reuse are shown in Table 5-4.
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Table 5-4: 1st Order Interactions

System Failures

System Successes

Systems

Hierarchic
Reuse and
Reuse and
Verification
Evolvability Evolvability *
* Reuse and
*Insight
Optimization
Evolvability

F-22
Hubble
COSTAR
PAC-3
ISS
Northrop B2
Boeing 777
MTSI
Lockheed F117
Learjet 60
IBM
Canadarm
DART
Boeing 787
MCO
ARIANE-5
Therac-25
Genesis
Contour
SOHO
WIRE
Soviet R-16
R101
Lewis
Mars Observer
SL-1
Centaur/Milstar
Md-11
Deep Space 2
X-15
X-43a
Comet
Constellation
ZR-2
Roma

1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
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1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0

0
0

0

0

0
0

Table 5-4 Continued

System Failures

Systems

Hierarchic
Reuse and
Reuse and
Verification
Evolvability Evolvability *
* Reuse and
*Insight
Optimization
Evolvability

Soyuz 1
Skylab Meteor
Shield
Electra
Athena
Delta 3
TOMS-EP
TIMED
Voyager 2
Pat-Scud
Interceptor
Cobalt 60
Mariner 1
Mariner 10
USS Thresher
Mark 14 Torpedo
Black Arrow
Boeing Starliner
Long March 3

0
0

0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
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0

H0 = Hierarchic Verification and Reuse and Evolvability
Interaction and Integration Success are not associated.
P-Value ~ 0.000: Therefore, the null hypothesis can be
rejected.

Figure 5-1: Example of Chi-Square Test Output for Interaction

An example of the Minitab output for the interaction Chi-Square tests can be seen
in Figure 5-1. In the example, the P-value for the test is 0.000, which is less than 0.05.
Therefore, an association was found to exist between Hierarchic Verification and Reuse
and Evolvability and Integration Success. Similar tests were run for each principle using
the thresholds identified in the methodology section. The outputs of each individual
Minitab analyses can be seen in Appendix C: Chi-Square Test Results.
A summary of the simplified results is shown in Table 5-5:
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Table 5-5: Summary of Interaction Analysis
Associated
Yes (P~0.00)
Yes (P ~ 0.014)
Yes (P~0.00)

Principle/Interaction
HV * Reuse
Reuse * Optimization
Reuse * Insight

The interactions shaded in blue represent an association was found with
integration success.
The results of the Chi-Square Analyses are shown in Appendix C: Chi-Square Test
Results and an overview of the results are shown in Table 4-10. As expected, the
interactions of Hierarchic Verification, Insight, and Optimization and Reuse were found
to be statistically significant with integration success.
The first-order Reuse interactions that were found to be related to integration
success will be tested for collinearity. Additional Chi-Square Tests for Association were
conducted on the contributing principles of the three first-order interactions that were
found to be associated with integration success to determine if the contributing principles
are collinear. The results are shown in Table 5-6.
Table 5-6: Collinearity Results
Collinearity
No (P>0.05)
Unable to Compute
Unable to Compute

Principle/Interaction
HV * Reuse
Reuse * Insight
Reuse * Optimization
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The contributing principles of the interaction results shaded in blue are not
collinear and the contributing principles of the interaction results shaded in grey could
not be computed. A Chi-Square Test could not be computed for the Reuse and Insight
interaction. The data points for this interaction are shown below:

Figure 5-2: Reuse and Insight Interaction Chi-Square Data

There are no instances where both the Principles of Insight and Reuse and
Evolvability are violated. There are also no instances where the principle of Insight was
followed and the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability was violated. Because the ChiSquare Test could not be conducted, a binomial probability will be calculated on this
interaction to determine if Insight is a predictor of reuse success. The cumulative
binomial probability will be calculated to determine the probability of five or less reuse
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successes in fourteen total trials. An event probability of 0.5 will be used, as there are
two resultant states for reuse, success or failure. Minitab was used to conduct the
binomial probability. The results of the binomial probability is shown in Figure 5-3.

Figure 5-3: Reuse and Insight Binomial Probability

The cumulative probability that less than 5 successes will occur given 14 trials and an
event probability of 0.05 is 0.0898. This cumulative probability is large enough that the
distribution suggests a near .50 probability of a reuse success given an integration
success. These results show that no correlation between Insight and Reuse exists.
Therefore, the Reuse interactions can be carried forward for further study.
The Reuse and Evolvability interaction also could not be tested for collinearity
using the Chi-Square Test for Association. The data points for this interaction are shown
below:
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Figure 5-4: Reuse and Optimization Interaction Chi-Square Data

There are no instances where both the Principles of Optimization and Reuse and
Evolvability are violated. There are also no instances where the principle of
Optimization was followed and the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability was violated.
Because the Chi-Square Test could not be conducted, the same methodology established
in the Insight and Reuse and Evolvability interaction will be utilized to test for
collinearity. The cumulative binomial probability will be calculated to determine the
probability of three or less reuse successes in six total trials. An event probability of 0.5
will be used, as there are two resultant states for reuse, success or failure. Minitab was
used to conduct the binomial probability. The results of the binomial probability is
shown in
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Figure 5-5: Reuse and Optimization Binomial Probability

The cumulative probability that less than 3 successes will occur given 6 trials and
an event probability of 0.05 is 0.34375. This cumulative probability is large enough that
the distribution suggests a near .50 probability of a reuse success given an integration
success. These results show that no correlation between Optimization and Reuse exists.
Therefore, the Reuse interactions can be carried forward for further study.
The results of the interaction analysis answers RQ2: In what circumstances is
Reuse a contributing factors of Integration Success or Integration Failure? Although the
Principle of Reuse and Evolvability is not directly related to integration success, the
interactions between this principle and the Principles of Hierarchic Verification, Insight,
and Optimization are significantly related to integration success. Therefore, as seen in
the historical system integration efforts, the relationship between integration success and
the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability is a seemingly more complicated relationship
than with the other principles. This quantitative analysis only validates the existence of
these interactions, but does not provide any insight into how these interactions manifest
in system integration efforts. Therefore, it does not provide a clear path of how to avoid
triggering an interaction event in a future integration effort. While RQ1 and RQ2
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identified in the literature review has been answered, this analysis highlights an
additional question that must be considered:
RQ3: What are the common technical root causes stemming from reuse that
result in integration issues of complex systems?
This question focuses solely on those systems that failed due to reuse components and
subsystems. Therefore, the data set must be reduced to only include those systems.
5.6 Identifying Systems with Reuse Implicated Failures
RQ3 seeks to determine the technical root causes stemming from Reuse that
result in systems integration issues. Therefore, to reduce the aperture to the desired
systems a root-cause analysis must be conducted. The system integration failures will be
evaluated on a system-by-system basis, using the hybrid methodology, to determine the
root cause of the failure and if reuse is implicated in the root cause. The systems that are
found to have failed directly due to reuse components or systems will be subjected to a
further root cause analysis of the failure. This analysis is to determine the reason for the
failure and (similar to the Reuse Conundrum) whether the violation of the other
principles that ultimately result in the failure were attributable to reuse in the system. As
in the pathfinder analysis, these attributions were divided into the three levels: directly
attributable, inferred attribution, speculated attribution.
5.6.1 Data Reduction Methodology
An attribution will be considered direct if there is evidence tying the departure of
one of the principles directly to the fact that reuse is incorporated into the system. An
example of evidence that would warrant a direct attribution can be found in the ARIANE5 Failure Report. The direct attribution between Reuse and the violation of Optimization
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was connected through “The same requirement does not apply to ARIANE 5, which has a
different preparation sequence and it was maintained for commonality reasons,
presumably based on the view that, unless proven necessary, it was not wise to make
changes in software which worked well on ARIANE 4” [10]. An inferred attribution is
supported with evidence that indirectly supports that a principle was violated due to the
incorporation of reuse into the system. An example of inferred data supporting causality
between Hierarchic Verification and Reuse can be drawn from the Mars Climate Orbiter
Mishap Investigation Board Report: “The Software Interface Specification (SIS) was
developed but not properly used in the small forces ground software development and
testing. End-to-end testing to validate the small forces ground software performance and
its applicability to the specification did not appear to be accomplished. The Software
Interface Specification (SIS) was developed but not properly used in the small forces
ground software development and testing. End-to-end testing to validate the small forces
ground software performance and its applicability to the specification did not appear to
be accomplished” [81]. A speculated attribution is one that does not have direct or
indirect data to support it, however, researchers, authors, investigators, and reviewers
speculate that a relationship between the violation of a principle and the fact a component
or system was reused exists. An example of a speculative data supporting causality
between Insight and Reuse is found in the SOHO case study: “Since ATK generally
worked with clients who were familiar with SRMs, they were accustomed to clients who
would already know how to integrate the generic motor into their design” [63].
The results are expected to show that a significant portion of the systems that failed due
to Reuse violated another principle because of the reuse component or subsystem. Table
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4-5 provides a clear picture of expected results for this analysis. In Table 4-5, Hierarchic
Verification is attributable to a reuse failure in all cases at some level and is directly
attributable in 3 out of 5 cases. Insight is attributable in over half of the cases being
directly attributable in 2 of 3 cases. Optimization is only directly attributable in 1 out of
5 instances. Therefore, it is expected that both Insight and Hierarchic Verification will
have many more direct, inferred, and speculated cases than Optimization. It is also
expected that Hierarchic Verification will have more cases than the other two principles.
These systems will be arranged in a qualitative data set similar to Table 4-5 for
inspection. The resulting qualitative data set will identify the technical root causes of
systems integration issues and their relationship to Reuse. These results answer RQ3:
What are the common technical root causes stemming from reuse that result in
integration issues of complex systems?
5.6.2 Data Reduction Results
All of the systems identified as system failures in Table 4-7 were subjected to a
root-cause analysis to determine which of them failed due to the incorporation of Reuse.
The ARIANE-5 will be used as an example to establish the types of data reviewed and
the key points that were being identified. The first step is to identify the technical root
cause of the system failure. In the case of the ARIANE-5, a software error in the Inertial
Reference System sent erroneous signals that caused the engines to swivel and impart
unsustainable stresses on the rocket causing it to break up [10]. The next step was to
determine if the system or component in question was reused from another system or
program. In the case of the ARIANE-5, the Inertial Reference System and associated
software were taken from the ARIANE-4 system [10]. Given that the failed
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component/subsystem in the ARIANE-5 was reused from the ARIANE-4, the ARIANE5 would qualify to be carried forward in the next steps of this study. The data gathered
and detailed study can be found in Appendix D: Root Cause Analysis. The review
resulted in the identification of eighteen systems that failed due to reuse components and
subsystems. They are outlined in Table 5-7.

Table 5-7: Reuse System Failures

Systems that Failed Due to Reuse
Genesis
Black Arrow
ARIANE 5
X-15
MCO
X-43a
CONTOUR
Delta 3
SOHO
Patriot/Scud
Lewis
R101
Mars Observer
Starliner
Centaur/Milstar
Long March 3B
ZR-2 (R-38)
Roma

Each of the failures in Table 5-7, were further evaluated to identify relationships
between the reused component and subsystem failures and the other Principles of
Integration. This process involved a more “in-depth” root-cause study that analyzed the
factors that caused the reuse component/subsystem failures in each of the systems. This
study aimed at determining, on a system-by-system basis, if the use of reuse
components/subsystems negatively influenced the departure from the other principles.
The ARIANE-5 will be carried forward as an example. Revisiting Table 4-9, ARIANE-5
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violated the Principle of Hierarchic Verification and Optimization. Therefore, these two
Principles were analyzed. First, the violation of the Principle of Hierarchic Verification
in the ARIANE-5 was analyzed to determine if Reuse was directly attributable, inferred
to, or speculated to result in the violation. In the case of the ARIANE-5, evidence was
found that Reuse was directly attributable to the failure to employ Hierarchic
Verification. One such piece of evidence stated that “Re-evaluation and analyses of
parameters from one system to the next (ARIANE 4 to 5) not understood - need to
evaluate thoroughly deemed ‘not necessary’” [81]. Next, Optimization was analyzed in
the same manner. Evidence from “Space System Failures” provided evidence that the
violation of the Principle of Optimization was directly attributable to the reuse decision
as well. The source states “While the realignment function served no role in on the
ARIANE 5, it was retained for commonality reasons, and allowed (as on the ARIANE 4)
to operate for approximately 40 seconds after liftoff” [81]. In this analysis a “3” was
assigned to a system if evidence was found that a principle violation was directly
attributed to Reuse, a “2” was assigned to a system if evidence was found that a principle
violation was inferred, and a “1” was assigned to a system if evidence is found that a
principle violation is speculated. This full system-by-system analysis is shown in
Appendix E: Reuse Impacts on Other Principles.
The results of this analysis provide a reduced number of systems that experienced
reuse failures due to the violation of another principle of integration. An additional step
was taken to characterize the relationship between Reuse and each principle as direct,
inferred, or speculated, as discussed in the methodology section. The results of this study
are shown in Table 5-8 and agree with the analysis results of the limited system set in that

126

Hierarchic Verification touches all systems, Insight touches thirty-three percent of
systems and Optimization affects approximately ten percent of systems. These results
will be discussed in further detail in the Discussion section.

Table 5-8: Relationship between Reuse and Other Principles
Principle
Genesis
ARIANE-5
MCO
CONTOUR
SOHO
Lewis
Mars Observer
Centaur Milstar
ZR-2 (R-38)
Airship
Roma Airship
Black Arrow
X-15
X-43A
Delta 3
Patriot/Scud
R101
Long March 3
Boeing Starliner

Hierarchic
Verification
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
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Insight

Optimization

0
0
2
3
2
3
0
3

0
3
0
0
0
0
0
3

0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Remarkably, the results of this study identified eighteen systems, or
approximately forty-five percent of the system failures, failed due to reused components
or subsystems. It is worth noting that all eighteen of these systems are aerospace
systems. This highlights how prevalent these system failures due to Reuse can be and the
necessity to better understand the interactions. The interactions between Reuse and the
other principles were qualitatively analyzed for the each of the systems to determine if
Reuse was directly, inferred, or speculated to have caused a violation of each respective
principles. The compiled results are shown in Table 5-8.
The results of this study show that the technical root causes of all of the failures of
reuse components and subsystems can be attributed at some level to the violation of
another principle of integration due to the reuse decision. In fact, in seventeen of the
eighteen cases, or approximately ninety-four percent, the technical root cause of the
failure is tied to the violation of a principle that is “directly” attributable to the reuse
decision.
These results match very closely with the results of the limited system set
explored in the “Reuse Conundrum” section of the pathfinder analysis. Hierarchic
Verification violations are the most prevalent and they showed up in every one of the
cases. Hierarchic Verification is followed by Insight that showed up in seven, or roughly
thirty-seven percent, of the cases. This is not surprising given the statistically significant
findings in the previous section and the results of the “Reuse Conundrum” analysis in the
pathfinder analysis. In that work, Hierarchic Verification violations were also found in
every case and Insight was found in three out of five cases. Further, the interaction
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between Optimization and Reuse seems to be limited in this system set as in the previous
system set. This interaction only showed up in two of the system failures, or roughly ten
percent of the systems that failed due to Reuse. This interaction showed up once out of
five cases in the “Reuse Conundrum” analysis. The comparison between the two
supports the suggestion that the violation of Optimization due to Reuse occurs very
seldom when compared with the other principles and seems to contribute less to the
overall failures as additional systems are added into the analysis.
This analysis answers RQ3: What are the common technical root causes
stemming from reuse that result in integration issues of complex systems. The technical
root causes for the failures are found to be tied to violations of the other principles due to
the reuse decisions. Eighteen of the failures are tied to the violation of Hierarchic
Verification, six are tied to the violation of Insight, and two are tied to Optimization.
These results are largely expected given the results of the “Reuse Conundrum” section of
the pathfinder analysis. While all of the technical reasons for the failures resulted from
the violation of another principle due to the reuse decision, the mechanisms or decisions
that precluded the violations were not characterized or explored. Ultimately, to this
point, this research has identified a phenomenon (the reuse decision results in the
violation of other principles) that has occurred in eighteen historical system failures, but
does not ultimately provide a characterization or guide to avoid this phenomenon in the
future. Therefore, two additional research questions that must be addressed:
RQ4: What are the contributing factors stemming from reuse that led to system
success or failure?
RQ5: How can these factors be avoided in future complex systems development?
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5.7 Underlying Postures that Result in Reuse Driven Failures
RQ4 seeks to identify the contributing factors stemming from reuse that led to
system failure. This question is very closely related to RQ3: What are the common
technical root causes stemming from reuse that result in integration issues of complex
systems, and warrants a brief discussion of the differences. RQ3 seeks the technical root
cause of why a system experienced issues due to Reuse. An example would be a system
failing to complete its mission because a heritage subsystem was not tested adequately
due to its flight heritage. RQ4 seeks to analyze a layer deeper: what programmatic
decisions or postures led to the technical root cause? Taking the previous example, RQ4
would seek to determine that a program sought to reduce verification cost by leveraging
heritage hardware. This decision to use heritage hardware as a method to reduce
verification cost directly led into the technical root cause of lack of testing, or departing
from the Principle of Hierarchic Verification.
Given the number of reuse driven failures that resulted in the violation of another
principle due to a reuse component, it is hypothesized that there are a number of technical
and programmatic postures and decisions that spawn from Reuse and cause programs to
commonly violate other principles. However, no preconceived postures or decisions
exist, so they need to be identified from the system integration cases.

Each of the

systems will be subjected to a more in depth analysis to determine what decisions and
postures led to the technical root cause of the integration issues. Thematic analysis will
then be employed to identify programmatic themes that resulted in the system failures. A
thematic analysis flow has been identified by Salleh et al as a basis for this portion of the
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research. This analysis flow will be modified to fit this research and the modified
research flow is shown in Figure 5-6 [83].
To begin the Thematic Analysis, the data must be read and reread to ensure
familiarization with the data. Next, the relevant data will be compiled and coded into a
table to allow for easier identification of themes in the data. Once the data is compiled
and encoded, it will be reviewed to identify themes that result in reuse component and
subsystem failure. These themes will be individually evaluated against the interaction
data, concerns, and considerations regarding the principle interactions identified in
literature in the earlier in the Discussion section of this document. If alignment between
the theme identified in the historical data is found with the data summarized in Table 5-2,
the theme is carried forward as a programmatic decision or posture. If no alignment is
found, the theme will not be carried forward.
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Data Familiarization

Code Generation
(Appendix F)

Theme Search

No
Theme
agreed with
associations
identified in
literature
review

Yes

Theme Defined

Theme Integrated into list
of Postures/Decisions

Figure 5-6: Thematic Analysis Flow (Adapted from Figure 1 in [83])
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The results of the thematic analysis will then be compiled. Each system failure
due to Reuse will be analyzed to determine if each system fell victim to one or more of
these themes using the hybrid methodology. The data will then be compiled into a
qualitative data set so that the postures and decisions that are common between systems
can easily be identified.
Although this analysis is expected to identify several contributing factors
stemming from system reuse that resulted in integration issues, these results will not fully
answer RQ4: What are the contributing factors stemming from reuse that led to system
success or failure? These contributing factors must be evaluated using quantitative
methods to determine which, if any, have a statistically significant association with Reuse
implementation success, and, therefore, integration success. A cursory qualitative
analysis will be used as a predicate to a full quantitative assessment. The qualitative
results will be used as preliminary method to determine whether an in-depth quantitative
analysis is warranted. For example, if the qualitative analysis of inspection suggests a
relationship is found between a contributing factor and Reuse implementation success,
the dataset will be transformed into a quantitative data set and a follow up quantitative
analysis should be employed. If the qualitative results do not show any promising
relationships with Reuse implementation success, an additional literature review will be
conducted to determine other manifestations of the interactions. The process will be
repeated to create and evaluate a new data set.
To establish the data set based on these postures/decisions the hybrid
methodology will employed to determine if each system fell victim to one or more of
these postures. The hybrid methodology will output a qualitative data set that can be
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inspected for patterns similar to Table 4-3. The results are expected that one or more of
the categories will appear to be prolific in the reuse failure cases. Based on the results of
the limited “Reuse Conundrum” section it is expected that at least one factor tied to
Hierarchic Verification and one tied to Insight would be abundant in the failures. Given
the low number of Optimization related failures seen in both the Reuse Conundrum and
literature review, several instances are expected to be present, although at a much lower
frequency than the other two principles.
If the qualitative analysis shows promising results, the dataset will also be
transformed into a quantitative, categorical dataset for quantitative analysis by the same
method used with respect to the Integration Principles. Because the X’s are associated
with negative performance, they will be changed to “0”, and the blanks are left as missing
data. However, the systems that were carried forward to this point only represents the
negative data or systems that failed due to Reuse. To perform a meaningful statistical
analysis, systems that represented positive integration of Reuse need to be added to the
dataset. Therefore, all systems that were integrated successfully with Reuse from the
expanded integration principle analysis dataset will be added into this dataset. These
systems must be populated with adequate data to be able to augment the data set, and
therefore, a method for populating this data must be identified.
If a system that successfully incorporated Reuse is found to follow the Principle
of Hierarchic Verification in the integration principle analysis, it will be treated as not
having fallen victim to any of the respective postures or decisions that depart from the
Principle of Hierarchic Verification. However, if the Principle of Hierarchic Verification
is missing data, it was carried over as missing data.
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As with the integration principle data set, an additional row will be added representing
“Reuse Success” where systems in which Reuse failed were given a “0” and systems in
which Reuse succeeded were given a “1”. Due to the categorical nature of the data, a
Chi-Square Test will be utilized once again to determine if the Decisions and Postures
could be associated with the success of Reuse due to the categorical nature of the data
where:
H0 = There is no association between the Posture or Decision and Reuse Success
H1 = There is an association between the Posture or Decision and Reuse Success
To avoid a compounding of errors the Bonferonni Corrections will be utilized to
drive the compilation of the test results to be at the ninety-five percent confidence level,
so a p-value of 0.01 (0.05/X) will be chosen, where X will represent the number of
themes and postures identified through the Thematic Analysis. The results are expected
to have highlighted at least one Hierarchic Verification, one Insight, and one
Optimization related decision that is statistically significant with Reuse success.
The statistically significant results of this analysis will serve to answer RQ4,
What are the contributing factors stemming from reuse that led to system success or
failure, and identify the contributing factors stemming from Reuse that led to system
failure. In addition, the results of this analysis will feed directly into answering the final
research question, RQ5: How can these factors be avoided in future complex systems
development. RQ5 seeks to identify a method by which these contributing factors can be
avoided in the future. Therefore, the statistically significant results of the contributing
factor analysis will be gathered and formulated into a set of secondary considerations that
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should be assessed by the integrator to ensure compliance in the systems engineering plan
with these considerations prior to integrating Reuse into complex systems. For example,
assuming that one of the decisions was that heritage designs did not have to be verified
after the modification of the system or mission, and that this decision was found to be
statistically significantly associated with Reuse success, the secondary consideration
could be as follows: Heritage designs must be evaluated for system and mission
modifications throughout the program lifecycle if incorporated into a complex system. If
the system or mission is found to be modified from the original design, the system should
be verified based on the new parameters.
The resulting set of secondary considerations are expected to include at least one
consideration relating to Hierarchic Verification and at least one consideration relating to
Insight given the results of the literature review and the Insights of the Reuse Conundrum
section.
Once again, ARIANE 5 will be brought forward as an example. Essentially this
effort seeks to identify all of the relevant direct, inferred, and speculated information
from the above analysis and compiling them into a table of easier identification of
common programmatic and technical decisions and postures. An example of
programmatic data supporting the technical decisions and postures for the ARIANE 5
was pulled from this table is shown in Table 5-9. Note that the supporting data shown in
the table points to unneeded functionality being kept for commonality and that the need
to test and evaluate thoroughly was deemed “unnecessary” due to the heritage. These
represent two of the programmatic decisions and postures found in the study.
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Table 5-9: ARIANE-5 Compiled Evidence

ARIANE-5

Supporting Data for Postures and Decisions
Re-evaluation and analyses of parameters from one system to the next
(ARIANE 4 to 5) not understood - need to evaluate thoroughly deemed
"not necessary".
The philosophy of the ARIANE 5 program, as stated in the accident
report, that it was not wise to change software that had worked well on
the ARIANE 4 unless it was proven necessary to do so is well founded:
Errors are often introduced when software is changed, particularly by
those who did not originally write it, as occurred with SOHO.
On ARIANE 5, this rapid realignment function does not serve any
purpose, nevertheless, it had been retained for commonality reasons.
Competitiveness on cost was essential, because when the development
began Arianespace had expected the competition to be "old" US vehicles,
whereas since then the Americans had announced plans to build a new
range of launchers with a view to cutting costs.
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Data
Sources

[82]

[42]
[82]

[11]

The evidence supporting this study is shown in Appendix F: Evaluation of Evidence for
Common Programmatic and Technical Decisions and Postures.
The compiled results were analyzed using thematic analysis to identify any
common decisions and postures that resulted in the violation of other principles due to the
reuse decision. As a simplified example, we will analyze the ARIANE-5 data in Table
5-9. For this example we will assume that multiple systems were found to keep
unnecessary functionality for the sake of commonality as in the case of the ARIANE 5:
“On ARIANE 5, this rapid realignment function does not serve any purpose,
nevertheless, it had been retained for commonality reasons”. Reviewing the data
identified in the Literature Review section we see that this closely aligns to the concerns
raised by Wincentsen [70, 71]. He identifies how using heritage designs can add
complexity and introduce potential new failure modes to a design [70]. Therefore,
maintaining unneeded functionality for commonality reasons should be carried forward
as a programmatic posture.
The thematic analysis identified five common themes causing reuse to lead to the
violation of each of the other principles validated in the Principle of Integration
Quantitative Analysis Results section. In the case of the ARIANE-5 above, one
decision/posture can be identified for Optimization and one can be identified for
Hierarchic Verification. For Optimization, it was stated that unnecessary functionality
was to be maintained to preserve the commonality across programs. For Hierarchic
Verification, the decision was made that additional analyses and testing were not
necessary, even though the overall system and mission had changed from the ARIANE-4.
Taking an additional system as an example, the Centaur/Milstar, one decision/posture can
138

be identified for Optimization as well as Insight. Similar to the ARIANE-5, it was stated
that the Centaur/Milstar kept the roll rate filter in place for later Milstar flights for
consistency [42]. As for the principle of Insight, the data stated that the oversight of the
software development and integration was cut due to funding constraints and the thought
that the software was mature. Data supporting these assertions for the Centaur/Milstar
can be found in Appendix F: Evaluation of Evidence for Common Programmatic and
Technical Decisions and Postures.
Looking at these two examples, there is a common theme identified for the
principle of Optimization, the fact that unnecessary functionality was kept for
commonality purposes. To determine the validity of this theme it, the literature was
revisited to determine if evidence exists that the theme is valid. Both Wincentsen and
Leveson identify how adhering to the principle of “commonality” with reuse components
can results in additional complexity, errant signals, and additional failure modes. [71, 42].
This lends credence to the common theme and it can be carried forward as a defined
theme for inclusion in further analysis.
This process was carried through on a system-by-system basis. Two common themes
for Hierarchic Verification, two for Insight, and one for Optimization were discovered.
They are as follows:


Hierarch Verification
o Heritage designs not appropriately verified after modification of system or
mission, which will be designated HV1
o Use of heritage designs reduce verification process (time, cost), which will
be designated HV2.
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Insight
o Significant reliance on Contractors/Subcontractors providing reuse
components with minimal oversight, which will be designated I1.
o Disregarding or not communicating case data/observations/test data from
reuse, which will be designated I2.



Optimization
o Did not adhere to the Principle of Optimization for commonality reasons,
which will be designated O.
A data set was built using the same methodology that was used to build the

integration principle analysis dataset. This data set showed whether each system
identified in Table 5-8 violated a principle due to one of the 5 common themes listed
above. As stated previously, the ARIANE-5 did not appropriately verify heritage designs
after the modification of the system and/or mission and did not adhere to the principle of
Optimization for commonality reasons. Therefore, an “X” will be marked for both of
these. This will result in a qualitative data set that will be used to supplement the
quantitative analysis due to the categorical nature of the data. The resulting qualitative
data set is shown in Table 5-10.
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Table 5-10: Decisions and Postures Qualitative Data Set

Genesis
ARIANE 5
MCO
CONTOUR
SOHO
Lewis
Mars
Observer
Centaur/Mil
star
ZR-2 (R-38)
Roma
Black
Arrow
X-15
X-43a
Delta 3
Patriot/Scud
R101
Long March
3B
Starliner
Principle
Associated

HV1:
Heritage
Designs not
appropriatel
y verified
after
modificatio
n of system
or mission
X
X
X
X
X
X

Decisions and Programmatic Posture Categories
I1:
Significant
HV2: Use
Reliance on
I2:
of heritage O: Did not
Contractors/
Disregarding or
designs
adhere to the Subcontractor not
reduce
Principle of
s Providing
communicating
verificatio Optimization Reuse
case
n process
for
Components
data/observatio
(time,
commonality with Minimal ns/ test data
cost)
reasons
Oversight.
from Reuse
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

Hierarchic Verification

Optimization
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Insight

Recall the results of the statistical interaction analysis in 5.5 validating the
Interactions: where the Reuse/Insight, Reuse/Hierarchic Verification, and
Reuse/Optimization interactions were found to be related to integration success. Given
these results, it is expected that at least one theme from each Hierarchic Verification and
Insight would be related to Reuse implementation success and that the Optimization
related theme would also be related to integration success. A quick inspection of the data
shows that both themes relating to Hierarchic Verification are prevalent. HV1 was
documented in fourteen of the eighteen systems, or in seventy-eight percent of cases.
HV2 was documented in ten of the eighteen systems, or in fifty-six percent of the cases.
In fact, every system meets one of these two themes. Given these results, it is a
reasonable expectation that both HV1 and HV2 will be related to Reuse implementation
success. On the other hand, the Optimization related theme was only documented in two
times out of eighteen systems, or in eleven percent of cases. This is reasonable given the
frequency of Optimization related issues seen in the Reuse Conundrum as well as the
limited amount of literature regarding this interaction. The first Insight related theme, I1,
was documented in four out of eighteen systems, or in twenty-two percent of cases. The
second theme, I2, was documented in two out of eighteen systems, or in eleven percent of
cases. These results are promising and support the expectation that at least one of the
themes related to each Hierarchic Verification and Insight are related to Reuse
implementation success. However, it is unknown whether the Optimization interaction
will be related to integration success, but the data is trending the expected direction.
Accordingly, a more in-depth study is warranted.
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5.7.1 Quantitative Analysis of Decisions and Postures
This data set was augmented with additional systems that successfully
incorporated reuse components/subsystems and transformed into a quantitative data set as
described in the methodology section. An example will be shown using the ARIANE-5
for a negatively impacted system and the F-22 for a positively impacted system. In
accordance with the methodology section, the ARIANE-5 qualitative data will be
transformed into quantitative data as shown in Table 5-11.
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Table 5-11: ARIANE-5 Transformation
Decisions and Programmatic Posture Categories
HV1:
Heritage
Designs
not
appropriat
ely
verified
after
modificati
on of
system or
mission
ARIANE-5

HV2: Use
of heritage
designs
reduce
verification
process
(time, cost)

X

O: Did not
adhere to the
Principle of
Optimization
for
commonality
reasons

I1: Significant
Reliance on
Contractors/
Subcontractors
Providing
Reuse
Components
with Minimal
Oversight.

I2:
Disregarding or
not
communicating
case data/
observations/
test data from
Reuse

*

*

X

Qual

ARIANE-5

0

*

0

Quant

For every “X” in the qualitative data set, a “0” was input in the quantitative data
set. All empty cells in the qualitative data set were carried over as missing data or “*” in
the quantitative data set. To be able to transform the data in the case of the F-22
Avionics, the data was brought forward from Table 4-9. As stated in the methodology
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section, if the F-22 Avionics was found to adhere to a principle, it was treated as not
having fallen victim to the associated programmatic and decisions to that principle.
Therefore, for every principle the F-22 Avionics program followed in Table 4-9, a “1”
was placed in the quantitative data set for the associated programmatic decisions and
postures. It is worth noting the counter-intuitive nature of this transformation, with the
“X” values being replaced with “0” instead of “1”. This is due to the negative nature of
the programmatic decisions and postures representing common ways that programs failed
to adhere to the integration principles. Therefore, although it seems counterintuitive, it is
consistent with the previous data sets with “0” representing departure from principles and
“1” representing adherence. Revisiting Table 4-9, the F-22 Avionics program adhered to
the Principle of Hierarchic Verification and the Principle of Optimization. The Principle
of Insight was missing data and will be carried forward as such and represented by a “*”.
Therefore, the quantitative transformation is shown in Table 5-12.
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Table 5-12: F-22 Avionics Quantitative Transformation
Decisions and Programmatic Posture Categories
HV1:
Heritage
Designs not
appropriately
verified after
modification
of system or
mission
F-22

1

HV2: Use
of heritage
designs
reduce
verification
process
(time, cost)

O: Did not
adhere to the
Principle of
Optimization
for
commonality
reasons

I1: Significant
Reliance on
Contractors/
Subcontractors
Providing Reuse
Components
with Minimal
Oversight.

I2: Disregarding
or not
communicating
case data/
observations/
test data from
Reuse

1

1

*

*

Avionics

This process was repeated for all of the systems in Table 5-8 and augmented by
all systems that successfully implemented Reuse. This transformation yielded the
quantitative data set in Table 5-13.
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Table 5-13: Decisions and Postures Quantitative Data Set

F-22
Hubble
COSTAR
PAC-3
ISS
Northrop B2
Boeing 777
MTSI
Lockheed F117
Learjet
IBM IS2
Canadarm
Genesis
ARIANE 5
MCO
CONTOUR
SOHO
Lewis
Mars Observer
Centaur/Milstar
ZR-2 (R-38)
Roma
Black Arrow
X-15
X-43a
Delta 3
Patriot- Scud Interceptor
R101
Long March 3B
Starliner

Reuse
HV1 HV2 O I1 I2 Implementation
1
1
1 * *
1
*
*
1 * *
1
1
1
* * *
1
1
1
* * *
1
1
1
* 1 1
1
1
1
* * *
1
1
1
* 1 1
1
1
1
* 1 1
1
1
1
* * *
1
1
1
1 * *
1
1
1
* 1 1
1
1
1
* * *
1
0
0
* * *
0
*
0
0 * *
0
0
*
* * 0
0
0
0
* 0 *
0
0
*
* 0 *
0
0
0
* 0 *
0
0
*
* * *
0
*
0
0 0 *
0
0
0
* * *
0
*
0
* * *
0
*
0
* * *
0
*
0
* * *
0
0
*
* * *
0
*
0
* * *
0
0
*
* * 0
0
0
*
* * *
0
0
0
* * *
0
0
*
* * *
0
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This quantitative data set was then subjected to a series of Chi-Square Analyses to
determine any association between the five programmatic decisions and postures and
Reuse implementation success. The Bonferonni Correction was applied and a p-value of
(0.05/5) was calculated because five decision and postures were identified by the
Thematic Analysis. These tests were carried out as discussed in the methodology section.
An example of the Minitab output for these Chi-Square Tests is shown in Figure 5-7.

H0 = HV1 and Reuse Implementation Success are not
associated.
P-Value ~ 0.000: Therefore, the null-hypothesis can
be rejected.

Figure 0-1: Chi-Square Results Example
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In this case, an association was found between Reuse implementation effect and
HV1. The P-value for this analysis can be seen in the figure to be approximately 0. The
results of this analysis is summarized in Table 5-14:

Table 5-14: Summary of Quant Analysis Results
Decision/Posture

P-Value

HV1

P~0

HV2

P~0

O

P > 0.01

I1

P < 0.01

I2

P < 0.01

The postures/decisions that were found to be significantly associated with Reuse
implementation success were shaded blue, and those that were not were shaded orange.
Four of the five common decisions/postures were statistically significant and associated
with Reuse implementation success. These were:


Hierarch Verification
o Heritage designs not appropriately verified after modification of system or
mission, which will be called HV1 (P-value ~ 0.00)
o Use of heritage designs reduce verification process (time, cost), which will
be called HV2. (P-value ~ 0.00)
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Insight
o Significant reliance on Contractors/Subcontractors providing reuse
components with minimal oversight, which will be called I1. (P-Value
<0.01)
o Disregarding or not communicating case data/observations/test data from
reuse, which will be called I2. (P-Value <0.01)

These results showed that the eighteen program failures seemed to be in good alignment
with a relatively few failure mechanisms. All of the themes identified shared very close
alignment with multiple warnings identified in the literature review for the interactions
between Reuse and the other principles shown in Table 5-2. Now that the themes have
been identified, each system should be reviewed once again to determine which, if any,
of the themes identified that the system fell victim to. The results of this review and the
corresponding quantitative transformation are shown in Table 5-10 (Qualitative Results)
and Table 5-13 (Quantitative Results).
The results of the previous section shown in Table 5-8 provided a very clear
expectation of what to expect on a principle-level (i.e. at least one of the two Hierarchic
Verification failure mechanisms will be realized in each of the failures). However, there
were no clear guidelines of what to expect for the breakout of how prevalent each failure
mechanism is in the eighteen cases.
Starting with the Hierarchic Verification failure modes, HV1 was found in
fourteen of the eighteen cases and HV2 was experienced in eleven of the fourteen cases.
It is worth noting that both failure modes were experienced in six cases. This is not
entirely unexpected as these two failure modes can speculatively be related to one
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another. For instance, use of heritage design to reduce verification process can easily
lead to these same heritage designs not being appropriately verified after modification
due to the adversity of the program to expend the time or cost related with retesting the
components or subsystems. However, each failure mode was experienced individually at
least five times showing a level of independence between the failure modes. Given the
number of cases identified, it is expected that the quantitative analysis will show a
statistically significant relationship between both of these failure modes and Reuse
implementation success.
Similarly, both failure modes related to the Principle of Insight are experienced in
a relatively similar number of cases. I1 was experienced in four of the eighteen cases and
I2 was experienced in three of the eighteen cases. Unlike the Hierarchic Verification
failure, modes there were no cases that failed due to both of these failure modes. These
failure modes occurred significantly less often than those of Hierarchic Verification,
which is expected, given the reduced number of cases in which Insight was implicated
into Reuse failure when compared to Hierarchic Verification. Given the number of cases
identified as well as the number of positive cases identified in Table 4-9, it is expected
that the quantitative analysis will show a statistically significant relationship between
both of these failure modes and Reuse implementation success.
In the case of Optimization, only one failure mode was identified. There were
also only two cases in which Optimization was implicated in Reuse failure. As expected,
both of these cases were found to fail due to the failure mode identified. Given the small
number of cases identified, it is not expected that the quantitative analysis will show a
statistically significant relationship between the failure modes and Reuse implementation
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success. The only manifestation of the interaction between Reuse and Optimization was
not found to be statistically significantly correlated with integration success in Table
4-10. Although this is unexpected, as the Reuse/Optimization interaction was found to be
related to integration success, the data does trend with the integration principle data set,
Reuse Conundrum data set, and the literature review data in that there exists a
significantly smaller amount of data related to Optimization than to Hierarchic
Verification and Insight. It is expected that a larger data would grow the number of
Optimization cases and perhaps validate the Optimization related posture: “Did not
adhere to the Principle of Optimization for commonality reasons”.
These results answer RQ4, What are the contributing factors stemming from
reuse that led to system success or failure, by identifying four contributing factors
stemming from Reuse:


Heritage designs not appropriately verified after modification of system or
mission



Use of heritage designs reduce verification process (time, cost)



Significant reliance on Contractors/Subcontractors providing reuse
components with minimal oversight



Disregarding or not communicating case data/observations/test data from
reuse



Did not adhere to the Principle of Optimization for commonality reasons

5.7.2 Development of Secondary Consideration for Reuse Implementation Success
Recall that early in this research it was determined that The Principle of Reuse
and Evolvability is not, individually, statistically significantly correlated to integration
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success, but that several of the interactions between this principle and the other principles
were in fact found to be correlated to integration success. The statistically significant
failure modes are more detailed characterizations of the interaction results shown in
Table 4-10. For instance, in addition to stating that a statistically significant interaction
between Reuse and Hierarchic Verification exists, it should be stated that the failure
modes for the interaction between Reuse and Evolvability are as follows:


Heritage designs are not appropriately verified after modification of system or
mission



Use of heritage designs reduce verification process (time, cost)

Both of these interactions are statistically significantly correlated with the successful
implementation of Reuse that will ultimately yield complex system integration success.
The same is true for the following Reuse and Insight interactions:


Significant reliance on Contractors/Subcontractors providing reuse components
with minimal oversight



Disregarding or not communicating case data/observations/test data from reuse

Revisiting the results of the pathfinder study, it was hypothesized that a set of
secondary considerations when implementing Reuse should be developed to serve as a
guideline for complex integration success. The statistically significant failure modes
serve as a basis for identifying these secondary considerations, as they are the primary
failure modes shown to result in Reuse implementation failure. Therefore, citing the
above failure modes a set of four secondary considerations can be as follows: When
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integrating reuse components or subsystems into a complex engineering product is
critical to:


Integrators must compare system and environment requirements between the
heritage system and newly developed system to ensure heritage designs are
appropriately verified after modification of system or mission



Integrators cannot utilize heritage designs as a method to reduce verification
process (time, cost). Heritage designs can reduce developmental complexity, but
must be appropriately verified.



Integrators must implement a management structure that provides adequate
oversight to Contractors/Subcontractors providing reuse components to avoid
Black-Box procurement scenarios.



Ensure that all heritage data is communicated to relevant stakeholders including
data/observations/test data from reuse components and subsystems. This is
particularly critical if the data is out-of-family with expectations or heritage data.

These four secondary considerations serve to answer the final research question,
RQ5: How can these factors be avoided in future complex systems development. These
four secondary considerations should be implemented in program planning when reuse
components or subsystems is being integrated to ensure that the next generation of
complex systems does not meet the same fate as the eighteen systems identified in this
research.
While the results of each step of this work provide meaningful and relevant
results, there are more broad overarching implications when viewed as a whole body. For
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example, it was established through the research that Reuse and Evolvability historically
has been successful approximately fifty percent of the time and introduced issues into
systems the other fifty percent of the time. This highlights the relevance of this study to
industry and redefines the underlying academic theory of component and subsystem
reuse. In academic literature component and subsystem reuse is largely regarded as a
common method to reduce system complexity and reduce integration resources needed.
This research has shown that reuse can be beneficial, but should not be implemented
blindly. Careful attention must be taken when implementing Reuse to avoid violating the
principles of Hierarchic Verification and Insight.
For example, with regard to Hierarchic Verification, reuse should not be used as a
method to reduce the verification resources needed to properly field a system. In this
case, it can be said that reuse can be a method to reduce developmental complexity, as in
the resources needed to develop the reused component, but should not be used as a
method to reduce the resources required to verify and test the component or subsystem.
Similarly, if a component or subsystem is reused, the integrator must ensure that
the mission and environments of the component or subsystem remains unchanged.
Otherwise, the integrator must ensure that the deltas between the requirements or mission
space is indeed tested to ensure the component or subsystem is viable. This echoes the
need to ensure that reuse to reduce developmental complexity is not used as a means to
reduce the verification and testing complexity during the integration effort.
The research also advises against the use of “black-box” procurement for complex
components and subsystems and argues that Insight into the development and testing of
reused components is imperative to Reuse implementation success. The research argues
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against relaxing oversight requirements on contractors due to reuse and the need to
ensure that appropriate observations are flowed up to the integrator, even if they are not
in line with heritage data. The data argues that while Reuse may be used to reduce the
technical development complexity, Reuse should not be used as a means to reduce
oversight or programmatic complexity. Recall that these conclusions apply to complex
components and subsystems and do not apply to common, mass-produced parts with
fixed specifications, such as a nut or bolt. Therefore, these conclusions do not extend
programmatic efforts to an unreasonable or unachievable level of testing, evaluation, and
oversight.
The results not only highlights mistakes and issues common to Reuse
implementation, but provides a roadmap to avoid these same common issues and
mistakes in future integration efforts. By properly implementing component and
subsystem reuse and only trying to claim a reduction in developmental complexity,
integrators can avoid introducing failure modes into future complex systems.
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CHAPTER 6. Conclusions

The overarching goal of this research was to answer the following question: why
does the integration of reuse components and subsystems cause complex systems to fail
almost as often as they are successful? However, the literature review identified a need
to better define, characterize, and validate a set of guiding principles for complex systems
integration. Therefore, the research conducted to answer this overarching question
ultimately drove two major sets of conclusions: the first regarding the definition and
understanding of complex systems integration and the second set focusing on Reuse
implementation success in the context of complex systems integration. To further define
and understand the nature of complex systems Integration, two research questions was
identified that needed to be answered:
RQ1: What are the key technical factors that contribute to integration success or
integration failures?
RQ2: In what circumstances is reuse one of these factors?
To narrow the focus to reuse and determine factors key to Reuse implementation
success, three more research questions were identified:
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RQ3: What are the common technical root causes stemming from reuse that
result in integration issues of complex systems?
RQ4: What are the contributing factors stemming from reuse that led to system
success or failure?
RQ5: How can these factors be avoided in future complex systems development?
Together, these four research questions will answer the question of why reuse seems to
cause failures as often as it reduces complexity.
The first research question, RQ1, seeks to determine the key technical factors that
contribute to integration success. To identify these factors, a literature review was
conducted which identified five integration principles: Hierarchy, Hierarchic
Verification, Reuse and Evolvability, Insight, and Optimization. These principles
represent a potential list of key technical factors that contribute to integration success.
Both Qualitative and Quantitative analysis techniques were utilized on historical system
integration data consisting of fifty-two systems to validate these principles. The results
of these analyses validate the principles of Hierarchy, Hierarchic Verification, Insight and
Optimization and showed that they were statistically significantly related with integration
success. Therefore, the principles of Hierarchy, Hierarchic Verification, Insight, and
Optimization represent the key technical factors that contribute to integration success.
RQ2 seeks to determine how the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability impacts
integration success. The results of the qualitative and quantitative analysis did not
validate the Principle of Reuse and Evolvability, so this principle alone is not impactful
to integration success. The pathfinder analysis identified a potential that the interactions
between Reuse and Evolvability and the other principles of integration has a relationship
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to integration success. To further evaluate these interactions, historical data interactions
were identified quantitatively analyzed in the same manner as the principles. The
analysis identified that the following interactions were statistically significantly related to
integration success:


Hierarchic Verification and Reuse



Insight and Reuse



Optimization and Reuse



Hierarchic Verification, Insight, and Reuse

This answers RQ2. While Reuse alone does not have a relationship with integration
success, the interactions between Reuse and Hierarchic Verification, Insight, and
Optimization are related to integration success.
The second portion of the research narrowed the aperture to focus more on Reuse
implementation success in the context of complex systems integration. RQ3 seeks to
identify how reuse contributes to the failures of the complex systems. The first step in
addressing this second portion of the research is data reduction to focus on only systems
that failed due to reuse. A root cause analysis was performed on each system to
determine the failure modes and determine if reuse was implicated on these failure
modes. One conclusion hidden in the reduction of the data set is that 100% of the
systems that failed due to reuse could be tied in some manner to the interactions between
Reuse and another principle (i.e. reuse feeding into a decision not to verify, etc.). In
approximately ninety-five percent of these cases, enough data existed to warrant a
“direct” attribution. Therefore, it can be concluded that the overwhelming majority of
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Reuse implementation failures occur due to these interactions. This serves to answer
RQ3.
The root causes of the system failures are rooted in the interactions between Reuse and
the other principles. That means that the integrators violated other principles with regard
to a reuse component or subsystem.
RQ4: What are the contributing factors stemming from reuse that led to system
success or failure, seeks to identify the contributing factors the interactions identified
above in the forms of programmatic posturing and decisions. The basis for these postures
was established through a literature review of the interactions shown and are as
summarized:


Heritage designs not appropriately verified after modification of system or
mission



Use of heritage designs reduce verification process (time, cost)



Significant reliance on Contractors/Subcontractors providing reuse
components with minimal oversight



Disregarding or not communicating case data/observations/test data from
reuse



Did not adhere to the Principle of Optimization for commonality reasons

Each of the systems were subjected to an in depth review to identify these
postures and decisions on a system by system basis and thematic analysis was employed
to establish a formal set of programmatic decisions and postures. These were the same
five themes identified in the literature review above. A data set was created in the same
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manner as the data set for the systems and these postures and decisions were qualitatively
and quantitatively analyzed to determine their respective relationship with Reuse
implementation success, and subsequently, integration success. The results of these
analyses identified four statistically significant decisions that related to Reuse
implementation success:


Heritage designs not appropriately verified after modification of system or
mission



Use of heritage designs reduce verification process (time, cost)



Significant reliance on Contractors/Subcontractors providing reuse
components with minimal oversight



Disregarding or not communicating case data/observations/test data from
reuse

These were four decisions or postures were the contributing factors to the
technical root cause of failure, the Reuse interaction. For example, a program fails to
adhere to Hierarchic Verification because they do not want to retest a heritage component
before integrating into a system with a different mission.
The final research question, RQ5: How can these factors be avoided in future
complex systems development, seeks to identify a method for avoiding these contributing
factors in the future when integrating reuse components or subsystems into a complex
system. Therefore, the validated programmatic decisions and postures were formulated
into a set of secondary considerations that should be considered when incorporating reuse
components and subsystems into complex systems. These secondary considerations are:
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Integrators must compare system and environment requirements between the
heritage system and newly developed system to ensure heritage designs are
appropriately verified after modification of system or mission



Integrators cannot utilize heritage designs as a method to reduce verification
process (time, cost). Heritage designs can reduce developmental complexity, but
must be appropriately verified.



Integrators must implement a management structure that provides adequate
oversight to Contractors/Subcontractors providing reuse components to avoid
Black-Box procurement scenarios.



Ensure that all heritage data is communicated to relevant stakeholders including
data/observations/test data from reuse components and subsystems. This is
particularly critical if the data is out-of-family with expectations or heritage data.

These secondary considerations provide a roadmap for Reuse implementation success in
complex systems and ultimately answer the final research question, RQ5.
If the 18 systems that failed due to reuse had used these filters when implementing
reuse components and subsystems, 16 of the systems would have not have failed due to
the reuse of components and subsystems. This is a reduction in the failure rate of
approximately 89%. The two failures that would not have been caught failed due to the
Optimization and Reuse interaction. Although no secondary consideration was validated
for this interaction, the data is trending towards relevance as both systems that failed due
to this interaction failed by the same mechanism. Throughout this research, each of the
data sets followed the same trend: each had a multitude of examples regarding Hierarchic
Verification and Insight, but few examples of Optimization. It is expected that a larger
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data would grow the number of Optimization cases and perhaps validate the Optimization
related posture: “Did not adhere to the Principle of Optimization for commonality
reasons”. By analyzing past integration efforts that experienced issues due to Reuse, this
research has characterized the interactions that predicated these issues and identified key
areas of consideration to avoid issues in the future. This research has shown that Reuse is
a double-edged sword: it can reduce the integration complexity, but if not implemented
correctly reuse can introduce complexities and failure modes into the very systems it was
meant to help. Therefore, Reuse must be implemented carefully with special attention
given to not violate any of the other principles of integration, especially Hierarchic
Verification and Insight. It is important for integrators to remember that the benefits of
Reuse are focused on reducing developmental technical complexity and should not be
thought to reduce integration, verification, and test complexity or reduce the complexity
of the oversight effort, lest they fall victim to the same mistakes. These results provide a
roadmap to successful incorporation of reuse systems and components into complex
aerospace systems.
The breadth of these conclusions should be stated. It is worth noting that this
research started off by analyzing complex systems in a wide variety of fields and that the
first part of this research, i.e. the Principles of Integration, are applicable to a wide array
of complex systems. However, by narrowing the focus to systems that failed due to
reuse, the data set was reduced to only incorporate those aerospace systems. Therefore,
the conclusions drawn in the second part of this research can be said to apply to
aerospace systems, but stating they apply to complex systems as a whole would be
largely conjecture.
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CHAPTER 7. Future Work

There will always be an opportunity to further refine and extend this work as
more data on additional integration efforts become available. These additional systems
can be added into the data set and the analyses rerun to further refine the conclusions
derived in this work. Additional latitude could perhaps be considered to analyze
additional commercial complex systems such as mobile phones, computing devices,
automobiles, production plant systems, and many others to determine if these
conclusions, in fact, apply to a larger body of systems or if these are specific to aerospace
related systems.
This research focuses exclusively on the interactions between Reuse and the other
principles, but largely leaves the other interactions unexplored. A similar thread of
research should be conducted to determine which of the remaining interactions are related
to integration success and determine the various ways these interactions can affect
complex system integration success.
As model-based systems engineering becomes more and more prevalent in
industry, methodologies to incorporate reuse findings into a model-based paradigm will
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be increasingly important. While this research has identified a set of secondary
considerations for incorporating reuse into complex systems, it has left the
implementation of these considerations in the model-based environment unexplored.
Future research could be conducted to develop metrics to track compliance to these
principles and considerations in the model-based engineering environment.
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APPENDIX A

Failure Criteria Analysis

Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART)


Following a series of navigational system errors and problems with fuel management,
DART crashed into its rendezvous partner spacecraft. Shortly afterwards, the mission
prematurely ended without having achieved any of its Phase III (Proximity
Operations) technical and scientific objectives. DART transitioned into Phase IV
(Departure and Retirement) only 11 hours into its 24-hour mission plan. [52]



For an overall cost of more than double what Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC)
initially proposed ($110 million versus $47 million), DART was designed to conduct
pre-programmed autonomous rendezvous and maneuvers with a target satellite
already in orbit named Multiple Paths, Beyond-Line-of-Sight Communications
(MUBLCOM). [52]

Boeing 787


On September 26, 2011, Boeing publicly announced the delivery of its first 787
Dreamliner transporter to its first customer, All Nippon Airways. That event took
place almost 40 months later than originally planned, after a long series of unexpected
delays. The actual development cost of the project was estimated at about US$40
billion and was “well more than twice the original estimate”. [47]

Mars Climate Orbiter
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Ground software had miscalculated the spacecraft’s trajectory. Instead of lightly
skimming the Martian atmosphere, the spacecraft was orbiting more than 170
kilometers below its target altitude. Heat and drag from the atmosphere presumably
destroyed the satellite [61].

ARIANE-5


On 4 June 1996, the maiden flight of the ARIANE 5 launcher ended in failure. Only
about 40 seconds after initiation of the flight sequence at an altitude of about 3700m,
the launcher veered off its flight path, broke up, and exploded. [10]

Therac-25


Between June 1985 and January 1987, a computer controlled radiation therapy
machine, called the Therac-25, massively overdosed six people. These accidents
have been described as the worst in the 35-year history of medical accelerators [44]



Between June 1975 and January 1987, six known accidents involved massive
overdoses by the Therac-25 – with resultant deaths and serious injuries. [85]

Genesis


On September 8, 2004 the Genesis sample return capsule drogue parachute did not
deploy during entry, descent, and landing operations over the Utah Test and Training
Range. The drogue parachute was intended to slow the capsule and provide stability
during transonic flight. After the point of expected drogue deployment, the sample
return capsule began to tumble and impacted the Test Range at 9:58:52 MDT, at
which point vehicle safing and recovery operations began. [62]

Contour
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While in orbit, CONTOUR fired its motor to put itself on the trajectory toward its
first comet. During this time, the team did not schedule telemetry coverage, but they
expected to regain contact once the burn was over. After many attempts to
reestablish communication with CONTOUR, the project team officially declared the
spacecraft lost. [85]

SOHO


After implementation of code modifications meant to increase SOHO’s lifetime
during its extended operations phase, multiple errors in the new command sequences
repeatedly sent the spacecraft into an emergency safe mode. One key error remained
undetected while ground controllers made a critical mistake based on an unconfirmed
and faulty assumption. SOHO’s altitude progressively destabilized until all
communication was lost in the early hours of June 25, 1998. It took three months to
miraculously recover and restore SOHO to full mission status. [63]

WIRE


Approximately 20 minutes after wire separated from its launch vehicle, a transient
electronic signal released the cryostat cover, exposing the hydrogen tanks to heat
from the sun and earth. The hydrogen sublimated and escaped through the vents,
sending the spacecraft into an uncontrolled spin. In less than thirty-six hours, the
entire four-month supply of solid hydrogen needed to cool the telescope’s infrared
sensors was gone. The mission ended in failure just four days after launch. [86]

Soviet R-16
184



At the dawn of the space age, the largest catastrophe in the history of rocketry
occurred in the Soviet Union, killing dozens of people. The incident was kept a secret
for decades, but we now know not only that it occurred, but that it was caused by a
number of preventable factors: improper safety procedures, flawed design, hazardous
chemicals treated with insufficient respect, and a rush to launch that was driven by
political pressures and an overconfidence in technical competence by management.
[87]

R101


The crash landing was witnessed by a French rabbit trapper setting snares in the
woods. According to this witness, the nose-down landing was immediately followed
by “a tremendous explosion that knocked me down. Soon flames rose into the sky to
a great height. Everything was enveloped by them. I saw human figures running
about like madmen in the wreck. Then I lost my head and ran away.” Only eight
people managed to get clear of the inferno, and of these, only six survived. Lord
Thomson and all the ship’s officers died in the flames. [12]

Lewis


The Lewis Spacecraft Mission was conceived as a demonstration of NASA’s Faster,
Better, and Cheaper (FBC) paradigm. Lewis was successfully launched on August 23,
1997, from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California on a Lockheed Martin Launch
Vehicle (LMLV-1). Over the next three days a series of on-orbit failures occurred
including a serious malfunction of the attitude control system (ACS). The ACS issues
led to improper vehicle attitude, inability to charge the solar array, discharge of
batteries, and loss of command and control. Last contact was on August 26, 1997.
The spacecraft re-entered the atmosphere and was destroyed 33 days later, calling
into question the value of FBC. [88]
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Between August 1994 and February 1995, communication between NASA and TRW
over cost control and changes in scope became increasingly adversarial. In March
1995, NASA issued TRW a formal budget overrun notice to “show cause and cure.”
[88]

Mars Observer


After eleven months in transit, and only three days away from entering the red
planet’s orbit, Mars Observer dropped from contact with its Earthbound NASA
controllers. The project team could not restore communication with the spacecraft; no
signals were detected from it in the following months, and NASA was forced to
declare Mars Observer permanently lost. [89]



Under the impact of such changes, the original schedule extended by two years and
project cost doubled [89]

SL-1


In the early years of nuclear power development, the first small-scale boiling water
reactor exploded catastrophically, claiming the lives of three engineering technicians.
This nuclear accident occurred in January of 1961 at the U.S. National Reactor
Testing Station near Idaho Falls, Idaho, and is the only nuclear accident resulting in
the loss of life ever to occur in the United States. The accident, called a “prompt
criticality,” resulted from a variety of factors, including inadequate design, inadequate
materials testing, and poor procedures and training. [90]
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Centaur/Milstar


On April 30, 1999, a Titan IV B-32/Centaur TC-14/Milstar-3 was launched from
Cape Canaveral. The mission was to place the Milstar satellite in geosynchronous
orbit. An incorrect roll rate filter constant zeroed the roll rate data, resulting in the
loss of roll axis control and then yaw and pitch control. The loss of attitude control
caused excessive firings of the reaction control system and subsequent hydrazine
depletion. This erratic vehicle flight during the Centaur main engine burns in turn led
to an orbit apogee and perigee much lower than desired, placing the Milstar satellite
in an incorrect and unusable low elliptical final orbit instead of the intended
geosynchronous orbit. [81]

MD-11


The nine month delivery delay of an original three year schedule and a 30% overrun
are significant for a redesign that did not require breakthrough technology. [45]

Deep Space 2


The probes had a very robust construction that had been tested by blasting them into
the ground using a powerful air gun. However, nothing was heard from them [11]

X-15


The year was 1967, and the United States and the Soviet Union had engaged in a race
to the moon. While the world watched as two nations broke old records and set new
milestones in Earth orbit, aerospace history was being made on a less publicized,
suborbital, stage. High above Edwards Air Force Base, test pilots pushed known
limits of materials, guidance, and human performance in the North American X-15.
Called “the most successful research airplane in history,” the X-15 probed the
hypersonic flight environment to carry out otherwise impossible experiments. After
190 flights, the X-15 had flown up to Mach 6.7 (4,520 miles per hour) and set an
altitude record for manned winged vehicles (354,199 feet) that would stand until the
Shuttle launched years later. But on November 15, the program saw tragedy. That
day, U.S. Air Force Major Mike Adams was piloting the number three aircraft when a
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drift in heading caused the X-15 to reenter the atmosphere perpendicular to its
ballistic flight path. The aircraft departed controlled flight. At 62,000 feet, severe g
forces tore the aircraft apart, and Major Adams perished in the accident. [91]
X-43a


The first vehicle was released by NASA’s B-52 off the coast of California on 2 June
2001. About 8 seconds later, the booster began to shed debris, and it was destroyed
by command when it veered off course. A replay of the video showed what appeared
to be a piece of the reinforced tail fin snapping off. [11]

Comet


At 10:50 on the morning of January 10, 1954, a British Overseas Airways
Corporation (BOAC) de Havilland Comet en route from Rome to London radioed
Rome that it was breaking through the overcast at twenty-seven thousand feet and
climbing to an assigned cruising altitude of thirty-six thousand feet. Less than two
minutes later, fisherman off the island of Elba in the Mediterranean saw flaming
wreckage falling out of the clouds and into the sea. There were twenty-nine
passengers and six crew members aboard.
On the night of April 8, 1954, a second Comet aircraft explosion occurred, resulting
in twenty-one deaths. [12]

Constellation


On July 11, 1946, a new TWA Lockheed Constellation carrying five crew members
on a routine training flight caught fire and crashed while trying to make an emergency
landing at the Reading, Pennsylvania, airport. The only survivor was Capt. Dick
Brown, a TWA instructor who was giving Capt. Art Nilsen an Instrument check ride.
[12]

ZR-2


On August 24, 1921, during a test flight of a British-designed airship carrying both
British and American crews, a series of high-speed turns was attempted. The
structurally unsound hydrogen airship sagged and began to break in two, casting out
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both men and equipment. The front half of the airship, becoming engulfed in flames,
exploded. The rear section of the airship, burning slowly, drifted down to a sandbar.
Of thirty-two British and seventeen American crewmen onboard, only five survived.
[12]
Roma


On February 21, 1922, the large semi-rigid Italian-built airship called the Roma
crashed and burned at Langley Field, Virginia, killing thirty-four of its crew of fortyfive Americans. [12]

Soyuz 1


On April 23, 1967, the Soviet Union launched the Soyuz-1 spacecraft to achieve a
new and elaborate docking capability. Multiple malfunctions on orbit forced ground
crews to abort the mission. In a crippled spacecraft with rapidly draining power
reserves, cosmonaut Colonel Vladimir Komarov heroically maneuvered the craft for
re-entry to Earth. Upon re-entry, the vehicle’s drag and backup para-chutes entangled.
With no means of braking, Soyuz-1 struck the ground at 90 miles per hour, and the
most experienced cosmonaut of the Soviet space program was killed upon impact.
[92]

Skylab Meteor Shield


Approximately sixty seconds after the unmanned Skylab Workshop was launched on
May 14, 1973, from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, there was an indication that the
workshop’s meteoroid shield had inadvertently deployed. That mishap was the first
in a series of events that made the Skylab program one of the most exciting and
adventuresome in space exploration. Two hours after what appeared to be an
otherwise successful launch, the Skylab was practically unusable. A rapidly planned
and executed rescue saved the Skylab program from becoming a complete loss [12]
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Electra


On September 29, 1959, a new Braniff Lockheed Electra, flying in clear, calm
weather over Buffalo, Texas, lost a wing and crashed. All thirty-three people on
board, including twenty-eight passengers and a crew of five, were killed in the crash.
Five and a half months later – March 17, 1960 – with stumped investigators about to
write off the Braniff accident as “crashed for reasons unknown,” a Northwest Electra
also lost a wing in flight and crashed near Tell City, Indiana. All sixty-three on board
were killed. [12]

Athena


As the Athena I lifted off for its inaugural launch on 15 August 1995 from SLC-6 at
Vandenberg. It was to put the satellite into a polar orbit at an altitude of 680
kilometers, but a T=160 seconds it veered off course and the range safety officer
destroyed it some 466 kilometers down range at an altitude of 148 kilometers. The
tracking camera footage indicated that an anomalous pitch excursion started at T+79
seconds. [11]

Delta 3


The first launch of the Delta III took place on August 26th, 1998 at night, carrying an
operational satellite for the company PanAmSat. It lifted off perfectly, only to
explode around 72 seconds later. This was due to the simultaneous ‘rocking’ of three
solid boosters, which made the gimbaling boosters overcorrect for each vibration.
Despite the gimbal system having about twice as much as it needed, it ran through its
supply of hydraulic fluid in about 20 seconds, leaving only the core stage to control
the rocket. [93]

TOMS – EP


Shortly after launch, the Sun sensors were found to be providing anomalous outputs.
The fault was a pin-assignment error in the connector between the satellite and one of
the two solar arrays. [11]
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TIMED


Soon after recovering from this initial problem, the satellite began to gyrate about its
desired Sun-pointing safe attitude. It was trying to point the wrong axis at the Sun.
Two Sun sensors were mounted 90 degrees from where they should have been. [11]

Voyager 2


The scan platform operated well at Jupiter, and for a while at Saturn, but shortly after
the spacecraft made its closest approach to the planet the azimuthal actuator seized,
locking the platform, resulting in the loss of a significant fraction of the scientific
observations from the outbound part of the encounter. [11]

Pat-Scud Interceptor


On February 25, 1991, a Patriot missile defense system operating in Dhahran, Saudi
Arabia, failed to engage an incoming Scud missile. The missile struck U.S. Army
barracks killing 28 soldiers and injuring 98. The reason for the failure of the Patriot
was a fixed-point round-off error in the range-gate algorithm of the Patriot radar
unit’s tracking system [94].

Cobalt 60


This report summarizes and analyzes the responses of various organizations that
provided assistance to the National Oncology Institute (Instituto Oncológico
Nacional, ION) of Panama following the overexposure of 28 radiation therapy
patients at the ION in late 2000 and early 2001. The report also looks at the long-term
measures that were adopted at the ION in response to the overexposure incident, as
well as implications that the incident has for other cancer treatment centers
worldwide. In March 2001, the director of the ION was notified of serious
overreactions in patients undergoing radiation therapy for cancer treatment. Of the
478 patients treated for pelvic cancers between August 2000 and March 2001, 3 of
them had died, possibly from an overdose of radiation. In response, the Government
of Panama invited international experts to carry out a full investigation of the
situation. Medical physicists from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)
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were among those invited. They ascertained that 56 patients treated with partially
blocked teletherapy fields for cancers of the uterine cervix, endometrium, prostate, or
rectum, had had their treatment times calculated using a computerized treatment
planning system. PAHO’s medical physicists calculated the absorbed doses received
by the patients and found that, of these 56 patients, only 11 had been treated with
acceptable errors of ±5%. The doses received by 28 of the 56 patients had errors
ranging from +10 to +105%. These are the patients identified by ION physicists as
overexposed. Twenty-three of the 28 overexposed patients had died by September
2005, with at least 18 of the deaths being from radiation effects, mostly rectal
complications. The clinical, psychological, and legal consequences of the
overexposures crippled cancer treatments in Panama and prompted PAHO to assess
radiation oncology practices in the countries of Latin American and the Caribbean.
ION clinicians evaluated the outcome of 125 nonoverexposed patients who had been
treated in the same time period and for the same cancer sites as the overexposed
patients. The clinicians uncovered a larger recurrence of cervical cancers than
expected. The finding prompted PAHO to launch an initiative for the accreditation of
radiation oncology centers in Latin America and the Caribbean, working in
collaboration with professional societies for radiation oncologists, medical physicists,
and radiotherapy technologists. The Latin American Association for Radiation
Oncology (Asociación Latinoamericana de Terapia Radiante Oncológica) has
established an accreditation commission. Accreditation will require that centers
implement a comprehensive radiation oncology quality assurance program that
follows international guidelines. Statistical data on patient outcomes will be collected
in order to document needs in radiotherapy centers in Latin America and the
Caribbean and to define future strategies for cancer treatment. [95]
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Mariner 1


This was to be the first Mariner mission. It was intended to perform a Venus flyby.
The vehicle was destroyed by the Range Safety Officer 293 seconds after launch at
09:26:16 UT when it veered off course. The booster had performed satisfactorily until
an unscheduled yaw-lift (northeast) maneuver was detected by the range safety
officer. [96]

Mariner 10


On January, after a gyro malfunction, the attitude control system wasted 16 percent of
its supply of nitrogen propellant. The loss of so much gas so early was of great
concern, as it was hoped that Mariner 10 would be able to perform three flybys of
Mercury. Two days after the Mercury flyby later an electrical short drained 90 watts
from the power system and made the power electronics bay run very hot, which
obliged the engineers to switch off the cameras to relieve the load. Shortly thereafter
the tape recorder failed, which meant that future flyby data would have to be
downloaded in real-time. Part of the telemetry system was also lost. [11]

USS Thresher


On April 10, 1963, while engaged in a deep test dive 220 miles east of Cape Cod,
MA, The USS Thresher, SSN593, was lost at sea settling at a depth of 8400 feet with
all aboard. The crew of 112 Naval Officers and Enlisted Personnel and 17 civilians
died. [97]

Mark 14 Torpedo


The U.S, Navy submarine force entered World War II with a defective primary
weapon system, the Mark XIV Torpedo. It was developed in the mid 1920‘s, but
never adequately developmentally or operationally tested prior full rate production.
After the inception of hostilities, submarine commanders reported multiple problems
with malfunctioning torpedoes. This case study presents the Mark XIV‘s
developmental history, initial combat performance, and the 21 month effort to find
and remedy the three root causes that were significantly degrading the torpedo‘s
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combat effectiveness. The study subsequently analyses the derived lessons learned in
requirements development, developmental testing, and operational testing. [98]
Black Arrow


The first test from the Woomera rocket range in Australia was on 28 June 1968, and
was to be a sub-orbital test of the first two stages. Within seconds it started to twist
and corkscrew. Although the dummy 3rd stage sheared off, the vehicle continued its
torturous climb. At an altitude of 8 kilometers it toppled over and started to tumble,
so it was destroyed by the range safety officer.
On 4 March 1969 another two-stage vehicle flew this sub-orbital test flawlessly,
clearing the way for a three-stage vehicle to attempt to place a demonstration satellite
in low orbit on 2 September 1970. Unfortunately, telemetry and tracking indicated
that the second stage’s engine was losing thrust. It shut down almost 30 seconds
ahead of schedule. The Waxwing motor of the third stage ignited successfully, but
was unable to compensate for the inherited shortfall in velocity and fell into the
ocean. [11]

Boeing Starliner


Aerospace America (2/28) reported that the clock error which prevented the Boeing
Starliner from successfully completing its December OFT “could have been found
with more complete testing, a Boeing official told reporters Friday.” [99]

Long March 3


Unfortunately, within two seconds of lifting off on its inaugural mission on 14
February 1996, it veered off course and fell to Earth, killing several people. [11]
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APPENDIX B

Integration Principle Analysis Data

F-22
Hierarchy

Figure B-1: F-22 Exploded View [46]
Hierarchic Verification
Because the display holds an on-board computer, video chip, and software the displays
can be tested as a stable intermediate and testable subsystem. The functionality of this
can be verified by signal injection, potentially without having to attach to another
subsystem in the cockpit avionics. [54]
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Reuse and Evolvability
The program decided to use the COTS OpenGL graphics language standard which
allowed the developers to use “standardized” computational and graphics technology
inside the displays. Code was also reused as available during the development of the F-22
Cockpit Avionics. Ada source code and executables were routinely reused for modeling,
simulation, and customer demonstration throughout the development of the avionics. [46]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
The display software takes the data and then renders the output to the pilot onboard the
actual display as opposed to rendering all display data on a central computer and feeding
them to the appropriate displays. By having dedicated computer chips, video chips and
software in each of the displays, this system adhered to The Principle of Optimization by
reducing the number of information paths to get from one state to another. [46]
Hubble
Hierarchy

Figure B-2: Hubble Space Telescope [100]
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Hierarchic Verification
The error in the HST mirror occurred because the optical test used in this process was not
set up properly; thus the mirror was polished to the wrong shape. [100]
This event occurred at a time when there was also great concern about cost and schedule,
possibly overshadowing the obvious need for independent verification testing, or
attention to the apparently anomalous RNC data suggesting that something might have
been wrong. [100]
Reuse and Evolvability
The HST Command and Control System (CCS) was engineered to lean heavily on COTS
and GOTS software in an effort to minimize the custom code required to operate the
HST. [101]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
A critical Middleware layer is also utilized for interprocess communication The CCS
Middleware layer provides a suite of services for message and data transport between
application and COTS/GOTS products while executing on a variety of hardware
platforms. [101]
COSTAR
Hierarchy

Figure B-3: COSTAR [102]

197

Hierarchic Verification
The Axial Science Instrument Simulator (ASIS) and the Axial Bay Simulator (ABS) were
used to verify the instruments on COSTAR before integration into the HST. In addition,
a replica of the aft end of the HST known as the High Fidelity Mechanical Simulator was
constructed for fit checks. [102]
Reuse and Evolvability
ASIS was used to verify instruments on the HST and was used on COSTAR. [102]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
PAC-3
Hierarchy

Figure B-4: PAC-3 Subsystems [51]
Hierarchic Verification
During the development each materiel change package is tested individually and then
retested as a part of the fielding configuration during integrated systems testing. [103]
The program heavily relied on a network of geographically dispersed facilities that
provided hardware-in-the-loop testing (HWIL), integration testing, and modeling and
simulation. [51]
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Reuse and Evolvability
The Patriot Advanced Capability – 3 (PAC-3) system differs from the previous two
systems in scope: the PAC-3 system is a system upgrade of the PAC-2 system instead of
a clean sheet design. [103]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
ISS
Hierarchy

Figure B-5: International Space Station [104]
Hierarchic Verification
To ensure the safety of the crew as well as the success of the program, the verification
process was based on the concept that each level of assembly would be verified before
being integrated into the next level. [104]
Reuse and Evolvability
NASA utilized COTS and reuse hardware anywhere they could. However, they balanced
this with a method to ensure that the reuse and COTS hardware could meet requirements
with minimum modifications. [57]
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Insight
NASA assigned a system development manager and an integration manager to each
subsystem and module to ensure that the development met the requirements and that each
module would successfully integrate into the system as a whole. [57]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
DART
Hierarchy

Figure B-6: DART Subsystems [105]
Hierarchic Verification
Time constraints pressed the software developers to incorporate flight code and
simulation model changes without adequate documentation and testing instead of
incorporating the changes in stable builds to verify individual functionality of the
changes. [106]
Reuse and Evolvability
DART utilized the fourth stage of a Pegasus launch vehicle as the aft portion of the
spacecraft. [106]
Insight
The time and budget constraints the program faced also forced NASA to be largely
uninvolved in the program development. NASA set broad requirements to the prime
contractor, Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC), and left most of the details and design
decisions up to OSC’s discretion [52]
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Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Boeing 787
Hierarchy

Figure B-7: Boeing 787 [48]
Hierarchic Verification
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Reuse and Evolvability
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Insight
The supply chain strategy of the Boeing 787 took the integrator, Boeing, out of major
portions of the integration process. [47, 48]
Many of Boeing’s supplier sent subsystems that were unfinished or missing appropriate
documentation for final assembly. [47]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Mars Climate Orbiter
Hierarchy

Figure B-8: Mars Climate Orbiter [107]
Hierarchic Verification
NASA cited a lack of end-to-end testing for the Small Forces software and could not
determine if any independent review of the software had been performed. [61]
Reuse and Evolvability
NASA reused software from other programs where possible. For example, the Small
Forces Software was reused from the Mars Global Surveyor Project. [81]
Insight
During the mission, the navigation team expressed explicit concerns about the MCO’s
trajectory among themselves, but ultimately did not communicate their concerns with the
spacecraft operations team or project management. This isolation of the navigation team
as well as the lack of end-to-end systems testing are symptoms of the overarching
integrator not having adequate Insight into all elements of the system. [61]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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ARIANE-5
Hierarchy

Figure B-9: ARIANE-5 [59]
Hierarchic Verification
However, because the ARIANE 5 did not use the flawed data generated there was no
requirement levied against this data and, therefore, no test associated to find the
issue. The SRIs were largely tested in isolation and not tested in the closed-loop
simulations of the flight for verification. [10]
Reuse and Evolvability
The software that failed was reused from the ARIANE 4 launch vehicle. [108]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
The software failed when an attempt to convert a 64-bit floating point number to a signed
16-bit integer caused the number to overflow. Even though the overflowing number was
not utilized by the ARIANE 5, there was no exception handler associated with the
conversion so the software was shut down. [108]
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THERAC-25
Hierarchy

Figure B-10: Therac-25 [55]
Hierarchic Verification
The Therac-25 was designed to take advantage of computer control from the onset, and
the decision was made not to build the computer control on a stand-alone machine. [55]
Reuse and Evolvability
The Therac-25 was designed to take advantage of computer control from the onset, and
the decision was made not to build the computer control on a stand-alone machine [84]
Only a small amount of software testing was done on a simulator, but the majority of
testing was pushed to integrate system testing. [84]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Genesis
Hierarchy

Figure B-11: Genesis Subsystems [62]
Hierarchic Verification
In the case of the G-switches, heritage pedigree fed an overconfidence in the design and
ultimately led to a relaxation of the verification process. [62]
Reuse and Evolvability
There was significant reuse of Hardware and Software for Genesis from the Stardust
program. The incorrectly installed G-switches were heritage hardware from the Stardust
Program. [62]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

205

CONTOUR
Hierarchy

Figure B-12: CONTOUR [109]
Hierarchic Verification
Testing the spacecraft with the SRM assembled was deemed to be impractical so the APL
team was not able to complete testing with their typical rigor. [85]
Reuse and Evolvability
NASA chose to incorporate ATKs STAR Solid Rocket Motor. [85]
Insight
Because of their inexperience with SRMs NASA heavily relied on their contractors
without sufficient oversight. In addition, ATK was used to customers who were familiar
with SRMs and would already know how to integrate the generic motor into their design.
[85]
To further compensate for APL’s lack of experience with SRMs, they hired a consultant
for dynamic analysis for the SRM firing. The consultant operated under several
misconceptions that the project team did not scrutinize, including neglecting fuel slosh
effects. [85]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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SOHO
Hierarchy

Figure B-13: SOHO [110]
Hierarchic Verification
An investigation board found that the code wasn’t thoroughly tested. The code was only
tested by a NASA computer-based simulator. The simulator tested changes in code on a
change-by-change basis and not all together. [111]
Reuse and Evolvability
All of the hardware and most of the software could be considered reuse as this was a
mission continuation. [111]
Insight
An Investigation Board found that the modifications to command sequences were not
properly documented, communicated, reviewed, or approved. [111]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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WIRE
Hierarchy

Figure B-14: WIRE Subsystems [112]
Hierarchic Verification
The Mishap Investigation Board determined a major contributing factor to the oversight
of these design flaws to be the inadequacy of the test campaign for WIRE. The test
program for the pyro electronics box did not uncover the design failure mode because the
box-level testing used the initiation of a laboratory power supply instead of the closure of
a relay to power up the box. This slow rise time of the power supply masked the short
turn-on transient of the pyro box. [113]
Reuse and Evolvability
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Insight
The project office never obtained the appropriate level of Insight into the instrument
electronics design. Because the instrument was managed by another NASA center senior
management encouraged the project office not to press the Insight issue out of respect to
the sister NASA center. [114]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Northrop B-2
Hierarchy

Figure B-15: B-2 Bomber [115]
Hierarchic Verification
24,000 hours of wind tunnel testing and years of simulator tests [45]
The B-2’s hundreds of cross sections were subjected to thousands of test measurements
covering the full, wide spectrum of radar frequency. [45]
To ensure the B-2 design conformed to performance requirements Northrop’s team and
the Air Force conducted a large amount of testing. As part of Northrop’s verification
strategy the company developed sophisticated laboratories to perform component and
subsystem testing early in the development process. Nearly a million hours of test time
accumulated through environmental stress screening, ground avionics testing, and flights
of a C-135 avionics test bed. Extensive wind tunnel, avionics, flight controls, computer
systems, qualification, and acceptance testing greatly reduced the number of program
unknowns. [45]
The B-2’s extensive four year development flight test program involved six aircraft.
Focus on testing ranged from envelope expansion to avionics, comparable to a
commercial aircraft flight test program. [45]
From the beginning, Northrop also planned a very extensive ground durability and
structural test series of the airframe. Two complete airframes were dedicated to this. [45]
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Reuse and Evolvability
Within the B-2’s airframe is packed a wide array of subsystems, including both off-theshelf and new technology items. [45]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Boeing 777
Hierarchy

Figure B-16: Boeing 777 [116]

210

Hierarchic Verification
Extensive wind tunnel testing and CFD simulation [45]
Boeing took the aircraft through an early break-in period to identify and correct
problems. Conducted extensive ground testing, additional flight testing. Boeing invested
$370 million dollars in a new test facility called the Integrated Aircraft Systems
Laboratory (IASL). The IASL tests individual parts, subassemblies, and integrated
aircraft systems both on the static bench and under flight simulated conditions. Boeing
conducted advanced Hardware in the Loop testing. Using 9 aircraft the 777 accumulated
about twice as much flight test time than normal. [45]
Reuse and Evolvability
Reused parts from the 757, 767, and 747-400. Nose structure of the 777 is the same as
the 767. The cockpit design was derived from the 747-400. The engine is a scaled
version of the design on the 757. [45]
Insight
At the top are 30 integration-level teams representing the largest aircraft sections, and
each has had the responsibility of maintaining the interfaces of its component parts for
the other 29 sections. Subcontractors and suppliers had unusually close working
relationships with Boeing under this structure. [45]
It was through full time onsite airline advisory teams that Boeing had influence on the
lower level design details. [45]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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MSTI (Miniature Seeker Technology Integration)
Hierarchy

Figure B-17: MTSI Subsystems [117]
Hierarchic Verification
A hardware-in-the-loop test bed was used throughout the project, which expedited system
integration. [118]
Reuse and Evolvability
The team took advantage of existing hardware architectures for their architectural design
to expedite the project. [118]
The compressed schedule increased the importance of the use of available but advanced
technologies and the use of standardized interfaces between each subsystem.
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Though faced with low cost and compressed schedule the MSTI design (figure 5)
included only 30 % Class I hardware - build-to-print or off-the shelf, 20% Class II
hardware - design variant, and Class III hardware –new developments [117]
Insight
The team was collocated, and daily meetings were used to assign daily tasks and keep the
team focused on the launch. The standard Problem Failure Report (PFR) was streamlined
and electronic reports provided snapshots of the resolved and outstanding PFRs. [118]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Lockheed F117
Hierarchy

Figure B-18: Lockheed F117 [119]
Hierarchic Verification
The program called for a variety of tests: radar cross-section and wind tunnel model tests
of the prototype design; qualification and proof tests for various systems and subsystems;
preflight testing of the assembled aircraft and flight testing. [45]
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Control system obtained from General Dynamics F-16 flight tested in a specially
modified T-33 before first F-117 flight. [45]
The 5 FSED aircraft incorporating all the design features were involved in F-117 flight
testing; and they were modified throughout the development to test design refinements.
Flight testing was crucial to the design process, especially considering the limited
simulation tools available. Testing identified commercial off-the-shelf subsystems were
inadequate and must be modified or replaced. [45]
Extensive ground testing of the test aircraft was performed prior to the first flight. In
addition to the wind tunnel and radar cross section testing, extensive component,
subsystem, and integration testing of avionics was accomplished. [45]
Another indicator of successful sys eng practices was the definition of the integrated
testing approach early in the development process. [45]
Reuse and Evolvability
Risk was minimized by the use of existing subsystems and technologies throughout the
aircraft. [45]
Lockheed’s approach to moving stealth from concept to reality was to use off-the-shelf
hardware when possible, modify existing equipment where feasible and invent new
systems only when required. To accomplish this subsystems and components were taken
from a wide variety of aircraft existing at the time. For example, most of the cockpit
avionics and engines were derived from the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 fighter; flight
controls came from the General Dynamics F-16 fighter, landing gear and ejection seat
from the McDonnell Douglas F-15 fighter, inertial nav system adapted from the Boeing
B-52 bomber; and the enviro control system from the Lockheed C-130 transport. Other
subsystems were obtained from many other airplanes going as far back as the T-33 jet
trainer of the early 1950’s. [45]
Insight
A strong systems integration and technical management presence was provided by the
Lockheed PM and his deputies. [45]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

214

Learjet 60
Hierarchy

Figure B-19: Learjet 60 [120]
Hierarchic Verification
The Model 60 team also performed extensive simulation testing and analysis. [45]
Learjet followed the verification and integrated testing in a manner required for FAA
certification. Therefore most of the verification and integrated testing requirements were
known at the beginning of the effort. The program created and flew one engineering
prototype before completing three deliverable preproduction units that were flown in the
flight certification program [45]
Reuse and Evolvability
Learjet Model 60 is a direct derivative of the Model 55. [45]
The PW305 engine from Pratt and Whitney Canada was chosen as an off-the-shelf
design. [45]
The integrated avionics suite selected was the Collins Pro Line System 4. This system
was essentially off-the-shelf. [45]
The Model 60 uses a majority of the same subsystems and components as the Model 55.
[45]
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Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
The OTS integrated avionics suite simplified the integration task for Learjet by reducing
the interfaces Learjet had to develop. The avionics suite and OTS engine arrived as
tested units and therefore Learjet’s developmental testing responsibility was primarily at
a system level. [45]

Soviet R16
Hierarchy

Figure B-20: Soviet R16 [121]
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Hierarchic Verification
While the explosion was caused by the failure of the electrical inhibitor, this resulted in
disaster because of poor design, a rush in development and testing, and a disregard for
common-sense safety procedures. [87]
The poor design was probably a consequence of the R-16’s rushed development, and the
rushed testing led to further mistakes. [87]
Reuse and Evolvability
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

R101 Airship
Hierarchy

Figure B-21: R101 Airship [122]
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Hierarchic Verification
R101 is a classic schedule-driven technology disaster. The cumulative political pressure,
attendant press cover-age, and competition with the R100 team all brought pressure on
the R101 design/build team to move forward without the necessary operational testing.
[123]
Effects of rain saturation were untested and unknown. [123]
Reuse and Evolvability
The R101 design team set out to push the envelope of technology in many ways: by
employing diesel engine technology for the first time in a rigid airship; using steel for the
first time in airship rib structures; employing newly designed pressure valves on the
flotation bags; implementing (unsuccessfully, in that it was not incorporated into the test
flights) innovations in outer skin manufacturing; and unsuccessfully attempting to
develop and implement hollow metal reversible propeller blades. [123]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

Lewis
Hierarchy
The ACS did not undergo sufficient independent reviews by functional experts in
Redondo Beach as the other subsystems enjoyed. [124]
Hierarchic Verification
Misapplication of a “heritage design” (borrowed from a previous application) for the
ACS represents a fatal error. The “heritage trap” occurs in making flawed assumptions
regarding the applicability of a specific technology to an-other operating environment or
another hardware configuration. The largely undefined FBC paradigm encouraged the
use of heritage hardware and software as a means of saving the expense of design
verification testing and analysis. [88]
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The ACS system verification was likewise flawed. The verification activity modeled a
limited set of nominal, on-orbit attitude control cases, failing to model a thruster
imbalance scenario that ultimately led to the loss of the spacecraft. [88]
Specific failures in test and verification were evident in this case. In some ways, Lewis
was the ultimate heritage trap in which the TOMS attitude control software was used for
pre-programmed, nominal operating conditions. [88]
Reuse and Evolvability
The ACS design heritage was initially based on the proven Total Ozone Mapping
Spacecraft (TOMS) design. [124]
Insight
Project Team Dislocation: The decision to move TRW technical and management core
capabilities to Redondo Beach in January 1995 was a significant factor because it isolated
the Lewis ACS and flight operations sub-system managers from critical discipline experts
and corporate assurance processes that might have challenged design assumptions and
pressed for more extensive simulation and training of operations personnel. [88]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Mars Observer
Hierarchy

Figure B-22: Mars Observer [125]
Hierarchic Verification
The board identified the propulsion pressurization system check valves as unfit for an
interplanetary Mars mission.
Testing showed that the valves could keep leaks down to an acceptable level during the
Earth-orbiting mission for which they were designed. During their long journey to Mars,
however, the valves were exposed to much more radical temperature and pressure
changes, over a much longer period than original testing had qualified them to sustain.
The likelihood for vapor particles to leak and accumulate in the tubing increased to the
point where only a tiny leak (tenths of a gram) posed a significant explosion hazard. In
defense of the designers, no leak ‘standard’ or minimum had yet been established from
previous NASA projects. [89]
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Reuse and Evolvability
In an effort to manage cost and schedule risk, the Mars Observer mission crew employed
a large number of heritage parts. [[89]
Much trust in qualification for the mission flight was granted to these heritage
components. [89]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

SL-1
Hierarchy

Figure B-23: SL-1 Nuclear Reactor [126]
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Hierarchic Verification
Before the accident there was little testing of BPS, and no testing of their behavior under
the high temperature, high neutron flux conditions present in an operating reactor.
Because of the Cold War context, there was a significant sense of urgency to continue
with the reactor operation even though the technology was not fully developed. [90]
Reuse and Evolvability
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Insight
Lack of Rigorous Training and Detailed procedures: There were also several operational
and management failures that contributed to the mishap. The maintenance technicians
would have been well aware of the rod sticking problems, and might have decided to
conduct a rod travel exercise manually prior to performing the drive reattachment. They
might have been especially concerned about sticking since the rods had not been
exercised for almost two weeks during the shutdown period. [90]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Centaur/Milstar
Hierarchy

Figure B-24: Milstar 3 Subsystem [127]
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Figure B-25: Atlas-Centaur Vehicle [128]
Hierarchic Verification
The accident investigation board concluded that failure of the Titan IV B-32 mission was
due to an inadequate software development, testing, and quality assurance process for the
Centaur upper stage. [81]
Reuse and Evolvability
The roll rate filter itself was included early in the design phase of the first Milstar
spacecraft, but the spacecraft manufacturer later determined that filtering was not
required at that frequency. A decision was made to leave the filter in place for the first
and later Milstar flights for “consistency.” [81]
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The same is true for the Centaur software with respect to the losses resulting from leaving
in the unneeded filter function. If the cost of the analysis of reused (or COTS) software or
of changes to software is prohibitively expensive or beyond the state of the art, then
redeveloping the software or completely rewriting it may be the appropriate decision.
[81]
Insight
The Titan/Centaur accident also involved critical information not getting to the right
people.
For example, tests right before launch detected the zero roll rate but there was no
communication channel established for getting that information to those who could
understand it. A guidance engineer at the launch site noticed the anomalous roll rates and
called LMA in Denver, leaving a voice mail message to call her or her supervisor. She
also sent an email to her supervisor at Cape Canaveral explaining the situation. Her
supervisor was on vacation and was due back at the office the next Monday, but the
engineer herself was scheduled to work the second shift that day. Two LMA engineers in
Denver, the control dynamics engineer who had originally specified the filter values and
his supervisor, listened to the voice mail from the launch site guidance engineer and
called her supervisor, who had just returned from vacation.
He was initially unable to find the email she had sent him during their conversation and
said he would call back. By the time he called back, the control dynamics engineer who
had created the filter values had left his supervisor’s office. At no time did the LMA
Denver engineers speak directly with the launch site guidance engineer who had
originally noticed the anomaly. [81]
Both the Titan and Mars ’98 programs were transitioning to process “Insight” from
process “oversight,” reflecting different levels of feedback control over lower levels and
a change from prescriptive management control to management by objectives, where the
objectives are interpreted and satisfied according to the local context. [81]
Optimization
The roll rate filter itself was included early in the design phase of the first Milstar
spacecraft, but the spacecraft manufacturer later determined that filtering was not
required at that frequency. A decision was made to leave the filter in place for the first
and later Milstar flights for “consistency.” [81]
Both the ARIANE and Titan/Centaur accidents involved software functions that were not
needed, but surprisingly the decision to put in these unneeded features was not questioned
in the accident reports. [81]
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Md-11
Hierarchy

Figure B-26: MD-11[129]
Hierarchic Verification
A considerable amount of wind-tunnel testing was carried out to verify and refine the
design. [45]
Through the use of computer simulations and wind tunnel testing Douglas was confident
the aircraft could meet customer requirements. During FSED it participated in and paid
close attention to the tests performed by the subcontractors. Douglas built and tested
wind tunnel models, a DC-10 fuselage was turned into an MD-11 development mock-up
and used for checking the mechanical fit of the interior components and potential cabin
configurations. The first units produced were relatively mature configurations and they
were subjected to a full range of inspections and tests. [45]
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Although avionics integration was performed by Honeywell, Douglas representatives
participated in and conducted some of the testing. Due to the criticality of the avionics to
the entire aircraft, a large amount of avionics ground testing and software checks had
been planned. Some of these tests were performed on a flight deck simulator that was
run by actual aircraft computers. [45]
The MD-11 was subjugated to a comprehensive series of integrated flight tests. When
flight tests were completed the aircraft was subjected to ground vibration tests to
demonstrate the airframe had sufficient margin. [45]
Reuse and Evolvability
The MD-11 is a stretched and updated version of the DC-10 and therefore can be
categorized as a redesign. The basic airframe is the same as the DC-10 but the fuselage is
18 feet 6in longer. [45]
Insight
Douglas had delegated integrated avionics development to Honeywell and engine
development to General Electric. [45]
This behavior prevented issues from being communicated adequately throughout the
team and resolved in a timelier manner. [45]
The delegation of critical responsibilities to subcontractors freed Douglas of some work,
but resulted in difficulties in addition to large amounts of travel. Since too many details
were vague or not specified properly Douglas had only limited control over what
activities it could get the subcontractors to perform. [45]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Deep Space 2
Hierarchy

Figure B-27: Deep Space 2 [130]
Hierarchic Verification
The system design for the probes did not permit functional testing after aeroshell
integration; therefore, verification of probe status after each of the following critical
mission phases was precluded:
Final assembly
System-level environmental tests
Cruise stage integration
Launch vehicle integration
Launch environment
Pre cruise stage separation [131]

228

Due to lack of a suitable air gun, a complete system-level impact test of the probe with
aeroshell was not conducted. [131]
There was no impact test of an electrically powered, complete system. Such a test was
planned but was deleted midway through the project, based on schedule considerations
and a determination that the test article could be put to better use in a non-destructive test.
[131]
The antenna was analyzed but not tested in the 6-torr Mars environment. The failure to
test the antenna in a simulated Martian environment may have overlooked the possibility
that the RF subsystem link margin might be compromised due to ionization breakdown at
the antenna. [131]
The flight battery lot was not subjected to impact tests. Testing was performed on eight
cells from a predecessor flight-like lot, with one structural but non-catastrophic failure.
Therefore, the statistical certainty of the battery impact test program is considered
inadequate to ensure flight battery impact survival. [131]
Reuse and Evolvability
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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X-15
Hierarchy

Figure B-28: X-15 Subsystems [132]
Hierarchic Verification
Because the apparatus had been used on a previous X-15-1 flight, controllers assumed
that the traversing probe and associated motor conformed to the engineering practices of
the day, when in fact it had never been tested. Furthermore, the airplane on which the
apparatus had last flown lacked the sensitive electric systems with which X-15-3 was
equipped. If a corona discharge had occurred on X-15-1 for example, it would have gone
unnoticed. [91]
Tests later showed that using a capacitor with the proper rating would not have prevented
the corona discharge, but these findings highlight the lack of hardware qualification and
testing procedures related to the flight. [91]
Reuse and Evolvability
Because the apparatus had been used on a previous X-15-1 flight, controllers assumed
that the traversing probe and associated motor conformed to the engineering practices of
the day, when in fact it had never been tested. Furthermore, the airplane on which the
apparatus had last flown lacked the sensitive electric systems with which X-15-3 was
equipped. If a corona discharge had occurred on X-15-1 for example, it would have gone
unnoticed. [91]
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Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

X-43A
Hierarchy

Figure B-29: X-43a Subsystems [133]
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Hierarchic Verification
The X-43A HXLV failed because the vehicle control system design was deficient for the
trajectory flown due to inaccurate analytical models (Pegasus heritage and HXLV
specific), which overestimated the system margins. [133]
What the engineers did not realize prior to the first X-43A launch was that the conditions
being tested were outside the design test case. The original Pegasus models were
designed with the 40,000 foot launch altitude as an assumption. The use of a different
altitude was not factored into the models, the result being that the models were not valid
design tools for the lower altitude launch situation being considered. [134]

Reuse and Evolvability
The X-43A HXLV failed because the vehicle control system design was deficient for the
trajectory flown due to inaccurate analytical models (Pegasus heritage and HXLV
specific), which overestimated the system margins. [133]
The X-43A was a combination of the Hyper-X Research Vehicle (HXRV), HXRV
adapter, and Hyper-X Launch Vehicle (HXLV) referred to as the X-43A stack. The first
X-43A flight attempt was conducted on June 2, 2001. [133]
The HXLV was a rocket-propelled launch vehicle modified from a Pegasus launch
vehicle stage one (Orion 50S) configuration. [133]
"Now we also had a certain amount of direction at the beginning of the project that we
would treat the launch vehicle as a quasi-off-the-shelf system. It was proven hardware.
It was a proven launch system. We were just modifying it slightly --- or not so slightly.
And what we wanted to do was focus on those changes in the launch vehicle, not the
things that were similar between the HXLV and Pegasus. We inherited a number of
things. One of them was the launch vehicle wind-tunnel model. And we'd modified
now, of course, the research vehicle on the front end. So we went into the wind tunnels,
and we didn't want to design a new wind-tunnel model; we didn't see a reason to. [134]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Comet
Hierarchy

Figure B-30: Comet [135]
Hierarchic Verification
The first factor leading to the Comet crashes was a simply inadequate test program that
failed to understand the long-range effects of continued pressurization and
depressurization on airframe integrity. Compounding this error was the use of squareshaped window frames and the failure to incorporate mechanisms to prevent a fatigue
crack from spreading into the aircraft's design. [12]
Reuse and Evolvability
Design Elements taken form the Vampire and DH-108 Swallow [135]
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Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

Constellation
Hierarchy

Figure B-31: Constellation [136]
Hierarchic Verification
The CAB “probable cause” findings also criticized the inspection procedures of the three
airlines. [12]
The CAB noted the almost total absence of research on the direction of smoke flow from
a fuselage fire. [12]
Reuse and Evolvability
Design based largely on the P-38 Lightning Design [12]
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Insight
There had been previous maintenance reports of leaking hydraulic lines due to faulty
studs that were never addressed. [12]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
ZR-2
Hierarchy

Figure B-32: ZR-2 Airship [137]
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Hierarchic Verification
No calculations had been made of the stresses that turning would impose on the airships
structure. [12]
Reuse and Evolvability
The British Airship copied a German zeppelin designed to operate at altitudes of over
20,000 feet. [12]
Its design was a virtually exact copy of the German L-55, a high-altitude type featuring a
much lighter structure than the normal construction. [138]
Insight
The German engineers understood that such a lightly framed airship could not withstand
abrupt turns at high-speed, particularly at low-altitudes. German airshipmen, in fact,
were specifically instructed not to attempt such maneuvers. This guidance did not flow
to the British or Americans. [12]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Roma
Hierarchy

Figure B-33: Roma Airship [139]
Hierarchic Verification
The new engines were not subjected to testing or analysis before being installed and
utilized on the Roma. [12]
Reuse and Evolvability
Roma airship replaces Ansaldo engines with American-built Liberty Engines. The
engines were replaced by February 1922 and the first flight with then new engines was
scheduled for February 21, 1922. This left little time for testing or analysis. [12]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

Soyuz 1
Hierarchy

Figure B-34: Soyuz 1 [92]
Hierarchic Verification
Remarkably, despite a 100% failure rate in the preceding Soyuz test flights, TsKBEM
leaders convened in February and March of 1967 to consider the feasibility of sending a
manned crew on the next mission. Engineers presented TsKBEM with more than 200
design faults. Several cosmonauts voiced concerns over the newly reinforced but not
flight-tested heat shield. After intense discussion, a majority of the engineers reportedly
expressed confidence in the heat shield and supported crewed flight. TsKBEM gave the
order to proceed with the docking mission. [92]
Reuse and Evolvability
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

Skylab Meteor
Hierarchy

Figure B-35: Skylab [140]
Hierarchic Verification
The board identified a major design omission – aerodynamic loads on the meteoroid
shield during launch phase had not been considered. [12]
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Reuse and Evolvability
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Insight
Communications between aerodynamics, structures, manufacturing, and assembly
personnel and systems engineering had broken down. [12]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

Electra
Hierarchy

Figure B-36: Electra [141]
Hierarchic Verification
Whirl mode was thought to be harmless and not tested due to the damping systems. This
aircraft was susceptible to this mode if fatigued. [12]
Reuse and Evolvability
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
240

Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

IBM
Hierarchy
The SE&A model provided a coherent, multilevel (system, subsystem, application, and
subapplication) and recursive emphasis on requirements, architecture development,
design, verification and validation, and integration. [142]
Hierarchic Verification
Each requirement included acceptance criteria that was later used as a basis for
developing use and test cases. [143]
Reuse and Evolvability
As a result significant compromises had to be made with the functionality and scope of
the first release of ISM (ISM 1.0) in order to meet the deployment schedule. Much of the
capability originally envisioned for ISM 1.0 had to be implemented in the second release
of ISM (ISM 2.0). At the same time, the business imperative to present IBM as an
integrated solutions provider over the Internet resulted in increased visibility and senior
management attention for the project. [142]
Insight
The significant advantage of this methodology for distributed teams was that it provided
a means of assuring that all key project participants had a clear understanding of what
was needed and how these needs were to be addressed. This reduced the need for
continual communication to clarify what to build or what to test and practically
eliminated the rework experienced in version 1.0 [143]
These sessions involved the SE&A team along with all relevant stakeholders and subject
matter experts from ibm.com and other IBM business units. The software development
and test teams were also represented on a limited basis. [142]
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Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Canadarm
Hierarchy

Figure B-37: CANADARM Subsystems [144]
Hierarchic Verification
Following the installation, Canadarm2's basic functions were tested. The arm was able to
carry out its activities and help assemble the Space Station [145]
Reuse and Evolvability
The second-generation arm was designed to feature: increased size and durability, the
ability to handle much larger payloads, innovative end-over-end mobility. [145]
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Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

Athena
Hierarchy

Figure B-38: ATHENA Family of Vehicles [146]
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Hierarchic Verification
Litton, the manufacturer had tested the unsealed package for this phenomenon, but only
to the 70,000 foot limit of its vacuum chamber. A test by Lockheed Martin for the
investigation established that it began to arc at 86,000 feet. It was an object lesson in
favor of high-fidelity testing. [11]
Reuse and Evolvability
Its first stage was a Castor 120 (which had been derived by Thiokol from the motors of
the Trident and Peacekeeper Missiles) and its second stage was an Orbus 12D supplied
by United Technologies. [11]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

Delta 3
Hierarchy

Figure B-39: Delta 3 [147]
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Hierarchic Verification
The cause of the failure? Inadequately tested software. [93]
Reuse and Evolvability
The core stage is almost identical to the Delta II, albeit with a stronger structure (to
withstand the larger forces placed upon it) and a tapering section to link with the larger
Delta Cryogenic Second Stage (DCSS). [93]
In a case eerily similar to the ARIANE 5’s first flight in 1996, the engineers building the
Delta III took most of the guidance software off the Delta II. [93]
Insight
Boeing blamed the design flaw, in part, on lack of communication between design
groups. [147]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

TOMS-EP
Hierarchy

Figure B-40: TOMS-EP [148]
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Hierarchic Verification
After concern about the polarity of the attitude sensors was raised at the Critical Design
Review, a polarity-testing plan was developed, reviewed and approved by the contractor
and government – polarity would be checked at component level, and a system-level
polarity check would methodically test the sensors with known inputs and verify the
responses of the actuators. However, rotating the spacecraft in the Earth’s magnetic
field to simulate tumbling was not possible, and the solar arrays did not possess the
rigidity to withstand deployment in a 1-g environment, and these compromises led to
failure [11]
Reuse and Evolvability
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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TIMED
Hierarchy

Figure B-41: TIMED [149]
Hierarchic Verification
There were observations by members of the GSFC technical staff that the processes used
at the spacecraft integration and test level were not consistent with the ones they were
used to at GSFC. [150]
They emphasized this again later by saying, “The choice to rely on the knowledge and
integrity of key staff in lieu of a process oriented approach led to inadequate levels of
testing and inadequate procedures when the key staff lacked crucial experience and
Insight into their tasks.” [150]
All the subsystems on TIMED worked well on orbit except the G&C subsystem. It
experienced some anomalies. It has since been acknowledged that there was a
breakdown in the APL G&C test processes that led to these anomalies. The possession
of good processes for integration and test alone does not guarantee success. They must
be implemented correctly. [150]
Reuse and Evolvability
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

Voyager 2
Hierarchy

Figure B-42: Voyager 2 [151]
Hierarchic Verification
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Reuse and Evolvability
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
In preparation for their epic exploration of the outer Solar System, the two Voyager
spacecraft were fitted with many redundant systems, one example being the command
receiver [11]
Pat-Scud Interceptor
Hierarchy

Figure B-43: Patriot-Scud Interceptor [152]
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Hierarchic Verification
In this context we can conclude that at least one of the following three assumptions
occurred: Either they had software errors in their simulation code, which produced
invalid testing results. Or they failed comprehensive testing with the simulation and
therefore did not find the errors in the update. A last assumption is that the bugs in the
updates could not be detected in a simulation environment. [153]
A software modification introduced the ‘bug’
– Conjecture. Presumably an effective endurance test was not run [152]
Reuse and Evolvability
Mid 60s: Originally designed as an AA System; deployed in 85
■ Mid 80s: ATBM threat (Soviets improve Scud accuracy)
■ Modification program
– PAC-1 modification program started leading to:
• Tested in 1986, deploys in 1988 radar and missile control SW mod’s
• Point defense against very short-range, low-v TBMs (FROG, SS-21)
• NOT area defense against longer range, high velocity TBMs ((SCUD)
• Problem is reliability in detonating the TBM warhead (mission kill)
– PAC-2 follow on program (fed straight into Desert Storm)
• Tested in 1987, scheduled for delivery in Jan 1991, actual in Aug 1990
• Fuse and warhead HW mods for additional lethality against long range TBMs
• System SW mods (post-deployment build 3, PDB-3) to exploit PAC-2 missiles
• System SW modifications for limited AD against wider spectrum of TBMs [152]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

Cobalt 60 Panama
Hierarchy

Figure B-44: Cobalt 60 [154]
Hierarchic Verification
“Complaint review found a number of reports of software errors or ‘bugs’ which
indicate Multidata’s software testing is incomplete. Several of these complaints reported
incorrect dose calculation described as ‘off by about 20%’, and ‘bizarre’ and ‘dramatic.’
[155]
Follow-up investigation of these and other complaints found many software errors
present in software shipped to customers that could have been found with structured,
thorough, and rigorous testing throughout the software development process using basic
software analysis and testing techniques.” [155]
Reuse and Evolvability
The software patch checked treatment-planning calculations and rejected anything that
was not identified by the system as a valid shape. [155]

251

Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

Mariner 1
Hierarchy

Figure B-45: Mariner 1 [156]
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Hierarchic Verification
The faulty program had been present on earlier missions, but this was the first time it
had been invoked. [157]
Reuse and Evolvability
The Mariner 1 spacecraft was identical to Mariner 2, launched 27 August 1962. [158]
It appears Mariner 1’s untimely end was more bad luck than bad design. After all,
the underlying faulty code had been used in previous Ranger missions (which saw
unmanned spacecraft photograph the moon up close) “with no ill effects”, according to
Paul Ceruzzi’s book Beyond the Limits: Flight Enters the Computer Age. [159]
Insight
The mathematical symbol to indicate ‘average’ was a horizontal bar over the quantity;
however, in the handwritten equations given to the programmer, the bar had been
neglected. [159]
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Mariner 10
Hierarchy

Figure B-46: Mariner 10 [160]
Hierarchic Verification
Despite the fact that the lifetime of the vidicon tubes of the cameras in space was
unknown, and had been nominally qualified for only a total of a few weeks of use, it was
decided to keep the cameras switched on as to maintain their operating temperature [11]
Reuse and Evolvability
More than a decade of evolution of Mariner technology was continued by the Mariner
Venus /Mercury 1973 spacecraft, which was the sixth of a series that began with Mariner
Venus in 1962. [161]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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USS Thresher
Hierarchy

Figure B-47: USS Thresher [162]
Hierarchic Verification
Yet the submarine was sent to sea with 2855 other joints untested [12].
Testing & inspection results were surprisingly poor, indicating SUBSAFE controls were
not sufficiently robust and the URO MRC program was added [97]
Reuse and Evolvability
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Mark 14 Torpedo
Hierarchy

Figure B-48: Mark 14 Torpedo [163]

Hierarchic Verification
Given its complexity, the MK XIV/VI should have been put through extensive testing
but it was not. [163]
Testing prior to implementation, or lack thereof, was a big contributor to the failure of
the Mark XIV/VI. [163]
While admitting that a destructive test was not part of the testing, he nevertheless felt
that, to get positive proof of satisfactory under bottom explosion and complete
development on the Index mechanism (MK VI exploder), a war shot against an obsolete
vessel was necessary. [163]
It was developed in the mid 1920‘s, but never adequately developmentally or
operationally tested prior to entering full rate production. [164]
Reuse and Evolvability
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Insight
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Black Arrow
Hierarchy

Figure B-49: Black Arrow [165]
Hierarchic Verification
The budget was so tight - only 9 million British Pounds - that the engines were refined in
ground trials rather than development flights. [11]
The schedule allowed twenty-nine working days for the assembly and prelaunch testing,
or with breaks, six weeks. There was plenty to do: separate test- firings of the first and
second stage engines, the step by step assembly of the complete rocket on Launcher 5B,
a series of radio transmission and interference checks, and finally a rehearsal of the
257

launching sequence to ensure that each part of the operating chain functioned
correctly. [11]
Reuse and Evolvability
In parallel, the Royal Aircraft Establishment was given the go-ahead to develop a small
launcher named Black Arrow as a derivative of the Black Knight, the two-stage rocket
built to test materials for the re-entry vehicle of the Blue Streak, which had flown 22
times without failure. [11]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.

Boeing Starliner
Hierarchy

Figure B-50: Boeing Starliner [166]
Hierarchic Verification
Aerospace America (2/28) reported that the clock error which prevented the Boeing
Starliner from successfully completing its December OFT “could have been found with
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more complete testing, a Boeing official told reporters Friday.” The Boeing Company
and ULA had tested the integration of the Atlas V rocket with the Starliner capsule
during launch. However, “in hindsight, engineers wish they had kept the simulation
going after the capsule separated from the rocket.” [99]
Reuse and Evolvability
Space News (2/28, Subscription Publication) reported that Mulholland also
discussed a “valve mapping error” that Boeing had discovered. The valve mapping issue
“involved the use of what Mulholland called a ‘legacy propulsion controller’ on the
service module. One mapping, which identified thrusters and valves in software, is
needed when the service module is attached to the crew module while another is
required for use after separation.” Mulholland indicated that “unfortunately, that
requirement was not picked up.” The oversight was not detected due to the hot-fire test
and emulator issue. [99]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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Long March 3
Hierarchy

Figure B-51: Long March 3 [167]
Hierarchic Verification
Although a new version, it relied heavily on well-tested rockets: the main stages were
essentially those of the Long March 3A while the strap-on rockets had been verified on
the Long March 2E. However, because the Chinese had received less than they had
hoped in launch fees, they did not have the resources to make a test flight of the 3B
before committing the new rocket to its first commercial mission. This proved to be
disastrous. Four possible causes of the failure were indicated including a broken wire
supplying electrical power to the guidance system. [168]
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Reuse and Evolvability
The Long March 3 adapts the Long March 2 as its first two stages, but adds an upper
stage, while later versions add powerful strap-ons to give the rocket an extra kick at
take-off. [168]
Because the first stage shared technology with the Long March 2E, this failure also
affected that vehicle, and withdrawing both vehicles excluded China from the
commercial launch business for the forseeable future. [11]
Insight
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
Optimization
No data was identified to support or refute the development program adhered to this
principle.
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APPENDIX C

Chi-Square Test Results

P-Value ~ 0.000: Therefore, the null
hypothesis can be rejected.
H0 = Hierarchic Verification and
Integration Success are not associated.

Figure C-1: Results of Hierarchic Verification Chi-Square Analysis
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H0 = Insight and Integration Success are not associated.
P-Value ~ 0.000: Therefore, the null-hypothesis can
be rejected.

Figure C-2: Results of Insight Chi-Square Analysis
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H0 = Reuse and Integration Success are not
associated.
P-Value > 0.05: Therefore, the null-hypothesis
cannot be rejected.

Figure C-3: Results of Reuse Chi-Square Analysis
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H0 = Optimization and Integration Success are
not associated.

P-Value < 0.05: Therefore, the nullhypothesis can be rejected.

Figure C-4: Results of Optimization Chi-Square Analysis
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H0 = The interaction between hierarchic verification and
reuse and Integration Success are not associated.
P-Value ~ 0.000: Therefore, the null-hypothesis can
be rejected.

Figure C-5: Results of Insight and Hierarchic Verification Interaction Chi-Square
Analysis
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H0 = The Interaction between Reuse and Optimization
and Integration Success are not associated.
P-Value > 0.0083: Therefore, the null-hypothesis
cannot be rejected.

Figure C-6: Results of Reuse and Optimization Interaction Chi-Square Analysis
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H0 = The interaction between Reuse and Insight
and Integration Success are not associated.
P-Value ~ 0.000: Therefore, the null-hypothesis
can be rejected

Figure C-7: Results of Reuse and Insight Interaction Chi-Square Analysis
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H0 = The constituent principles of the
interaction between Reuse and Hierarchic
Verification are collinear.

P-Value > 0.05 Therefore, the null-hypothesis
can be rejected

Figure C-8: Results of Reuse and Hierarchic Verification Collinearity Test
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H0 = The constituent principles of the
interaction between Insight and Reuse
and Evolvability are collinear.

The test could not be completed, as
there were no instances of both
principles being violated.

Figure C-9: Results of Reuse and Insight Collinearity Test
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APPENDIX D

Root Cause Analysis
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Table D-1: Root Cause Analysis Result
System Integration

Root Cause

Failure

Root Cause

Reuse

Reuse

Roots

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

(Technical/

Implicated

Sources

Programmatic)
MCO

Proximate Cause: • Ground software used English

Technical

Y

Small Forces Software

[169]

units, while onboard software worked in metric. The

[170]

discrepancy caused errors in trajectory calculations

[61]

which sent the spacecraft too close to Mars.

[171]

Underlying Issues: •Verification and validation

[42]

processes did not verify that navigation software met

[81]

requirements. •The navigation team was unfamiliar
with the spacecraft and its controls and unprepared
for off-nominal conditions. •Concerns were only
informally communicated.

272

Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

ARIANE-5

Root Cause

Incorrect control signals were sent to the engines

Sources

Inertial Reference

[108]

and these swiveled so that unsustainable stresses

System Software

[10]

were imposed on the rocket.

Reused from ARIANE-

[11]

● It started to break up and was destroyed by

4

[81]

ground controllers.
● The system failure was a direct result of a
software failure. However, it was symptomatic of
a more general systems validation failure.
Software failure occurred when an attempt to
convert a 64-bit floating point number to a signed
16-bit integer caused the number to overflow.
● There was no exception handler associated with
the conversion so the system exception
management facilities were invoked. These shut
down the software.
● The backup software was a copy and behaved in
exactly the same way.
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Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

Genesis

Root Cause

During entry, the SRC-AU was responsible for
detecting entry and invoking specific commands in

G-switch Sensors from
Stardust Program.

the proper sequence to deploy the drogue chute,
cut the drogue chute harness, deploy the main
chute, and activate the UHF and GPS systems.
During the Genesis entry, none of these occurred.
The Avionics System fault tree branch consisted of
13 sub-branches. These included: 1. The G-switch
sensors did not activate the EST. 2. The low-pass
filter in the EST was not designed properly for the
anticipated aerodynamic braking profile. 3. After
the EST started, an inadvertent reset would stop
the EST. 4. Incorrect timing of the EST oscillator
prevented the release of the drogue. 5. Latent
electronic fault resulting from a potential highvoltage discharge from the scientific concentrator
grid circuit. 6. Mortar initiator circuit’s current
limiting ballast resistor damaged in pre-fight
testing which prevented drogue pyro firing.
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Sources

[62]

Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

7. Logic circuits out of phase. 8. EST jumpers set
incorrectly, resulting in wrong event sequence. 9.
Electromagnetic interference (EMI) disrupted
avionics circuit operation. 10. Space or entry
environment adversely impacted avionics. 11.
Pressure transducers, if improperly wired,
interfered with the fire command. 12. The
Avionics System internal short during flight or
entry. 13. An open fuse prevented the Avionics
Systems from operating properly. As noted earlier,
it was determined that the G-switch sensors were
improperly oriented on the SRC-AU relay card,
making it impossible to initiate the EST circuitry
and fire the pyrotechnics (item number 1 above).
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Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

Contour

Root Cause

CONTOUR’s signal disappeared during a solid
rocket motor (SRM) burn on August 15, 2002.
Mission control never regained contact with the
spacecraft. Probable Proximate Cause: •The SRM
was nested too far into the body, and heat from the
motor’s exhaust destroyed the spacecraft
Underlying Issues: •Inadequate project team SRM
expertise •Insufficient rigor in contracting and
design reviews •Significant reliance on
subcontractors who were not integrated into the
project •Reliance on heritage designs •Focus on
project goals at the expense of programmatic
objectives
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ATK STAR Rocket

[109]

Motor

[85]

Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

SOHO

Root Cause

Proximate Cause:

Sources

SOHO Vehicle (Was an

[63]

• Errors in software code configured the gyros

in Orbit Code

[81]

incorrectly and caused inaccurate thruster firings

Modification)

[172]

which destabilized the spacecraft
Underlying Issues:
• Software code modifications were not properly
documented, communicated, tested, or approved
• Operators failed to follow procedures to check
the
spin status Gyro A before taking actions
• Staffing levels were inadequate for the schedule
• Detailed training specific to SOHO was
insufficient
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Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

R101

Root Cause

In October of 1930, the R101 crashed, killing 48
people.

Sources

Previous Configurations

[123]

of R101

[173]

Proximate Cause:

[12]

• Loss of forward buoyancy, due to weather-

[44]

induced
damage, causing the nose to pitch down violently
• Hot engine contacting extremely combustible
hydrogen gas leaking from airship
Underlying Issues:
• Time and development pressures
• Off-nominal weather conditions
• Ignored stand down call
• Fundamental buoyancy and control issues

No full-speed trial: The airship was never tested
when fully stressed before it embarked to India.
Overconfidence and inadequate trials.

278

Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

Lewis

Root Cause

Lewis Spacecraft lost after only three days in orbit

ACS Design

Sources

[124]

Proximate Causes: •Inappropriate application of

[88]

ACS software and lack of design peer review

[11]

•Inconsistent monitoring during critical early

[174]

operational phase
Underlying Issues:
•Ineffective and inconsistent project leadership
•Incomplete and unstained articulation and
communication of Faster, Better, Cheaper
•Inadequate test and verification of heritage
hardware/software
•Insufficient budget to support robust ground
operations
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Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

Mars Observer

Root Cause

Mars Observer loses communications after

Sources

Wave Tube amplifiers

[125]

planned telemetry shutdown. Probable and

for pyro firing shock,

[89]

Possible Proximate Causes: • Probable: oxidizer

design of the propulsion

[11]

leakage and mixing with fuel in the propulsion

system, and fault-

system with subsequent explosion • Possible:

management software.

power bus short circuit and power loss • Possible:
propellant tank rupture from regulator failure •
Possible: propellant tank rupture from ejection of
initiator from pyro valve Underlying Issues: •
Inadequate Testing • Tradeoff Decisions •
Telemetry Priorities in Design
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Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

Centaur/Milstar

Root Cause

The accident Investigation Board concluded that
failure of the Titan IV B-32 mission was due to an
inadequate software development, testing, and
quality assurance process for the Centaur upper
stage. The process did not detect the incorrect
entry by a flight software engineer of a roll rate
filter constant into the Inertial Navigation Unit
software file. The roll rate filter was included
early in the design phase of the first Milstar
spacecraft, but the spacecraft manufacturer later
determined that filtering was not required a that
frequency. A decision was made to leave the filter
in place for the first and later Milstar flights for
"consistency".
The incorrect roll rate filter constant zeroed any
roll rate data, resulting in the loss of roll axis
control, which then caused loss of yaw and
pitch control. The loss of attitude control caused
excessive firings of the Reaction Control System
and subsequent hydrazine depletion. Erratic
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Previous

[82]

Milstar/Centaur Flights

[175]

Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Programmatic

Y

Sources

vehicle flight during the Centaur main engine
burns caused the Centaur to achieve an orbit
apogee and perigee much lower than desired. The
Milstar satellite separated in a useless low final
orbit.
MD-11

Even though Douglas personnel oversaw the

MD-11 is a stretched

[45]

complex avionics integration effort instead of

and updated version of

[176]

performing it, Douglas still had to integrate the

the DC-10 and therefore

avionics with the rest of the aircraft. This required

can be categorized as a

developing new interface devices for the analog

redesign.

DC-10 Components that were carried over into the
MD-11 design, as well as of new subsystems.
From Douglas's point of view, its avionics
challenge was therefore mainly that of software
integration since that was the major area with
which they had little knowledge or experience.
The software problems turned out to be more
difficult to deal with than expected.

282

Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

de Havilland

The first factor leading to the Comet crashes was a

Comet

Sources

Design Elements

[12]

simply inadequate test program that failed to

Taking from the

[135]

understand the long-range effects of continued

Vampire and DH-108

pressurization and depressurization on airframe

Swallow.

integrity. Compounding this error was the use of
square-shaped window frames and the failure to
incorporate mechanisms to prevent a fatigue crack
from spreading into the aircraft's design.
Lockheed

Multiple different materials with varying

Constellation

expansion rates under heat were used in the

Technical

through-studs, resulting in the studs becoming
loose. These poorly designed and located throughstuds facilitated electrical arcing between the
through-stud and the fuselage resulting in the
burning of the skin and through-stud. The
through-studs were located near high-pressure
hydraulic lines. The heat from the arcing electrical
charge burned through the lines and caught the
flammable fluid on fire.
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Y

Based largely on the P-

[12]

38 Lightning Design

[177]

Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

ZR-2 (R-38)

Neither the British nor the Americans involved with

Airship

Sources

ZR-2/R-38 was

[12]

the project seemed aware of the significance of

modeled after an

[138]

aerodynamic loads (the forces that act upon an object

existing zeppelin.

as it moves through the air) to airship design. The
British airship copied a German zeppelin designed to
operate at altitudes of over 20,000 feet. Given this
purpose, the German zeppelin required an extremely
light frame. Campbell's design ignored the principle
that the aerodynamic loads or stresses become much
higher when an object turns in flight.
Roma Airship

The Americans replaced the Ansaldo engines with the
American built Liberty engines due to part

Technical

Y

Roma Airship Structure

[12]
[139]

availability, and familiarity. These more powerful
engines put an increased strain on the nose of the
aircraft causing it to buckle. Subsequent tests showed
that the nose structure of the aircraft should have
collapsed at 55 or 56 mph. That was about the speed
it was traveling when it collapsed. The effects of the
more powerful engines were not tested prior to flight
test.
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Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

Black Arrow

Root Cause

The telemetry indicated that one of the four engine

Black Knight

Sources

[11]

pairs had been repeatedly slewing from one end of its

[165]

movement range to the other. The investigators ran a

[178]

computer simulation that indicated that this violent

[179]

movement had almost certainly been caused by a loss

[180]

of signal, which suggested a broken wire.

Flight 2: Telemetry and tracking indicated that the
second stage's engine was losing thrust. It shut down
almost 30 seconds ahead of schedule. The Waxwing
motor of the third stage ignited successfully, but was
unable to compensate for the inherited shortfall in
velocity, and fell into the ocean. The enquiry
determined that a fractured pipe in the second stage
had allowed the nitrogen pressurant to vent. Starved
of oxidizer, the combustion had declined and
eventually shut down the engine.
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Table D-1 Continued

System

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

X-15

Root Cause

Proximate Causes:

Sources

Reuse of base X-15

[91]

Underlying Issues:

craft with additional

[181]

Proximate Causes:

payload integrated

[182]

• Qualification of Hardware

[183]

• Qualification of Flight Crew

[184]

• Human Factors Considerations
Underlying Issues:
• Electrical disturbance deactivates automatic reaction
control system
• Aircraft reenters at incorrect angle of attack
• Adaptive control system becomes saturated; prevents
pilot from regaining control of aircraft
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Table D.1 Continued

System

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

X-43a

Root Cause

The major contributors to the mishap were modeling
inaccuracies in the fin actuation system,
modeling inaccuracies in the aerodynamics and

Sources

Pegasus based HXLV

[133]

booster

[11]
[134]

insufficient variations of modeling
parameters (parametric uncertainty analysis). Pegasus
heritage and HXLV specific models
were found to be inaccurate.
§ Fin actuation system inaccuracies resulted from:
- Discrepancies in modeling the electronic and
mechanical fin actuator system components
- Under prediction of the fin actuation system
compliance used in the models.
§ Aerodynamic modeling inaccuracies resulted from:
- Error in incorporation of wind tunnel data into the
math model
- Misinterpretation of wind tunnel results due to
insufficient data
- Unmodeled outer mold line changes associated with
the thermal protection system (TPS).
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Table D.1 Continued

System

Root Cause

Root Cause

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

Roots

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

(Technical/

Implicated

Programmatic)
§ Insufficient variations of modeling parameters
(parameter uncertainty analysis) were found in:
- Aerodynamics, Fin Actuation System, Control System
Less significant contributors were errors detected in
modeling mass properties. Potential
contributing factors were found in the areas of dynamic
aerodynamics and aeroservoelasticity.
Root Cause: The X-43A HXLV failed because the
vehicle control system design was deficient for the
trajectory flown due to inaccurate analytical models
(Pegasus heritage and HXLV specific), which
overestimated the system margins.
§ The key phenomenon that triggered the mishap was the
divergent roll oscillatory motion at a 2.5 Hz frequency.
- The divergence was primarily caused by excessive
control system gain.
§ A second phenomenon that was a consequence of the
divergent roll oscillation was a stall of the rudder actuator
that accelerated the loss of
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Table D.1 Continued

System

Root Cause

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

control.
§ Neither phenomenon was predicted by preflight
analyses.
§ The analytical modeling deficiencies resulted from a
combination of factors.
Note: Models include system architecture, boundary
conditions and data.
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Table D.1 Continued

System

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

Athena

Root Cause

Two independent failures were found, either of which

Castor 120 Thrust

would have led to the loss of the vehicle. The thrust-

Vector Design taken

vectoring system had induced the attitude excursion

from Peacekeeper

shortly prior to first stage shutdown. The inertial
measurement unit had failed while coasting at T+ 127
seconds. The Castor 120 was a modified missile
booster with a carbon-epoxy casing and a 'submerged'
flexible nozzle bearing that was driven through 5.5
degrees of deflection by cold-gas-pressurized
hydraulic actuators to vector the thrust to steer the
vehicle. The spent hydraulic fluid was vented, but it
caused a fire that eroded the insulation of the cable
with the signal that made the control system deflect
the nozzle - which induced the attitude excursion. The
thrust-vectoring system was similar to that of the
Peacekeeper, except that the hydraulic fluid in that
case had not been vented. The solution was to install
a reservoir to collect the spent hydraulic fluid, thereby
forming a closed system. The subsequent inertial
measurement unit fault resulted from corona arcing in

290

Sources

[11]

Table D.1 Continued

System

Root Cause

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

Sources

its power supply. Litton the manufacturer, had tested
the unsealed package for this phenomenon, but only to
70,000 feet. The investigation established that it
began to arc at 86,000 feet. It was an object lesson in
favor of high-fidelity testing.
Delta 3

The Delta III took most of the guidance software from

Delta 2 Software

[93]

the Delta II. Because the Delta II didn't have any

[147]

gimbaling boosters, the Delta III repeatedly

[185]

overcorrected, wasting hydraulic fluid needed for

[11]

control.
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System

Root Cause

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

Patriot-Scud

Time in the Patriot Range gate is calculated in milli-

Interceptor

seconds, but expressed from the ECS time register as a

Sources

Software Upgrade to

[94]

Existing System

[153]

whole number. Therefore the no clock rollover time

[152]

integer just gets bigger. The patriot ECS performs

[186]

calculations in floating point. Therefore, the time
inaccuracy grows exponentially while the system is
operational. If the RGA shifts more than 50% the
track decorrelates from the detection. This means the
system must be shut down and restarted every 8 hours.
This is what happened in the Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
Incident. That particular Patriot had been operational
for more than 100 hours.
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System

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Technical

Y

Long March 3B

Root Cause

Within 2 seconds of lifting off on its inaugural

Sources

Various Reuse

[11]

mission on 14 February 1996 it veered off course and

Components and

[168]

fell to Earth, killing several people. Because the first

Subsystem

[187]

stage shared technology with the Long March 2E, this
failure also affected that vehicle. The report, issued in
September, identified the cause as a fault in the
inertial reference system which would have to be
redesigned. The failure was eventually traced to the
deterioration of gold-aluminum wiring connections
within the power amplifier for a motor in the inertial
measurement unit.

Although a new version, it relied heavily on welltested rockets: the main stages were essentially those
of the Long March 3A while the strap-on rockets had
been verified on the Long March 2E. However,
because the Chinese had received less than they had
hoped in launch fees, they did not have the resources
to make a test flight of the 3B before committing the
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System

Root Cause

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

new rocket to its first commercial mission. This
proved to be disastrous. Four possible causes of the
failure were indicated including a broken wire
supplying electrical power to the guidance system.

Failure attributed to guidance system shortcomings
(deterioration of gold/aluminum connections in a
power amp for the IMU).
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System

Root Cause

Root Cause Roots

Reuse

Reuse

Integration

(Technical/

Potentially

Component/Subsystem

Failure

Programmatic)

Implicated

Sources

Space News (2/28, Subscription Publication) reported
that Mulholland also discussed a “valve mapping
error” that Boeing had discovered. The valve mapping
issue “involved the use of what Mulholland called a
‘legacy propulsion controller’ on the service module.
One mapping, which identified thrusters and valves in
software, is needed when the service module is
attached to the crew module while another is required
for use after separation.” Mulholland indicated that
“unfortunately, that requirement was not picked up.”
The oversight was not detected due to the hot-fire test
Boeing Starliner

and emulator issue.

Legacy Propulsion
Technical

295

Y

Controller

[99]

APPENDIX E

Reuse Impacts on Other Principles Data Set
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Table E-1: Root Cause Analysis Result

System

Principle

Evidence

Source

Hierarchic Verification

Although it was recognized that the final Genesis
AU was not strictly a heritage design (since it
was extensively modified from the Stardust
design), many team members viewed it as
maintaining much of its heritage and, hence,
requiring less scrutiny in design and verification.
An erroneous belief that the SRC-AU was a
heritage, or partially a heritage design, and
unfounded confidence in heritage designs in
general led to five errors that contributed to the
mishap. 1. The key drogue deployment
requirement in the SRC-AU specification was
recycled from Stardust without reconsideration;
2. Stardust schematics were used without
reconsideration; 3. the design reviews focused
less attention to the details of the design of the
pyro firing circuitry, because greater confidence
than was justified was placed in it due to its
heritage; 4. Verification of the G-switch sensor
orientation by similarity to the Stardust heritage
design was performed (and performed
incorrectly); and 5. one of the Red Team Focus
Groups that reviewed the SRC-AU did not
review the design or the verification
methodology, because they considered the
likelihood of a design or verification issue with a
heritage design to be unlikely. The FBC
philosophy was,

[62]

Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

Genesis:
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Table E-1 Continued

System

Principle

Insight
Optimization

Evidence
in part, based on the assumption that the use of
heritage hardware would reduce costs,
schedule, and technical risks and reduce
verification process requirements. The
assumption that heritage hardware could reduce
cost and schedule risks was perhaps well
founded, but such an argument regarding
technical risks could only be made after a
thorough technical review of the design and its
verification in the Genesis-specific application.
In summary, there existed a major misconception
within much of the JPL and LMSS leadership
and within the Red Team that heritage hardware
meant a lower standard of review and verification
was acceptable. Had the same standards as those
applied to new hardware been applied to the
SRC-AU, it is likely that the design error
would not have occurred or would have been
discovered during verification.
N/A
N/A

Hierarchic Verification

Re-evaluation and analyses of parameters from
one system to the next (ARIANE 4 to 5) not
understood - need to evaluate thoroughly deemed
"not necessary".

Source

Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

N/A
N/A

0
0

[82]

3

ARIANE-5
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Table E-1 Continued

System

Principle

Insight

Optimization

Evidence
Simulations had indicated that the software
would function properly in the new vehicle, but
no tests were made using real hardware to
confirm this.
Another example was the use of ARIANE 4
trajectory data in the simulations of the ARIANE
5 software even though the ARIANE 5 trajectory
was known to be different. The ARIANE inertial
reference system specification, in addition, did
not include operational restrictions arising from
the implementation and needing to be considered
during
N/A
While the realignment function served no role in
on the ARIANE 5, it was retained for
commonality reasons, and allowed (as on the
ARIANE 4) to operate for approximately 40
seconds after liftoff.
On ARIANE 5, this rapid realignment function
does not serve any purpose, nevertheless, it had
been retained for commonality reasons.
The philosophy of the ARIANE 5 program, as
stated in the accident report, that it was not wise
to change software that had worked well on the
ARIANE 4 unless it was proven necessary to do
so is well founded: Errors are often introduced
when software is changed, particularly by those
who did not originally write it, as occurred with
SOHO.
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Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
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[81]
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[82]

[81]
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Principle Violation to Reuse
Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

MCO
NASA lost the MCO because the verification and
validation process did not confirm that the navigation
software met requirements.

Hierarchic Verification

The investigation board found no evidence of
complete, end-to-end testing for the Small Forces
software, and they could not determine whether
independent verification and validation had been
performed on the software in question. In any case, the
interface control process and interface verification
were not sufficiently rigorous.
Verification & Validation: • Development and V&V
did not rely on the Software Interface Specification
(SIS) to ensure the software was compatible. • The
mishap investigation board found no evidence of
complete, end-to-end testing for the trajectory tracking
software.
Similarly, informal interface testing with the
Navigation team did not test the truth of the file, but
concentrated on making sure it could be moved across
on the file server.
Unfortunately for Mars '98 the full up tests that were
run with all the players were more focused on crew
certification and data path demonstration, than flight
product/process validation and data correctness. For
MCO, tests that involve file transfer with certified
"truth" would have caught the anomaly before launch
and certainly before MOI.
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System

Principle

Evidence
Several verification and validation process issues
were uncovered during the Board’s review of the
MCO program that should be noted. The
Software Interface Specification (SIS) was
developed but not properly used in the small
forces ground software development and testing.
End-to-end testing to validate the small forces
ground software performance and its applicability
to the specification did not appear to be
accomplished. It was not clear that the ground
software independent verification and validation
was accomplished for MCO. The interface
control process and the verification of specific
ground system interfaces was not completed or
was completed with insufficient rigor.
According to the MCO developers, the small
forces software was reused from the Mars Global
Surveyor project, with the substitution of a new
thruster equation. Technical management
accepted the “just like MGS” argument and did
not focus on the details of the software. The
SOHO software was changed without appropriate
analysis of the changes.
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Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0
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System

Principle

Insight

Evidence
The project team also had an opportunity to catch
the error during the mission, when several
anomalies hinted at problems with the software,
but incomplete understanding of the spacecraft’s
design, coupled with communication problems
between various elements of the MCO operations
team prevented the team from recognizing and
mitigating the problem.
Although the navigation team discussed concerns
about the MCO’s trajectory among themselves,
they did not fully communicate their concerns to
the spacecraft operations team or project
management. Overall, there was little crosscommunication or shared understanding between
various teams on the project. Team members
relied on informal communication channels
rather than using standard methods for reporting
concerns. Teams were isolated from the other
teams, particularly the operations navigation
team.
Communication Between Project Teams: • Team
members relied on informal communication
channels. • The navigation team did not fully
communicate their concerns to the spacecraft
operations team or project management.
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Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0
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System

Principle

Evidence
In the MCO project, and again in the MPL
project, there is evidence of inadequate
communications between the project elements,
including the development and operations teams,
the operations navigation and operations teams,
the project management and technical teams, and
the project and technical line management.

Optimization

N/A

Source

Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

[42]

Contour

Hierarchic Verification

Unfortunately, testing the spacecraft with the
SRM assembled was impractical, and the APL
team was not able to complete testing with their
typical rigor. Neither NASA nor APL recognized
the weaknesses in APL’s design-test-design
strategy for CONTOUR’s specific configuration.
• Insufficient rigor in contracting and design
reviews.
• APL relied on a design-test-design strategy
rather than design reviews; it
was not practical to test the assembled SRM
design before launch.
A deeper cause was poor systems engineering
and review, and the reliance on analysis by
similarity.
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System

Principle

Insight

Evidence
The Board observes that a less formal approach to
documenting engineering design work at APL is
compensated for by a robust test program followed by
any necessary redesign and retest. In this case, the
impracticality of testing the assembled SRM with the
spacecraft did not allow the traditional APL approach
of design and test cycles to be accomplished.
Significant reliance on subcontractors who were not
integrated into the project.
Since ATK generally worked with clients who were
familiar with SRMs, they were accustomed to clients
who would already know how to integrate the generic
motor into their design. If APL had formally stated
ATK’s integral role in providing SRM expertise, ATK
might have become more involved in the specifics of
the SRM design and provided advice on how to
integrate the SRM with the rest of the spacecraft.
To further compensate for APL’s lack of in-house SRM
expertise, APL relied on a consultant’s dynamic
analysis for the SRM firing. The consultant operated
under several misconceptions that the project team did
not scrutinize.
Separation between the contractors and subcontractors
meant that information and expertise in one group was
not shared with other groups on the project team.

Table E-1 Continued

304

Source

Principle Violation to Reuse
Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

[109]

[85]

3

System

Principle

Optimization

Evidence
Significant reliance on subcontractors who were
not integrated into the project.
• Relied on the SRM manufacturer and a
consultant for expertise; channels
of communication between subcontractors were
not clear.
The CONTOUR Project also relinquished
responsibility of spacecraft dynamic analysis for
SRM firing to a consultant, and relied heavily on
the consultant’s findings and conclusions to
verify the sufficiency of the spacecraft design.
The lack of in-depth Project oversight resulted in
several deficiencies in analysis for the SRM
firing event that concerned both performance and
stability, although neither are believed to have
contributed to the mishap.
The concern is not whether the subcontractors
were competent, but whether the CONTOUR
Project was sufficiently involved to ensure that
the subcontractors were provided all the
information needed to perform their tasks, and to
question and penetrate the subcontractor analyses
and conclusions for appropriate application to
CONTOUR.
N/A
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[188]

[109]
N/A

Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

System

Principle

Evidence

Source

Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

SOHO
Software code modifications were not properly
documented, communicated, tested, or approved.

Hierarchic Verification

The only testing performed was by a NASA
computer-based simulator that verified each
change separately, but not all together.
The verification process was accomplished using
a NASA computer-based simulator. There was no
code walk-through as well as no independent
review either by ESA, MMS, or an entity directly
involved in the change implementation.
Modifications to the SOHO command procedures
were subjected to very little testing and review,
perhaps because they were considered to be
minor.

[63]

[189]

The SOHO software was changed without
appropriate analysis of the changes.
Testing of SOHO operational procedures was
primarily performed using a simulator, but the
simulator had not been maintained with all the
on-board software changes that had been
implemented on the spacecraft, essentially
making such testing useless.
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System

Principle

Insight

Evidence
Software code modifications were not properly
documented, communicated, tested, or approved.
Modifications to the command sequences were
not properly documented, communicated,
reviewed, or approved by either ESA or NASA.
The MOCR itself was an internal flight
operations document only distributed within the
team.
Lack of Change Control – Code modifications
were not properly documented, communicated,
tested or approved by either NASA or ESA. –
There were no independent reviews, no hard
copies of command sequences, and no changes to
the filename. – The spin status of the gyros was
not obvious to ground operators, such that it
allowed roll rate readings to be collected and
misinterpreted, even as the gyro itself was
despun.
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Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0
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System

Principle

Optimization

Evidence
Though some of these modifications were made
at the request of the SOHO Science Team, they
were not necessarily driven by any specific
requirement changes. The procedure
modifications appear to have not been adequately
controlled by ATSC configuration board,
properly documented, nor reviewed and approved
by ESA and/or NASA.
The functional content of an operational
procedure, A_CONFIG_N, was modified without
updating the procedure name and without
communicating either to ESA or MMS the fact
that there had been a functional change.
SOHO had similar communication problems
between the operations team and technical
experts. For example, when a significant change
to procedures was implemented, an internal
process was used and nobody outside the flight
operations team was notified
N/A
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Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

System

Principle

Evidence

Source

Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

Lewis

Hierarchic Verification

Misapplication of a “heritage design” (borrowed
from a previous application) for the ACS
represents a fatal error. The “heritage trap”
occurs in making flawed assumptions regarding
the applicability of a specific technology to
another operating environment or another
hardware configuration. The largely undefined
FBC paradigm encouraged the use of heritage
hardware and software as a means of saving the
expense of design verification testing and
analysis.
The ACS system verification was likewise
flawed. The verification activity modeled a
limited set of nominal, on orbit attitude control
cases, failing to model a thruster imbalance
scenario that ultimately led to the loss of the
spacecraft.
Inadequate test and verification of heritage
hardware/software: – The ACS verification
process failed to address the improper application
of software designed for a much different
spacecraft. – FBC encouraged the use of heritage
hardware and software, but verification
procedures were slim and often only modeled a
limited set of nominal scenarios.
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System

Principle

Insight

Evidence
Fundamentally, the failure was due to poor
design and inadequate testing of the Sun-pointing
mode. Although this mode was simulated
without difficulty, this was somewhat idealized,
notably in assuming that thrusters fired perfectly
and imparted an impulse only in the direction
intended. Whereas the TOMS-EP (which had a
stable sun-pointed axis) used three gyros to
completely determine attitude, Lewis (which did
not have a stable sun-pointed axis) had only a
two-axis gyro and so could not sense rotation
around the Sun-pointing axis induced by slight
thruster imbalance or misalignment.
The decision to move TRW technical and
management core capabilities to Redondo Beach
in January 1995 was a significant factor because
it isolated the Lewis ACS and flight operations
sub-system managers from critical discipline
experts and corporate assurance processes that
might have challenged design assumptions and
pressed for more extensive simulation and
training of operations personnel. In general,
TRW was to provide a functional group peer
review which was completed for all other
systems; however a similar review was not
conducted for the ACS design.
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Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0
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[88]

3

System

Principle

Optimization

Evidence
Incomplete and unsusainted articulation and
communication of Faster, Better, Cheaper: – By
design, there were no government specified
technical or quality assurance requirements. FBC
relied on commercial best practices rather than
traditional NASA management program control
functions. – In the absence of higher level policy
guidance NASA program executives struggled to
define FBC in practical terms.
The move to Redondo Beach also left the Ground
Crew separated from the Integration and Test
Group.
However, the Board also believes that TRW
erred in leaving the ACS and the Ground
Operations in Chantilly, separated from the rest
of the spacecraft development, integration and
testing and most importantly, the ACS functional
discipline support system in Redondo Beach.
N/A
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Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

System

Principle

Evidence

Source

The board identified the propulsion
pressurization system check valves as unfit for
an interplanetary Mars mission. Testing showed
that the valves could keep leaks down to an
acceptable level during the Earth-orbiting
mission for which they were designed. During
their long journey to Mars, however, the
valves were exposed to much more radical
temperature and pressure changes, over a much
longer period than original testing had
qualified them to sustain. The likelihood for
vapor particles to leak and accumulate in the
tubing increased to the point where only a tiny
leak (tenths of a gram) posed a significant
explosion hazard. In defense of the
designers, no leak ‘standard’ or minimum
had yet been established from previous NASA
projects.

[89]

Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

Mars Observer

Hierarchic Verification
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System

Principle

Evidence
The original philosophy of minor
modifications to a commercial productionline spacecraft was retained throughout the
program. The result was reliance on design
and component heritage qualification that was
inappropriate for the mission. Examples of
this reliance were the failure to qualify the
traveling wave tube amplifiers for pyre
firing shock; the design of the propulsion
system; and the use of a faultmanagement software package that was
not fully understood, The Board also noted
that the discipline and documentation culture
associated with, and appropriate for,
commercial production-line spacecraft is
basically incompatible with the discipline
and documentation required for a one-ofa-kind spacecraft designed for a complex
mission. Mars Observer was not a productionline spacecraft.
These changes also had a more subtle, but
possibly more serious effect. They led to
frequent violations of one of the basic tenets
of the program: namely that Mars Observer
was simply slightly modified for Mars
Observer version of a well-proven,
reliable, high-heritage-design spacecraft that
would undertake a different mission.
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Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
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System

Principle

Evidence
In fact, many of the spacecraft systems had
been so extensively modified for Mars
Observer that their heritage had been lost;
others, whose
heritage remained intact, should have been
requalified to verify that they would function
properly on an interplanetary mission of three
years duration (an environment for which
they were not designed).Part E of this report
includes a review of program changes and
their effects.

Insight

There was far too much reliance on heritage
for spacecraft hardware, software and
procedures, especially given that the Mars
Observer mission was fundamentally different
from the mission of the satellites from which
the heritage was derived.
N/A

Optimization

N/A
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Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
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Centaur/Milstar
The accident investigation board concluded that
failure of the Titan IV B-32 mission was due to
an inadequate software development, testing,
and quality assurance process for the Centaur
upper stage. That process did not detect the
incorrect entry by a flight software engineer of a
roll rate filter constant into the Inertial
Navigation Unit software file.
The Titan/Centaur report was the only one to
mention the existence of an independent
verification and validation review process by a
group other than the developers. In that process,
default values were used for the filter rate
constants and the actual constants used in flight
were never validated.
One example was not testing the Titan/Centaur
software with the
actual load tape prior to launch.

Hierarchic Verification

The same occurred with the Titan/Centaur
accident, where default and simulated values
were used in system testing although the real roll
rate filter constants could have been used. Like
ARIANE, the Titan/Centaur engineers
incorrectly thought the rigid-body simulation of
the vehicle would not exercise the filters
sufficiently.
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[82]
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System

Principle

Evidence
In addition, the corporate
consolidation/evolution process had led to a loss
of knowledge that the test bed could use the
actual roll rate filter constants. The current
engineers thought only default constants could
be used in the test bed. Even the tests performed
on the Titan/Centaur right before launch
(because anomalies had been detected) used a
default set of constants to filter the measured roll
rate instead of the actual constants, and thus
were unsuccessful in detecting the error. After
wiring errors were discovered in the MPL testing
process, for undisclosed reasons the tests
necessary to detect the software flaw were not
rerun.
• An independent verification and validation
program was developed and approved that does
not verify or validate the I1 filter rate constants
used in flight.
• No formal processes exists to check validity of
the I1 filter constants or monitor attitude rates
once the flight tape is loaded in the Inertial
Navigation Unit at Cape Canaveral Air Station
prior to launch.
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Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0
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System
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Insight

Evidence
In the Milstar satellite loss, the Titan Program
Office had no permanently assigned civil service
or military personnel nor full-time support to
“work” the Titan/Centaur software. They had
decided that because the software was “mature,
stable, and had not experienced problems in the
past,” they could best use their limited resources
available after the initial development effort to
address hardware issues. The Titan program
office had cut support for monitoring the
software development and test process by 50%
since 1994 and had greatly cut the number of
engineers working launch operations.
The Titan/Centaur accident report, for example,
notes that “fragmentation/stove piping in the
flight software development process, coupled
with the lack of an overall defined process,
resulted in poor and inadequate communication
and interfacing among the many partners and
sub processes.” The report suggests that many of
the various partners were confused about what
the other groups were doing. For example, the
LMA software group personnel who created the
database from which the erroneous load tape
constants were generated, were not aware that
the independent verification and validation
testing did not use the as-flown constants but
instead used default values...
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Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
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Evidence
The company responsible for the independent
verification and validation (Analex-Denver) did
not know that the division actually doing the
independent verification and validation (AnalexCleveland) was only verifying the functionality
of the design constant and not what was actually
loaded into the Centaur for flight. The Defense
Contract Management Command software
surveillance personnel were not aware that the
filter constants contained in the flight software
were generated by a manual input and were
never tested by LMA in their preflight
simulation nor subjected to independent
verification and validation by Analex-Cleveland
The roll rate filter itself was included early in the
design phase of the first Milstar spacecraft, but
the spacecraft manufacturer later determined that
filtering was not required at that frequency. A
decision was made to leave the filter in place for
the first and later Milstar flights for
“consistency.”
Inadequate and indirect communication among
the responsible parties prevented correction of
the problem observed during testing at Cape
Canaveral Air Station prior to launch.
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de Havilland Comet
Hierarchic Verification
Insight
Optimization

No data to tie other principles to reuse
components

Lockheed Constellation
Hierarchic Verification
Insight
Optimization

No data to tie other principles to reuse
components

Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

ZR-2 (R-38) Airship

Hierarchic Verification

The British Airship copied a German zeppelin
designed to operate at altitudes of over 20,000
feet. However, the British nor the Americans
involved with the project seemed aware of the
significance of aerodynamic loads to airship
design. The British committee, to its
amazement, learned that Campbell had not taken
aerodynamics into account when formulating his
design.
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Principle
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Evidence
Its design was a virtually exact copy of the
German L-55, a high-altitude type featuring a
much lighter structure than the normal
construction. During the acceptance trials, 'R38'
crashed and burned while maneuvering sharply
at low altitude. The Court of Inquiry found that
weather conditions did not contribute to the
crash, and that the airship's structure was not
faulty in fabrication. The most likely explanation
seemed to be that the light structure, designed
for the modest flight loads at high-altitude, was
stressed by the flight loads associated with lowaltitude aerobatics.
N/A
N/A
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Principle Violation to Reuse Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0
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Roma Airship

Hierarchic Verification
Insight
Optimization

Roma airship replaces Ansaldo engines with
American-built Liberty Engines. The engines were
replaced by February 1922 and the first flight with
then new engines was scheduled for February 21,
1922. This left little time for testing or analysis.
Testing after the crash pointed to aerodynamic
loads on the nose from the more powerful engines:
General Orvil Anderson, an experienced lighterthan-air pilot, believed that the speed of the Roma
smashed the nose. He conducted tests in an
American built semi-rigid dirigible, the RS-1. The
nose of this airship caved in at 59 mph and General
Anderson wrote that, "The weaker nose structure
of the Roma and the lower internal pressure at
which it was flown should have triggered a nose
collapse at 55-56mph.”
Lessons Learned from the crash:
Improved airship testing—RS-1 airship tests at
Scott Field 1925-1926
•Use of 1/33-scale water model testing
•Extensive ground testing preceded first flight test
•Flight test with experienced crew
•Finding: semi-rigid airship envelope and keel are
mutually dependent to maintain structural integrity
•Recommendations for future airship testing and
instrumentation
N/A
N/A
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Principle Violation to Reuse
Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

Black Arrow

Insight

The budget was so tight - only 9 million British Pounds that the engines were refined in ground trials rather than
development flights.
The schedule allowed twenty-nine working days for the
assembly and prelaunch testing, or with breaks, six weeks.
There was plenty to do: separate test- firings of the first
and second stage engines, the step by step assembly of the
complete rocket on Launcher 5B, a series of radio
transmission and interference checks, and finally a
rehearsal of the launching sequence to ensure that
each part of the operating chain functioned correctly.
N/A

Optimization

N/A

Hierarchic
Verification

Because the apparatus had been used on a previous X-15-1
flight, controllers assumed that the traversing probe and
associated motor conformed to the engineering practices
of the day, when in fact it had never been tested.
Furthermore, the airplane on which the apparatus had last
flown lacked the sensitive electric systems with which
X-15-3 was equipped. If a corona discharge had occurred
on X-15-1 for example, it would have gone unnoticed.
Tests later showed that using a capacitor with the proper
rating would not have prevented the corona discharge, but
these findings highlight the lack of hardware qualification
and testing procedures related to the flight.

Hierarchic
Verification

[11]

[179]

X-15

322

[91]

3

Table E-1 Continued

System

Principle

Evidence
Mishap investigators determined that the electrical
disturbance had been initiated by an electrical arc from a
traversing probe carried in the aircraft’s right wingtip pod.
•Testing later showed that the traversing probe’s capacitor
exhibited electrical arcing tendencies at pressures
equivalent to 80,000-90,000 ft.
•The traversing probe had been used on a previous X-15-1
flight. No qualification requirements existed at that time,
and project personnel believed the component was safe to
use.
Harry Shapiro, an engineer on the external tank system
had this to say "The electrical system we had on the X-15
was 1950 vintage, yet we were putting in this computer
that was 1960 vintage. It needed precision power. The
two things were not compatible. The pulses that brute
force system put spikes back into the computer and made
the computer go offline..."
The traversing probe experiment produced electrical
problems yet was found to have never gone through
altitude testing before being mounted aboard a rocket
plane that took it into space. Instead of questioning this
lack of testing, someone assumed that since it had flown
before it was good enough.
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The NESC assessment confirmed that the root cause of the
accident was an electrical disturbance originating from an
experiment package using a commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) component that had not been properly qualified
for the X-15 flight environment. Notably, the risks of
accelerated and/or limited flight qualification of COTS
components have been highlighted in other recent
assessments by the NESC. These assessments are
referenced in the final report.
N/A

Optimization

N/A
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Principle Violation to Reuse
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Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

X-43
The X-43A HXLV failed because the vehicle control
design was deficient for the trajectory flown due to
inaccurate analytical models (Pegasus Heritage and HXLV
specific), which overestimated the system margins.
What the engineers did not realize prior to the first X-43A
launch was that the conditions being tested were outside
the designed test case. The original Pegasus models were
designed with the 40,000 foot launch altitude as an
assumption. The use of a different altitude was not
factored into the models, the result being that the models
were not valid design tools for the lower altitude launch
situation being considered.

Hierarchic
Verification

"Now we also had a certain amount of direction at the
beginning of the project that we would treat the launch
vehicle as a quasi-off-the-shelf system. It was proven
hardware. It was a proven launch system. We were just
modifying it slightly --- or not so slightly. And what we
wanted to do was focus on those changes in the launch
vehicle, not the things that were similar between the
HXLV and Pegasus. We inherited a number of things.
One of them was the launch vehicle wind-tunnel model.
And we'd modified now, of course, the research vehicle on
the front end. So we went into the wind tunnels, and we
didn't want to design a new wind-tunnel model; we didn't
see a reason to.
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[134]

3

Table E-1 Continued

System

Principle

Evidence
Root Cause: The X-43A HXLV failed because the vehicle
control system design was deficient for the trajectory
flown due to inaccurate analytical models (Pegasus
heritage and HXLV specific), which overestimated the
system margins.

Source

The key phenomenon that triggered the mishap was the
divergent roll oscillatory motion at a 2.5 Hz frequency.
−The divergence was primarily caused by excessive
control system gain.
A second phenomenon that was a consequence of the
divergent roll oscillation was a stall of the rudder actuator
that accelerated the loss of control.
Neither phenomenon was predicted by preflight analyses.
The analytical modeling deficiencies resulted from a
combination of factors.

Insight
Optimization

The major contributors to the mishap were modeling
inaccuracies in the fin actuation system, modeling
inaccuracies in the aerodynamics and insufficient
variations of modeling parameters (parametric uncertainty
analysis). Pegasus heritage and HXLV specific models
were found to be inaccurate.
N/A
N/A
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[133]

Principle Violation to Reuse
Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

Table E-1 Continued

System

Principle

Evidence

Source

Hierarchic
Verification
Insight
Optimization

No data to tie other principles to reuse components

Hierarchic
Verification

Boeing attributed the loss to "improper analytical
assumptions in the dynamic models, and poor
communication between two design engineering groups".

Principle Violation to Reuse
Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

Athena

Delta-3
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[11]

3

Table E-1 Continued

System

Principle

Evidence
An investigation quickly determined that the rocket had
begun to suffer 4 Hertz roll oscillations about 50 seconds
after liftoff, when the RIFCA system loaded a new set of
flight control system gain constants - something that it did
every 10 to 15 seconds as the rocket flew through differing
phases of flight. The roll oscillation was created when the
RS27A and three of the ground-lit solid motors vectored in
a way that amplified a natural 4 Hertz resonance of the
vehicle. As the system fought the resonance, it rapidly
used up its hydraulic fluid. At T+65 seconds, the fluid ran
out, leaving the solid motor nozzles stuck in their final
position. The RS-27A system tried to correct, but was
unable to counteract the forces created by the powerful
solids. Delta 259 began to pitch over at T+72 seconds,
and break apart, its final destruction ensured by a flight
termination system.

Source

The Delta 3 guidance system, it turned out, had not been
designed to handle the particular 4 Hertz roll mode that led
to the failure. During Delta 3 development, McDonnell
Douglas/Boeing designers had identified 56 roll modes.
Extensive Delta 2 flight data had shown that the most
significant roll mode at liftoff remained dominant
throughout the first stage flight. The team assumed,
incorrectly, that Delta 3 would behave in a similar fashion.
Since the 4 Hertz roll mode was not significant at Delta 3
liftoff, the designers had not added its effects into the
control system.
[147]
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Principle Violation to Reuse
Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

Table E-1 Continued

System

Principle

Evidence

Source

But Delta 3 used substantially heavier, more powerful
solid motors than Delta 2. While three of the Delta 3
solids used thrust vector control, none of the Delta 2 solids
provided steering. It turned out that Delta 3's 4 Hertz roll
mode did become more significant as the solid motor
propellant was consumed.
Analysts noted, in hindsight of course, that full vehicle
dynamic testing or more extensive flight control analyses
would have discovered the roll oscillation before the
launch.
When designing the roll aspects of the control system, 56
roll modes were identified. A 4 hertz (cycles per second)
roll mode caused the roll instability seen in the Delta III
launch. A mode is the characteristic pattern of movement
or shape an object takes as it vibrates. "Past flight data
with Delta II shows the most significant roll mode at
liftoff remains the dominant mode throughout the first
phase of flight," Quan said. "This data drove the design of
the control system; because the 4 hertz roll mode was not
significant at liftoff it was not designed into the control
system."
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[185]

Principle Violation to Reuse
Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

Table E-1 Continued

System

Principle

Insight

Evidence
Boeing attributed the loss to "improper analytical
assumptions in the dynamic models, and poor
communication between two design engineering groups".
Boeing blamed the design flaw, in part, on lack of
communication between design group

Optimization

Source

[11]

Principle Violation to Reuse
Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

0

[147]

N/A

Patriot Scud Interceptor
Hierarchic
Verification

Insight

A software modification introduced the 'bug'. Conjecture:
Presumably an effective endurance test was not run.
In fact, because the Patriot system was not intended to run
for extended times, it was probably never tested under
those conditions, explaining why the problem was not
discovered until the war was in progress.
Army officials said that they believed the Israeli
experience was atypical-they assumed other Patriot users
were not running their systems for 8 or more hours at a
time.
The Patriot system was originally designed to operate in
Europe against Soviet medium- to high-altitude aircraft
and cruise missiles traveling at speeds up to about MACH
2 (1500 mph). To avoid detection it was designed to be
mobile and operate for only a few hours at one location.
The Patriot had never before been used to defend against
Scud missiles nor was it expected to operate continuously
for long periods of time.
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[152]

3

[94]

[186]

3

Table E-1 Continued

System

Principle

Optimization

Evidence
One such constraint was that the designers did not expect
the Patriot system to operate for more than a few hours at
a time--it was expected to be used in a mobile unit rather
than at a fixed location. They also made other design
decisions which later caused failures when the Army
modified the Patriot for anti-missile defense.
N/A

Source

Principle Violation to Reuse
Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

[94]

R101 Airship

Hierarchic
Verification

Insight
Optimization

The engineers were not as enthusiastic as Thomson,
because the rebuilt ship had not yet passed its test trials,
nor had it received its certificate of airworthiness. The
certificate was required to fly legally. As political
pressure mounted for Thomson's flight to depart as
planned, a conditional certificate was issued, stipulating
that full-speed trials be carried out during the voyage.
The people who built and flew the airship were especially
worried since the rebuilt ship had been given no time for
meaningful trail flights. In fact, it had not yet received a
certificate of airworthiness, which was necessary for it to
fly legally. As political pressure mounted for the flight to
depart on schedule, the rules were bent and a certificate
was issued on condition that full-speed trials be carried out
during the voyage.
N/A
N/A

331

[44]

[12]

3

Table E-1 Continued

System

Principle

Evidence

Source

Hierarchic
Verification

Although a new version, it relied heavily on well-tested
rockets: the main stages were essentially those of the
Long March 3A while the strap-on rockets had been
verified on the Long March 2E. However, because the
Chinese had received less than they had hoped in launch
fees, they did not have the resources to make a test flight
of the 3B before committing the new rocket to its first
commercial mission. This proved to be disastrous.

[168]

Insight
Optimization

Failure attributed to guidance system shortcomings
(deterioration of gold/aluminum connections in a power
amp for the IMU).
N/A
N/A

Principle Violation to Reuse
Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

Long March 3B
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[187]

3

Table E-1 Continued

System

Principle

Evidence

Source

Aerospace America (2/28) reported that the clock error
which prevented the Boeing Starliner from successfully
completing its December OFT “could have been found
with more complete testing, a Boeing official told
reporters Friday.” The Boeing Company and ULA had
tested the integration of the Atlas V rocket with the
Starliner capsule during launch. However, “in hindsight,
engineers wish they had kept the simulation going after the
capsule separated from the rocket.” Boeing Commercial
Crew Program Manager John Mulholland said during a
Friday teleconference, “If we would have run the
integrated test with ULA through the first orbital insertion
burn timeframe, we would have seen that we would have
missed the orbital insertion burn.” Rather than “simulating
an entire mission from launch to docking, ‘the team
decided they would rather run multiple tests with chunks
of the mission,’ Mulholland said.” Mulholland added,
“Going forward, for every flight, we will do launch to
docking and undocking to landing in addition to the other
tests we were doing in our qualification testing.”
The Washington Post (2/28) reported that Mulholland
said, “From a hindsight standpoint, it’s very easy to see
what we should have done because we uncovered an error.
But I really don’t want anyone to have the impression that
this team tried to take shortcuts. They didn’t. They did an
abundance of testing.”

[99]

Boeing Starliner

Hierarchic
Verification
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Principle Violation to Reuse
Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

Table E-1 Continued

System

Principle

Evidence
Boeing also had an issue with testing for “the moment
when the service module was to separate from the crew
module just prior to re-entry into the atmosphere.” Boeing
scheduled a “hot fire” thruster test for the same time that a
software test was supposed to happen. Therefore, to test
the software, Boeing was only able to use an emulator.
However, “the emulator had the wrong thruster
configuration programmed in.”

Insight
Optimization
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Source

[190]

Principle Violation to Reuse
Attribution
Directly Attributable to Reuse = 3
Inferred Connection to Reuse = 2
Speculated Connection to Reuse = 1
No Evidence = 0

APPENDIX F

Evidence for Common Programmatic and Technical Decisions and Postures

System
Genesis:

Decisions and Programmatic Posturing Evidence
Although it was recognized that the final Genesis AU was not strictly a heritage design (since
it was extensively modified from the Stardust design), many team members viewed it as
maintaining much of its heritage and, hence, requiring less scrutiny in design and
verification. An erroneous belief that the SRC-AU was a heritage, or partially a heritage
design, and unfounded confidence in heritage designs in general led to five errors that
contributed to the mishap.
1. The key drogue deployment requirement in the SRC-AU specification was recycled from
Stardust without reconsideration;
2. Stardust schematics were used without reconsideration;
3. the design reviews focused less attention to the details of the design of the pyro firing
circuitry, because greater confidence than was justified was placed in it due to its heritage;
4. Verification of the G-switch sensor orientation by similarity to the Stardust heritage design
was performed (and performed incorrectly); and
5. One of the Red Team Focus Groups that reviewed the SRC-AU did not review the design
or the verification methodology, because they considered the likelihood of a design or
verification issue with a heritage design to be unlikely.
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Source

[62]

The FBC philosophy was, in part, based on the assumption that the use of
heritage hardware would reduce costs, schedule, and technical risks and
reduce verification process requirements. The assumption that heritage
hardware could reduce cost and schedule risks was perhaps well founded, but
such an argument regarding technical risks could only be made after a
thorough technical review of the design and its verification in the Genesisspecific application. In summary, there existed a major misconception within
much of the JPL and LMSS leadership and within the Red Team that heritage
hardware meant a lower standard of review and verification was acceptable.
Had the same standards as those applied to new hardware been applied to the
SRC-AU, it is likely that the design error would not have occurred or
would have been discovered during verification.

ARIANE-5
Re-evaluation and analyses of parameters from one system to the next
(ARIANE 4 to 5) not understood - need to evaluate thoroughly deemed "not
necessary".
The philosophy of the ARIANE 5 program, as stated in the accident report,
that it was not wise to change software that had worked well on the ARIANE
4 unless it was proven necessary to do so is well founded: Errors are often
introduced when software is changed, particularly by those who did not
originally write it, as occurred with SOHO.
On ARIANE 5, this rapid realignment function does not serve any purpose,
nevertheless, it had been retained for commonality reasons.
Competitiveness on cost was essential, because when the development began
Arianespace had expected the competition to be "old" US vehicles, whereas
since then the Americans had announced plans to build a new range of
launchers with a view to cutting costs.
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[82]

[81]
[82]

[11]

MCO
According to the MCO developers, the small forces software was reused
from the Mars Global Surveyor project, with the substitution of a new
thruster equation. Technical management accepted the “just like MGS”
argument and did not focus on the details of the software. The SOHO
software was changed without appropriate analysis of the changes.
In the MCO project, and again in the MPL project, there is evidence of
inadequate communications between the project elements, including the
development and operations teams, the operations navigation and operations
teams, the project management and technical teams, and the project and
technical line management.
Poor coordination between teams doomed the Mars Climate Orbiter and
inadequate testing had resulted in the loss of the Mars Polar Lander. The
underlying commonality was the relentless pressure to drive down costs.

[81]

[42]

[11]

Contour
Significant reliance on subcontractors who were not integrated into the
project.
Since ATK generally worked with clients who were familiar with SRMs,
they were accustomed to clients who would already know how to integrate
the generic motor into their design. If APL had formally stated ATK’s
integral role in providing SRM expertise, ATK might have become more
involved in the specifics of the SRM design and provided advice on how to
integrate the SRM with the rest of the spacecraft.
To further compensate for APL’s lack of in-house SRM expertise, APL
relied on a consultant’s dynamic analysis for the SRM firing. The consultant
operated under several misconceptions that the project team did not
scrutinize.
Separation between the contractors and subcontractors meant that
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[85]

information and expertise in one group was not shared with other groups on
the project team.
The CONTOUR Project also relinquished responsibility of spacecraft
dynamic analysis for SRM firing to a consultant, and relied heavily on the
consultant’s findings and conclusions to verify the sufficiency of the
spacecraft design. The lack of in-depth Project oversight resulted in several
deficiencies in analysis for the SRM firing event that concerned both
performance and stability, although neither are believed to have contributed
to the mishap.
The concern is not whether the subcontractors were competent, but whether
the CONTOUR Project was sufficiently involved to ensure that the
subcontractors were provided all the information needed to perform their
tasks, and to question and penetrate the subcontractor analyses and
conclusions for appropriate application to CONTOUR.

[109]

SOHO
The verification process was accomplished using a NASA computer-based
simulator. There was no code walk-through as well as no independent review
either by ESA, MMS, or an entity directly involved in the change
implementation.
[189]
Lewis
The largely undefined FBC paradigm encouraged the use of heritage
hardware and software as a means of saving the expense of design
verification testing and analysis.
The ACS system verification was likewise flawed. The verification activity
modeled a limited set of nominal, on orbit attitude control cases, failing to
model a thruster imbalance scenario that ultimately led to the loss of the
spacecraft.
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[88]

Inadequate test and verification of heritage hardware/software: – The ACS
verification process failed to address the improper application of software
designed for a much different spacecraft. – FBC encouraged the use of
heritage hardware and software, but verification procedures were slim and
often only modeled a limited set of nominal scenarios.
[174]
Mars Observer
There was far too much reliance on heritage for spacecraft hardware,
software and procedures, especially given that the Mars Observer
mission was fundamentally different from the mission of the satellites
from which the heritage was derived.
The original philosophy of minor modifications to a commercial, productionline spacecraft was retained throughout the program. The result was
reliance on design and component heritage and qualification which were
inappropriate for the mission. Examples include the failure to fully
qualify the TWTs for operation during pyro-fling events, the design
of the propulsion system, and the use of fault-management software
that was not fully understood.
[125]
Centaur/Milstar
In the Milstar satellite loss, the Titan Program Office had no permanently
assigned civil service or military personnel nor full-time support to “work”
the Titan/Centaur software. They had decided that because the software was
“mature, stable, and had not experienced problems in the past,” they could
best use their limited resources available after the initial development effort
to address hardware issues. The Titan program office had cut support for
monitoring the software development and test process by 50% since 1994
and had greatly cut the number of engineers working launch operations.
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[81]

The roll rate filter itself was included early in the design phase of the first
Milstar spacecraft, but the spacecraft manufacturer later determined that
filtering was not required at that frequency. A decision was made to leave the
filter in place for the first and later Milstar flights for “consistency.”
[81]
ZR-2 (R-38) Airship
The British Airship copied a German zeppelin designed to operate at
altitudes of over 20,000 feet. However, the British nor the Americans
involved with the project seemed aware of the significance of aerodynamic
loads to airship design. The British committee, to its amazement, learned
that Campbell had not taken aerodynamics into account when formulating
his design.

[12]

Roma Airship
The Americans replaced the Ansaldo engines with the American built
Liberty engines due to part availability, and familiarity

[12]
[139]

The budget was so tight - only 9 million British Pounds - which the engines
were refined in ground trials rather than development flights.

[11]

Black Arrow
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X-15
Because the apparatus had been used on a previous X-15-1 flight, controllers
assumed that the traversing probe and associated motor conformed to the
engineering practices of the day, when in fact it had never been tested.
Harry Shapiro, an engineer on the external tank system had this to say "The
electrical system we had on the X-15 was 1950 vintage, yet we were putting
in this computer that was 1960 vintage. It needed precision power. The two
things were not compatible. The pulses that brute force system put spikes
back into the computer and made the computer go offline..."

[91]

The traversing probe experiment produced electrical problems yet was found
to have never gone through altitude testing before being mounted aboard a
rocket plane that took it into space. Instead of questioning this lack of
testing, someone assumed that since it had flown before it was good enough.
The traversing probe experiment produced electrical problems, yet was
found to have never gone through altitude testing before being mounted
aboard a rocket plane that took it into space. Instead of questioning this lack
of testing, someone assumed that since it had flown before it was good
enough.

[183]

X-43a
Now we also had a certain amount of direction at the beginning of the project
that we would treat the launch vehicle as a quasi-off-the-shelf system. It was
proven hardware. It was a proven launch system. We were just modifying it
slightly --- or not so slightly. And what we wanted to do was focus on those
changes in the launch vehicle, not the things that were similar between the
HXLV and Pegasus. We inherited a number of things. One of them was the
launch vehicle wind-tunnel model. And we'd modified now, of course, the
research vehicle on the front end. So we went into the wind tunnels, and we
didn't want to design a new wind-tunnel model; we didn't see a reason to.
[134]
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Delta-3
An independent mission assurance review led by Shelia E. Windall, a former
Secretary of the Air Force concluded in November that the task of
developing the Delta III had been underestimated by Boeing, which was
ironic considering that it was to have been a low-risk upgrade of the Delta II.

[11]

Patriot Scud Interceptor
Army officials said that they believed the Israeli experience was atypicalthey assumed other Patriot users were not running their systems for 8 or
more hours at a time.
The Patriot system was originally designed to operate in Europe against
Soviet medium- to high-altitude aircraft and cruise missiles traveling at
speeds up to about MACH 2 (1500 mph). To avoid detection it was designed
to be mobile and operate for only a few hours at one location.
The Patriot had never before been used to defend against Scud missiles nor
was it expected to operate continuously for long periods of time.

[186]

R101 Airship
The engineers were not as enthusiastic as Thomson, because the rebuilt ship
had not yet passed its test trials, nor had it received its certificate of
airworthiness. The certificate was required to fly legally. As political
pressure mounted for Thomson's flight to depart as planned, a conditional
certificate was issued, stipulating that full-speed trials be carried out during
the voyage.
The people who built and flew the airship were especially worried since the
rebuilt ship had been given no time for meaningful trail flights. In fact, it
had not yet received a certificate of airworthiness, which was necessary for it
to fly legally. As political pressure mounted for the flight to depart on
schedule, the rules were bent and a certificate was issued on condition that
full-speed trials be carried out during the voyage.
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[44]

[12]

Long March 3B
Although a new version, it relied heavily on well-tested rockets: the main
stages were essentially those of the Long March 3A while the strap-on
rockets had been verified on the Long March 2E. However, because the
Chinese had received less than they had hoped in launch fees, they did not
have the resources to make a test flight of the 3B before committing the new
rocket to its first commercial mission. This proved to be disastrous.

[168]

Boeing Starliner's first unmanned flight failed in December, because the
aerospace giant divided its tests in small chunks instead of conducting longer
tests that simulate the whole process from launch to docking. Starliner
program manager John Mulholland has revealed at a teleconference that the
company thought it would be "more logical to break the mission phases into
chunks and do a lot of testing in those smaller chunks." Doing a single test
run from launch to docking takes over 25 hours, after all.
NASA and Boeing formed a team to investigate what happened, and a report
recently published by Orlando Sentinel said that the fact that the company
didn't do an end-to-end test took NASA by surprise.
Aside from not conducting a launch-to-docking simulation, Boeing also
didn't test the Starliner's software against its service module. Boeing
scheduled the spacecraft's software test and a "hot fire" test of the module's
thrusters at the same time. That's why the service module was in a different
location, and the company had to use an emulator in its place. The emulator
turned out to be flawed, though, and the investigation team found a critical
software defect that could've led to "loss of vehicle."

[190]

Boeing
Starliner
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APPENDIX G

Evaluation of Evidence for Common Programmatic and Technical Decisions and
Postures
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H0 = HV1 and Reuse
Implementation Success are not
associated.
P-Value ~ 0.000: Therefore, the
null-hypothesis can be rejected.

Figure G-1: Reuse Success and HV1 Chi-Square Results
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H0 = HV2 and Reuse Implementation Success are not
associated.
P-Value ~ 0.000: Therefore, the null-hypothesis can
be rejected.

Figure G-2: Reuse Success and HV2 Chi-Square Results
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H0 = O and Reuse Implementation Success are not
associated.
P-Value > 0.01: Therefore, the null-hypothesis
cannot be rejected.

Figure G-3: Reuse Success and O Chi-Square Results
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H0 = I1 and Reuse Implementation Success are not
associated.
P-Value < 0.01: Therefore, the null-hypothesis can
be rejected.

Figure G-4: Reuse Success and I1 Chi-Square Results
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H0 = I2 and Reuse Implementation Success are not
associated.
P-Value < 0.01: Therefore, the null-hypothesis can
be rejected.

Figure G-5: Reuse Success and I2 Chi-Square Results
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